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Managing the Human Service Market: 
The Case of Long-Term Care in Japan
 2 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
 
Providing human service through competitive markets is inherently 
problematic (Lipsky, 1980; Nyman, 1994; Wiener et al, 2007; Donabedian, 1988; 
Hunsmann, 1980).  On one hand, governments in the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member nations cannot 
afford to respond directly to today’s human service needs.  The bureaucratic 
model that led to an adherence to prescribed procedures has proved 
unsustainable, because human service needs to be flexible to respond to the 
rapid changes in society (Thomas, 2006).  In this context, non-government 
sectors1 are more flexible and specialized in the service field.  Nonetheless, 
human service provision through competitive markets tends to leave the users 
vulnerable to the profit-driven whims of private-sector providers.  Unlike 
choosing a grocery store that can be easily replaced by others, the choice of 
necessary human service providers such as nursing homes, disability care 
institutes, and childcare centres, greatly influences peoples’ quality of life.   A 
notable example is that a great number of elderly people have suffered from 
unsatisfactory care for decades in the competitive market of long-term care for 
the elderly (OECD, 2005). 
 
This thesis examines the provision of long-term care for the elderly through 
competitive markets, considering the capacity of governments to ensure the 
quality of care.  The cases of several OECD members are used, but the case of 
Japan, which has the biggest demand of such care provision per capita, is 
primarily investigated. Two research questions guide the empirical research:  
1. How should governments design the human service market in order 
to keep the capacity to ensure the quality of service? 
                                                   
1 Non-profit sector and for-profit (private) sector. 
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2. How should governments set the performance measurement? 
 
To this end, the empirical study is divided into two parts.  Part I first reveals 
the weaknesses of the existing care quality model (hereinafter, Existing CQM) 
in which the providers can sacrifice the quality of care to market competition.  
The research then presents an alternative care quality model that aims to direct 
the market competition to enhance the quality of care. To justify the validity of 
the alternative model, the research denies the effects of the conflicting market 
theories, such as Hansmann’s (1980) Conflict Failure model, the Medical Arms 
Race model, and Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model.  Part II presents an 
alternative, process-based performance measurement, propounding a 
theoretical modification to the existing public administration theory.  The 
research points out that unsatisfactory care problems have continued because 
the existing outcome-based performance measurement conflicts with the 
ambiguous policy goals of human service.  Since human service provision 
inevitably has ambiguous policy goals and a considerable amount of (care) 
service workers’ discretion, the research claims that governments need to 
evaluate the process, rather than the outcomes.  The research then modifies the 
existing model to highlight the care workers’ behaviour and training.  Finally, 
there is an examination of the generalization of the presented models in 
long-term care to other human service provisions. 
 
A simple thesis recurs throughout the analysis and findings presented in this 
study: 
1. Governments need to implement a care quality model to direct the 
market competition to enhance the quality of services. 
2. Governments need to develop a process-based performance 
measurement that focuses on the behaviour and training of care 
workers. 
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From this thesis, three main arguments flow. First, governments need to strike a 
balance between market contestability and service quality assurance. On one 
hand, market contestability is necessary for sustainable human service 
provisions because it promotes necessary innovations and flexibilities. On the 
other hand, however, the contestability accommodates inexpensive low-quality 
care in market. Governments are required to direct the contestability for the 
positive sides of the market. Second, governments need to introduce systems to 
provide users with service quality information about the providers. In human 
service markets, users often cannot choose a provider based on its service 
quality, because there is information asymmetry between users and providers. 
Third, governments need to develop process-based performance measurement 
for human services; they should not rely on outcome-based performance 
measurement. The policy goals of human service are inevitably ambiguous, and 
therefore, notoriously difficult to be measured in a meaningful way (Lipsky, 
1980).  
 
 
The Research Problem 
 
The problem of human service provision through competitive markets 
originates from the contradiction between the mission of human service and the 
nature of markets. Since human service aims to meet basic developmental and 
care needs of people, human service provisions need strong moral and 
government imperatives to ensure at least some minimum level of service for 
everyone and to avoid poor service to anyone. However, the nature of 
competitive markets allows poor quality of care to exist. Suppose q indicates 
quality and p indicates price. The provided services in competitive markets can 
be expressed as Y=x (q, p). In this formula, the market accommodates a wide 
range of quality from very good to very poor. This range may be acceptable in 
 5 
consumer items, but not in human service.   
 
In practice, many governments have tried to eliminate the poor quality of 
services by implementing regulatory policies. They have imposed minimum 
requirements for service providers such as care workers/ care recipients ratios, 
complaint offices, and emergent access to hospitals and governments can 
suspend the businesses of the providers who do not meet the regulations.   
 
However, the quality of human service is very difficult to measure. There is no 
absolute single measurement of human service quality (Donabedian, 1987). 
Moreover, what to measure varies from time to time. In the long-term care 
market, for instance, physical abuse by caregivers was a unique signal of 
disqualified care several decades ago. Nonetheless, such a signal is no longer 
sufficient today. Mental abuse and neglect by caregivers must also be 
recognized because required care has continuously been changing.   
Governments need to strike a balance between the mission of human service 
and the nature of competitive markets, but such models, in terms of market 
design and performance measurement, have not yet been established. This is 
the problem of human service provisions through competitive markets. 
 
 
Investigating the Case of Long-Term Care for the Elderly 
 
The case of long-tem care for the elderly (hereinafter, long-term care) provides 
an excellent opportunity to undertake a systematic analysis of this problem. 
First, most OECD nations have chosen to provide long-term care through 
competitive markets in order to respond to the increasing needs. Long-term  
 
 6 
care has already occupied the biggest number of users2 in human service in 
these nations. The next decades will see further expansion of these numbers.  
Second, in long-term care, governments are strongly required by moral 
imperatives to ensure a certain level of service in the market. Frail elderly, 
especially those who suffer from cognitive problems, often cannot exercise their 
consumer rights by leaving and complaining. Moreover, many of them need to 
rely on care for many years of their lives. The lessons leant from long-term care 
provision, therefore, have strong adaptability to other fields of human service. 
 
Third, the research outcomes in long-term care will remain important for many 
decades. Today, OECD members are almost the only group of nations that face 
the challenge of long-term care provision through competitive markets. 
However, many other nations are expected to deal with the same problem in 
the near future. For instance, the speed of aging populations in East Asia is 
much faster than that of OECD members. Table 1-1 indicates the shift from an 
aging society3 to an aged society4 in many East Asian nations - regions such as 
China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand - 
with the comparison to that of developed nations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
2 This may be varied by the definition of human service. This thesis, however, defines 
long-term care, childcare, and handicapped care as the fields of human service. Among 
them, long-term care commonly has the largest number of users in OECD nations. For 
further definition of human service, please refer to page 11. 
3 The share of older people (aged 65 or above) in the population is over 7% (United 
Nations, 2006). 
4 The share of older people (aged 65 or above) in the population is over 14% (United Nations, 
2006). 
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Table 1- 1. The Speed of the shift of Aging to Aged Society in East Asian Nations 
 Reached Year of 
Aging Society: Share 
of Older people (aged 
65+) in the population 
is 7% or more  
Reached Year of 
Aged Society: Share 
of Older people (aged 
65+)in the population 
is 14% or more 
Elapsed Years 
Hong Kong 1983 2014 31 years 
Taiwan 1993 2018 25 years 
Singapore 1999 2016 17 years 
China 2002 2026 24 years 
Thailand 2002 2024 22 years 
Malaysia 2020 2043 23 years 
Indonesia 2018 2039 21 years 
More developed 
regions* 
1950** 2000 50 years+ 
OECD average -*** 2006 - 
* More developed regions, defined by United Nations (2008), comprise all regions of Europe plus 
Northern America, Australia/New Zealand and Japan. 
** The ratio of older people in the population is already 7.9% in that year, but the data prior to 1950 is not 
available.   
*** The oldest information available is in 1970 with the proportion of 9.6%. 
Source: United Nations (2008) and OECD (2009) 
 
 
Why Study the Case of Japan? 
 
Although this research investigates the cases of various OECD member nations, 
the focus is on the case of Japan. There are three main reasons. First, Japan is the 
front-runner of aging societies. As shown in Figure 1-1, the share of very old 
people in the population in Japan is the highest and it is expected to keep the 
position for the next decades. This means the Japanese government faces the 
most pressing requirement to cope with the problem of long-term care 
provision through a competitive market.   
 
Second, Japan deals with this challenge very well. In fact, the expense of 
long-term care per capita in Japan is among the smallest (see Figure 2-1 in 
Chapter 2). That is, the government efficiently utilizes the innovation and 
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flexibility of a competitive market in long-term care provision. Moreover, 
according to comparative care quality-assurance research by Wiener et al (2007: 
5), long-term care in Japan is perceived as the least problematic in terms of care 
quality. This implies that the government successfully ensures the quality of 
care in a competitive market.   
 
Third, there is almost a complete absence of documentation of the Japanese 
model in the literature. Despite the fact that Japan performs well in terms of 
human service (long-term care) provision through a competitive market, very 
little research has investigated the model provided by Japan5. The majority of 
the research in this area comes from the United States6.  
 
Figure 1-1. The Share of Very Old People (aged 80+)  
in the Populations of Selected OECD Members 
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Note: Most long-term care recipients belong to the age group of very old (aged 80 years and more) 
(OECD, 2005). 
Data Source: United Nations (2008) 
                                                   
5 Notable exceptions are the market new entry models by Nanbu (2000) and Suzuki and 
Satake (2001). 
6 For example, Scanlon (1980), Nyman (1985), Dusansky (1989), Gertler (1989, 1992), 
Gertler and Waldman (1992), and Norton (2000). 
 9 
 
Research Design and Methods 
 
In studying how governments can strike a balance between the missions of 
human service provisions and the nature of competitive markets, this research 
takes a model-testing approach. Specifically, Part I presents a new market 
design - called “Ideal CQM” - in order for governments to direct the market 
competition to enhance care quality7. The research then tests the applicability, 
workability, and financial sustainability of the model by primarily analysing the 
case of the Japanese long-term care market. Part II of this thesis also presents 
and tests a model. The research ensures the applicability and financial 
sustainability of presenting process-based performance measurement model.  
 
Given such multi-dimensioned processes of the testing, the research inevitably 
combines diverse methods and both quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
An outline and summary of these methods is provided in Table 1-2 and 
discussed in the followings; each individual chapter contains further about the 
methods being used. 
                                                   
7 Otherwise, the market competition, to some extent, sacrifices the quality of care. 
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Table 1-2. Summary of Research Design and Methodology 
Case Analysis (Japan)Market ResearchApplicability of care workers’
training Financial 
Sustainability of care 
workers’ training
Test 59
Case Studies (Japan and the United 
States)
Street-Level Bureaucracy (Lipsky, 1980)
Logic of Governance (Lynn et al, 2001)
Applicability of behaviour 
measurement
Test 48
Model-TestingStreet-Level Bureaucracy (Lipsky, 
1980)
Logic of Governance (Lynn et al, 2001)
Does Process-based PM 
reflect users’ voice into the 
policy?
Process-based 
Performance 
Measurement
7P
a
r
t
2
Pearson’s product-moment 
correlation coefficient
Leverage ModelTesting a Back-up ModelTest 46
Survey of OECD nations
Theoretical investigation
Microeconomics (Public good/Merit 
good)
Scale of Economics
Financial SustainabilityTest 36
Finding the correlation, by 
regression, between service quality 
and providers’
a) ownership
b) market competitiveness
c) timing of market entry
Information Asymmetry Models:
a)Contract Failure Model (Hansmann, 
1980)
b)Medical Arms Race Model
c)Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) Model
WorkabilityTest 25
Survey of OECD nations
Investigating Japanese Long-Term 
Care Market
Care Quality Model based on Universal 
System
Applicability Test 14
Model-TestingCare Quality ModelDoes Ideal CQM Direct the 
market competition to 
enhance the quality of 
human service?
Ideal CQM3P
a
r
t
1
Method/ SubjectRelevant Theory QuestionModelC
 
Note: C in the top of the second low indicates Chapter. 
 
Part I consists of five different methods. First, in order to investigate the 
applicability of Ideal CQM, this thesis seeks the market that meets the 
preconditions of Ideal CQM, by surveying OECD nations. Second, finding the 
market that qualifies the preconditions, the research further investigates the 
market, using case study method (Yin, 2002). Third, to test the workability of 
Ideal CQM, the research investigates the models that conflict with the idea of 
Ideal CQM by regression analysis. The examination utilizes the quantified care 
quality data, publicised by local governments of Japan, and testing variables of 
1,093 Group Home8 providers9. Investigating the correlation between the data 
and testing variable, the research analyses the validity of the conflicted models 
and workability of Ideal CQM. Fourth, for testing the financial sustainability of 
                                                   
8 Group Home for the elderly with dementia, a common type of community-based care 
in Japan (See the detailed definition on page 85). 
9 1,093 providers occupy 13 percent of the Group Home providers in the surveyed year 
in Japan. 
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Ideal CQM, the research again conducts the survey of OECD nations. Analysing 
the financial information of these nations, the research sorts out a condition for 
the sustainability of Ideal CQM. Fifth, as an additional argument, the research 
proposes a model called, Leverage Model, which utilises Peason’s 
product-moment correlation coefficient. This model is developed because it can 
also be used for the markets which is not qualified for the precondition of Ideal 
CQM.   
 
In regard with Part II, the research also combines different methods. First, 
testing the applicability of the presenting process-based performance 
measurement model, the research compares the cases of Japan with applies the 
model and the United States which uses a different model. Second, for further 
test of applicability and financial sustainability, the research utilises case 
analysis, focusing on the details of Japanese case. 
 
 
Defining the Area of Study 
 
Human Service 
Although the definition of human service is changing (Schmolling, Youkeles, 
and Burger, 1997; Zins, 2001), the concept today is a synonym for (or a part of) 
social welfare services. Zins (2001: pp.6-7) defines human service as 
“institutionalized systematic services” aimed at “meeting human needs … 
required for maintaining or promoting the overall quality of life” of service 
users. The field includes childcare, health care, long-term care, disability care, 
and family support. In fact, several governments are in charge of such services 
under the name of human service (e.g., Department of Human Service, 
Government of Australia and Department of Health and Human Service, the 
United States government). This research, however, specifically deals with the 
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field of long-term care. 
 
Long-term Care 
Long-term care brings together a variety of services for people who are 
dependent on help with basic Activities of Daily Living (ADL) for extended 
periods. Such activities include bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of 
beds or chairs, moving around, and using the bathroom. These long-term care 
needs are due to long-standing chronic conditions that cause physical or mental 
disability. As in many other long-term care studies, this study distinguishes 
between long-term care services and medical services, such as interim 
hospitalizations, medical diagnoses, and prescription drugs.   
 
Although long-term care does not necessarily mean long-term care for older 
people, the categories are closely aligned. Certainly, the age of the care recipient 
is not an eligibility criterion for long-term care programs in most OECD 
member countries. Nevertheless, according to OECD (2005: p. 25), “as a rule of 
thumb, around 80% of users of home-care services and some 90% of nursing 
home residents are aged 65 and older.” It is for this reason that throughout this 
thesis the terms “long-term care” and “long-term care for older people” are 
often used interchangeably. 
 
Competitive Market 
Competitive markets that provide human service allow providers to compete 
with each other, but such competitions are inevitably regulated. It is clear that a 
perfect competitive market does not ensure a minimum standard of users’ 
living, an important mission of human service provisions. There are three levels 
of regulated forms: Competitive Tendering and Contracting (CTC), License 
Subsidies (LS) and the Hybrids of CTC and LS. The definitions are slightly 
varied by literature, but according to Davidson (2009), in CTC government 
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agencies choose the providers for a designated group of users, whereas in LS, 
entry is open for any provider that meets a set of minimum requirements (i.e., 
license). The hybrid is literally the mixture of CTC and LS. 
 
In long-term care markets (and other human service markets in general), the 
degree of demand usually correlates with the required level of regulation. That 
is, the bigger the demand, the more competitors governments need to admit, 
because mass-provision requires the innovative and efficient aspects of 
competitive markets.   
 
In long-term care markets, most countries in the OECD have already applied 
License-Subsidised markets and the others are expected to follow them, because 
the demand is predicted to increase. For these reasons, therefore, this research 
particularly deals with License Subsidised (LS) markets as competitive markets 
for human service provisions.   
 
 
Chapter Overview and Arguments 
 
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, this thesis argues that in human 
service provision through competitive markets, governments need to ensure a 
certain quality of service. Three secondary arguments support this thesis: a) 
governments need to strike a balance between market contestability and service 
quality assurance; b) governments need to introduce a system to provide users 
with information about the providers’ service quality; and c) governments need 
to develop process-based performance measurement for human service 
provision.  
 
Chapter 2 of this research is a broad survey of historical and theoretical work on 
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human service provision through competitive markets. The chapter begins by 
outlining the reason that governments need to be responsible for human service 
provisions. Tracking back the origin of human service, the research investigates 
the transitions of governments’ commitments to human service provision. The 
analysis concludes that today’s democratic systems urge governments to ensure 
a certain standard of living by being responsible for human service provisions. 
The chapter then investigates how human service is provided through 
competitive markets and how governments have tried to ensure care quality by 
analysing the case of long-term care. To date, the literature primarily consists of 
two major points: 1) the care quality models to direct the market competition to 
enhance the quality of care and 2) the performance measurements to evaluate 
and regulate the providers’ quality of care. Thus, the research argues the first 
point in Part I and the second point in Part II. 
 
Part I, which consists of Chapter 3, 4, 5, and 6, investigates the market design 
(i.e., care quality model) for long-term care provision. Since competitive 
markets naturally accommodate unwanted poor quality care, this part examines 
how governments should design/modify the market in order to eliminate such 
poor quality care. Specifically, the research focuses on directing the market 
competition to enhance the quality of care, so that poor quality of care is 
eliminated from the market. 
 
Chapter 3 presents the alternative care quality model (i.e., Ideal CQM). 
Although the care quality model for human service provision through 
competitive markets is very important, the existing literature has almost 
completely overlooked the universal care systems applied in nearly half of the 
OECD member countries. The literature, then, has dominantly come from the 
case of the United States, which applies a means-tested care system. To make 
matters worse, the model (Existing CQM) developed in the United States has 
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several crucial defects. First, Medicaid, the government funded means-tested 
program in the United States, does not allow care recipients to pay attention to 
care quality, because the reimbursement rate is independent of care needs. 
Second, because the model contains the component of price competition, poor 
quality care remains in market. Furthermore, the workability of care quality 
regulations in the model is limited, because such regulations cause market 
price-rise that may deprive non-wealthy care recipients of access to care. 
Chapter 3, therefore, suggests Ideal CQM, which directs the market competition 
solely for a better quality of care in order to get rid of poor quality care. Ideal 
CQM requires three conditions: a) a universal long-term care system; b) 
standardized content of care according to care recipients’ conditions; c) no price 
competition. The following three chapters, respectively, investigate Ideal CQM 
in terms of empirical applicability, empirical workability, and financial 
practicability. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the empirical applicability of Ideal CQM. Investigating the 
Japanese long-term care markets, the chapter shows that the market for Group 
Homes for the elderly with dementia (hereinafter, Group Home) in Japan meets 
all conditions of Ideal CQM. That is, in the Group Home market, standardized 
content of care according to care recipients’ care conditions is provided with no 
price competition through competitive markets and within a universal care 
system.   
 
Chapter 5 investigates the empirical workability of Ideal CQM. In health 
economics literature, three models, based on information asymmetry between 
users and providers in care-related markets, conflict with the utility of Ideal 
CQM. The conflicted models are 
a) The Contract Failure model that claims users perceive non-profit providers 
as a sign of good service quality (i.e., users cannot choose a provider solely 
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based on its quality of care), 
b) The Medical Arms Race (MAR) model that argues that the competition in 
the care market tends to lower the service quality, and 
c) Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model that claims new entries in the care market 
do not contribute to improvement in the market’s care quality. 
Testing the three conflicted information asymmetry models, the research 
reveals that none of the three models was fully supported in the Group Home 
for the elderly with dementia market in Japan. As a result, it is possible for Ideal 
CQM to direct the market competition to enhance the market’s quality of care. 
The findings of this chapter suggest that “publicizing providers’ care quality 
evaluations” should be added as a fourth condition to Ideal CQM, initially set 
out in chapter 3. 
 
The first half of Chapter 6 examines the financial sustainability of Ideal CQM. 
One may think that the implementation of Ideal CQM is costly for governments, 
because one of Ideal CQM’s conditions is to introduce a universal care system: 
care for “everyone,” not just for the economically vulnerable. An analysis of the 
correlation between public long-term care expenditures per the share of very 
old people in populations and the care systems, nonetheless, indicates that the 
universal system does not necessarily cost more than does the means-tested 
system. The research further uncovers that the size of the domestic economic 
gap greatly influences the financial efficiency of the long-term care provision. 
That is, even if governments universally cover the peoples’ long-term care 
expenses, the public expenditure remains comparatively small, as long as the 
gap between rich and poor is relatively small (approximately Gini coefficient = 
0.3 or below). 
 
The second half of Chapter 6 presents “Leverage Model”, which is an 
alternative solution for governments that cannot immediately introduce a 
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universal care system (i.e., the government of the nations with a bigger 
economic gap10). Analysing the correlations among care quality indicators, 
Leverage Model finds the ‘leveraged indicator’ that gives the most positive 
influences to other indicators. Focusing resources into the indicator, therefore, 
governments can efficiently enhance the market’s care quality.  
 
As Part I proves that governments can direct the market competition to enhance 
care quality by implementing Ideal CQM, Part II investigates how to measure 
the quality of care: performance measurement.   
 
Chapter 7 provides a modification to the existing public administration theory 
and presents an alternative, process-based performance measurement. As 
Chapter 2 questioned the current public administration theory, Chapter 7 
compares both outcome-based performance measurement and the alternative 
process-based performance measurement. The chapter finds weaknesses in 
both measurements. Whereas process-based measurement does not fit the 
current public administration theory, outcome-based measurement does not fit 
the ambiguous policy goals of human service. Favouring process-based 
performance measurement from the view of solving the care quality problem, 
the research provides a modification to the current public administration theory 
to accommodate the use of process-based performance measurement. 
Process-based performance measurement, with the modified public 
administration theory, consists of evaluating the behaviour (i.e., the process of 
care implementation) and the training of care workers. The following two 
chapters, respectively, examine performance measurement in terms of the 
empirical validity of the behaviour and the training of care workers. 
 
Chapter 8 investigates the empirical validity of the presented process-based 
                                                   
10 Approximately Gini coefficient 0.35 or the above. 
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performance measurement, with modified public administration theory. To do 
so, this chapter specifically compares two cases: the Japanese long-term care 
market with the presented process-based measurement and the United States 
long-term care market with the existing outcome-based performance 
measurement. Analysing two empirical cases, the chapter proves that the 
long-term care market performs better when governments implement 
process-based performance measurement with modified public administration 
theory.  
 
Chapter 9 investigates the kind of training needed for process-based 
performance measurement. Among the OECD members, the United States and 
Japan appear as the only nations that require minimum training for care 
workers nationally. Analysing the two nations provides theoretical evidence 
that care workers’ training has two phases and that both are, respectively, 
useful to ensure quality of care. That is, whereas Phase 1 standardises the care 
quality of overt needs by ensuring proper care attitudes and physical skills (e.g., 
transfer techniques), Phase 2 enables care workers to respond to potential care 
needs by teaching them to appreciate care recipients’ mentalities and by 
training communication skills to pick up potential care recipients’ needs. 
Therefore, Phase 2 training is preferred for the use of process-based 
performance measurement. Certainly, Phase 2 training is concerned about 
sustainability, as it requires more resources (i.e., time and cost). However, the 
research finds that implementing Phase 2 training leads to eliciting potential 
care market needs and activating care-related industries such as service robot. 
By aiming at the best possible quality of care by training care workers, 
governments can expect a considerable amount of positive spillover in 
care-related industries.   
 
Chapter 10 concludes this thesis by reviewing the two models. Sorting out the 
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arguments, the chapter presents the models as the answers to the research 
questions of this thesis. Summarising the research contributions, the chapter 
shapes the research implications to the existing public administration theory 
and, finally, describes the remaining research problems for future research.   
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Chapter 2. Studying Human Service Provision through 
Competitive Markets 
 
 
Researchers are divided over the efficacy of market provision of human service 
and the negative consequences on quality of care. One stream of researchers 
presents market utilisation for human service provision as a necessary trend, 
arguing that governments today cannot afford direct provision of services due 
to their technical and financial capacity limitations. Nonetheless, other 
researchers suggest that such market utilisation has caused long-standing 
negative service quality issues, because the market competition tends to 
sacrifice quality for profit maximisation. In sum, the existing literature offers 
contradictory findings on the utility of providing human service through the 
market, suggesting that further analysis is necessary.   
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature and identifies the areas of limitation. 
Whereas most research intends to adjust the nature of human service to the 
market, utilising public administration theory, few try to modify the theory to 
reflect the nature of human service. Certainly, the market-oriented theories has 
been very useful in many other public service provisions where public services 
provided through the market have successfully enhanced the efficiency of 
human service without losing the quality 11 . Thus, it was reasonable for 
researchers to suggest that the quality issue of human service could be solved 
by governmental regulatory policies. Nonetheless, such symptomatic 
treatments have not solved the issue for decades because the nature of human 
service is very different from that of other public services. This thesis, therefore, 
adjusts the current public administration theory to accommodate the nature of 
human service provision.    
                                                   
11 See for example Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer (1993) and Li and Xu (2004). 
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The arguments of this chapter flow in the following order. First, the chapter 
reviews the reasons why governments need to be responsible for the provision 
of human services and how the main provider has shifted from governments to 
non-government sectors. The chapter further explains the rise of the poor 
service quality issue and governments’ efforts to solve it with a particular focus 
on the case of long-term care. Analysing the cause of the long-standing quality 
issue, the chapter then discusses the fundamental disagreements between the 
market-utilising, public administration theory and the nature of human service. 
The chapter ends with an explanation of the research questions driving the 
thesis. 
 
 
Background History of Government Intervention in Human Service 
 
History of Welfare States 
The concept of human service as a right for citizens is rooted in the idea of 
welfare states, and nations are held responsible for ‘cradle to grave’. To 
understand the concept, it is important to grasp how governments have become 
responsible for people’s minimum standard of living. This section reviews the 
background history of the concept.. 
 
Since early times, social welfare provision have been connected with religion 
for Jews, Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and other religions that emphasize 
the concept of mutual aid. Such religions preach the importance of relief for the 
socially vulnerable. In fact, many charity organizations today can track their 
histories to religious groups. Zakat, a concept of tithing and alms, is one of the 
five pillars of Islam. Shikanin, built in 593 A.D., is the oldest surviving social 
welfare institution in Japan and has a strong Shinto/Buddhist influence. These 
religions, especially the Christian Church (which was supplemented by guilds), 
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played a significant role in social welfare provision in the Middle Ages.  
 
However, the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century was a catalyst for state 
intervention in European social welfare. Martin Luther (1520: 71) stated that 
beggary was to be eliminated, emphasizing the importance of labour. John 
Calvin (1536) criticized the existing arbitrary ‘social welfare,’ quoting the 
Biblical phrase: “If man will not work, he shall not eat.” As Protestantism 
became more influential in many European countries, such thinkers gradually 
changed the views that people had of the socially vulnerable. As a result, 
governments began to intervene in social welfare to save the economically 
vulnerable. The Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601 in the United Kingdom was the 
first legislation on social welfare. The idea of ‘welfare’ was also added to the 
French Constitution of 1791.12  These legislations had an influence outside 
Europe, too; for example, Japan adopted the 1874 social welfare principle 
(Kekkyu-kisoku)13 (Kasuno, 1997). 
 
Governmental intervention in social welfare developed as the governing 
systems of the industrialised nations became democratic in the 19th and 20th 
centuries. As seen in Table 2-1, the political systems gradually democratized in 
many countries and, as this occurred, the voice of the socially vulnerable began 
to influence policies. Shortly after male suffrage was introduced in 1883, for 
example, the German government decided to provide health insurance for 
workers; compulsory accident insurance and retirement pensions were 
introduced in subsequent legislation. These legislations indicate when 
governmental intervention into the social welfare of ordinary citizens―not just 
the poor―commenced. 
                                                   
12 The constitution mentioned public intervention in social welfare. 
13 This principle was to educate the people. The government did not owe any 
responsibility, but it was the first time for the government to step into social welfare 
issues in modern Japan.  
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Table 2-1. Introduction of Universal Suffrage, Selected Countries (Year) 
Country Male Female 
France 1848 1944 
United States 1870 1920 
Germany 1871 1919 
United Kingdom 1918 1928 
Japan 1925 1945 
 
Governmental social welfare provision was further developed in reaction to 
two global events in the first half of the 20th century. First, the Great Depression 
led to the welfare state14 in many countries. In the United States, as a part of the 
New Deal program, the Social Security Act of 1935 provided for federally 
funded financial assistance to the elderly, the blind, and dependent children. In 
Japan, the National Health Insurance Law, which was especially for those who 
suffered from the Depression, was enacted in 1938. By the 1930s, most of the 
world’s industrial nations had health insurance and retirement pensions. These 
trends represented the ‘middle way’ between communism and capitalism. 
Moreover, in 1942, the idea of comprehensive cradle to grave social welfare 
services was suggested in the Beveridge report in the United Kingdom in 1942. 
 
Secondly, in the period following World War II, cradle to grave welfare 
programs were implemented in many countries to recover from the damage of 
the war. In the United Kingdom, the National Insurance Act, the National 
Assistance Act, and the National Health Service Act came into force in 1948. In 
Japan, the Child Care Law (Jido-fukushi hou) of 1947 and the 
Mentally/Physically Challenging Care Law (Shintaishougaisha fukushi hou) were 
enacted. 
 
Not all governments have equally extensive social welfare systems. 
                                                   
14 The term “welfare state” was coined by the Allies as a contrast to the “warfare state” 
of the Axis (Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
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Esping-Andersen (1990) laid out three main types of welfare state, depending 
on the degree of governmental intervention, namely, the Liberal, Conservative, 
and the Social Democratic, which are typically represented by the United States, 
Germany, and Sweden, respectively. Meanwhile, the role of non-governmental 
(charitable) organizations continued to be an important provider of social 
welfare, and non-profit organizations continue to play a significant role in the 
provision of social welfare in many countries. 
 
Nevertheless, most modern governments are expected to be responsible for 
ensuring their citizens have a certain standard of living. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (CECD) was formed in 1960 with the 
objective of “achieving the highest sustainable economic growth and 
employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries.” In addition, 
the foundations of welfare-related international organizations, such as the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), globally advocated the idea of welfare states. Together with other 
social welfare services, these organizations contributed to how the provision of 
human service became a part of governments’ responsibility. 
 
Government Intervention in the Context of Market Provision 
As governments became incapable of providing for increasing service needs, 
human service began to be provided through the markets, but governmental 
interventions in the provision of human service have continued. Davidson 
(2009: p. 46-47) cited several reasons for governments’ continued interventions 
in the human service market. First, since human service aims to meet the basic 
developmental and care needs of people, strong moral and public policy 
imperatives are required to ensure a minimum level of service quality for 
everyone and to avoid poor service to anyone. Second, human service is 
difficult to standardise (i.e., difficult to measure), because service players in the 
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market have a great deal of discretion in the provision of customized services to 
users. Third, the end users of human service generally are vulnerable and the 
agents (e.g., a family member) who make decisions on behalf of users are very 
important. Yet, information asymmetry exists between providers and users 
(plus agents) in human service markets. Finally, many of the end users of 
human service have limited funds to purchase the necessary services. 
 
 
How the Market Provision of Human Service Began  
The Case of Long-Term Care 
 
This section explains the factors that have created the care quality problem that 
is the focus of this thesis. With specific reference to the case of long-term care, 
the first part of the discussion points to high and growing demands, cost 
increases, and the move from direct government to market provision. The next 
section describes governmental efforts to maintain quality of care in a system of 
market provision, and the problems that continue to hamper these efforts. 
 
Snapshot of Today’s Long-Term Care Needs 
OECD countries currently spend large amounts of money on providing 
long-term care. Table 2-2 illustrates public and private expenditures on 
long-term care as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Total 
expenditures range from below 0.2% in Mexico to almost 3% of the GDP in 
Sweden. Most countries, however, range between 0.5% and 1.6% of the GDP, 
with only Norway and Sweden having expenditure ratios well above this level.   
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Table 2-2.  Public and Private Expenditures on Long-term Care as a Percentage of GDP 
 Total expenditure Public expenditure Private expenditure 
 Home care Institutions Total 
Home 
care Institutions Total 
Home 
care Institutions Total 
Australia 0.38 0.81 1.19 0.30 0.56 0.86 0.08 0.25 0.33 
Austria n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.32 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Canada 0.17 1.06 1.23 0.17 0.82 0.99 n.a. 0.24 0.24 
Germany 0.47 0.88 1.35 0.43 0.52 0.95 0.04 0.36 0.40 
Hungary < 0.10 < 0.20 < 0.30 n.a. n.a. < 0.20 n.a. n.a. < 0.10 
Ireland 0.19 0.43 0.62 0.19 0.33 0.52 n.a. 0.10 0.10 
Japan 0.25 0.58 0.83 0.25 0.51 0.76 0.00 0.07 0.07 
Korea n.a. n.a. < 0.30 < 0.10 < 0.10 < 0.20 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Luxemburg n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.15 0.37 0.52 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Mexico n.a. n.a. < 0.20 n.a. n.a. < 0.10 n.a. n.a. < 0.10 
Netherlands 0.60 0.83 1.44 0.56 0.75 1.31 0.05 0.08 0.13 
New 
Zealand 0.12 0.56 0.68 0.11 0.34 0.45 0.01 0.22 0.23 
Norway 0.69 1.45 2.15 0.66 1.19 1.85 0.03 0.26 0.29 
Poland 0.35 0.03 0.38 0.35 0.03 0.37 n.a. 0.00 0.00 
Spain 0.23 0.37 0.61 0.05 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.26 0.44 
Sweden 0.82 2.07 2.89 0.78 1.96 2.74 0.04 0.10 0.14 
Switzerland 0.20 1.34 1.54 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
United 
Kingdom 0.41 0.96 1.29 0.17 0.58 0.74 0.16 0.39 0.54 
United 
States 0.33 0.96 1.29 0.17 0.58 0.74 0.16 0.39 0.54 
Average* 0.38 0.88 1.25 0.35 0.64 0.99 0.06 0.19 0.24 
Note:  Data for Hungary, Korea, Mexico, and Poland are only rough indicators of magnitude. Data for 
Australia, Norway, Spain, and Sweden are for the age group 65+. “n.a.” indicates not available. To be 
comparative, all data is as of the year 2000. 
*Average excludes Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, Korea, and Mexico 
Source:  OECD (2005: p. 26) 
 
In most OECD countries, major portions of the expenditures on long-term care 
come from public funding. As illustrated in Figure 2-1, the case of Spain is an 
exception. 
 
Figure 2-1.  Public and Private Expenditures on Long-term Care as a Percentage of GDP 
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              Source: See Table 2.2. 
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Internationally, total spending on long-term care correlates with the share of the 
very elderly people in the population. Using expenditure figures from the 
OECD, Figure 2-2 plots the expenditures for long-term care as percentages of 
GDPs and the percentages of people aged 80 years and older. This graph clearly 
shows a positive correlation between the two factors.   
 
Figure 2-2.  The Correlation between Total Long-term Care Spending and the Population 
Share of Very Old People (Aged 80+)15 
 
          Data Source:  Table 2-2 and United Nations (2008).   
 
Interestingly, the correlation between expenditure and population aged 65 
years and older is rather weak, as shown in Figure 2-3. According to OECD 
(2005: p. 20), major long-term care users among older people are generally aged 
                                                   
15 The term “Very Old People,” used in OECD (2005), indicates those aged 80 years or 
above. 
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80 years and older. 
 
Figure 2-3. The Correlation between Total Long-term Care Spending and the Population 
Share of Older People (Aged 65+) 
 
              Data Source:  Table 2-1 and United Nations (2008).  
 
The expenditure on long-term care is expected to increase because the share of 
elderly people in the population is set to expand. Figure 2-4 shows the 
percentage of people over the age of 80 in the populations for all OECD 
countries for the period 1960 to 2040. Clearly, Japan faces the largest and most 
immediate challenge with the proportion of people over the age of eighty 
growing at an accelerated rate from 6.3 to 14.0 percent each year from 2010 to 
2040. In Australia, the rise is from 3.9 in 2010 to 7.8 percent in 2040. In the 
United States, the growth is from 3.8 to 7.0 percent in the same period. In 
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summary, the speed of increase varies from country to country; however, the 
OECD average percentage is projected to rise to 7.7% by 2040 (OECD, 2005).  
 
Figure 2-4. Share of Very Old People (80+) in the Population, 1960 to 2040 
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Note:  The data for Korea is not available. 
Data Source:  United Nations (2008). 
 
The problem of providing long-term care for a growing percentage of the 
population is compounded by the existence of fewer taxpayers. In most OECD 
countries, the ratio of persons aged 65 and older to the population aged 20-64 is 
growing. As Table 2-3 shows, the old age-dependency ratio will continue to 
expand. This means a) fewer people to support the older population and b) 
possible limitations on the budget for long-term care due to the decreasing 
share of working (tax-paying) population. Governments will need to become 
more efficient at providing long-term care.  
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Table 2-3. Old Age-dependency Ratio, 1960-2040 
Ratio of persons 65+ to the population 20-64 
Change in % points  1960 2000 2040 
1960-2000 2000-2040 
Australia 15.8 20.7 43.8 4.9 23 
Austria 21.1 25.1 59 4 33.9 
Belgium 20.4 28.2 51.2 7.7 23 
Canada 14.7 20.3 43.6 5.6 23.2 
Czech Republic 15.2 21.9 47.8 6.8 25.9 
Denmark 19 24.1 44.4 5.2 20.3 
Finland 13.4 24.6 49.8 11.2 25.1 
France 20.8 27.5 50 6.7 22.5 
Germany - 26.4 54.5 - 28.1 
Greece 14.0 28.3 57.9 14.3 29.6 
Hungary 15.5 24.5 38.4 8.9 13.9 
Iceland 16.1 20.4 41 4.3 20.6 
Ireland 22.4 19.2 37.7 -3.2 18.5 
Italy 15.9 29.1 63.9 13.2 34.8 
Japan 10.6 27.9 59.9 17.4 31.9 
Korea 6.4 11.4 43.5 4.9 32.1 
Luxemburg 17.6 23 36.9 5.4 13.9 
Mexico 11.3 9 26 -2.4 17.1 
Netherlands 16.9 21.9 48.1 5 26.1 
New Zealand 17 20.1 48.2 3.1 28.1 
Norway 19.8 25.7 42.9 6 17.2 
Poland 11.1 20.3 41.1 9.2 20.8 
Portugal 14.5 26.7 46.3 12.2 19.6 
Slovak Republic 12.8 18.8 39.4 6 20.6 
Spain 14.5 27.2 55.7 12.7 28.5 
Sweden 20.2 29.5 46.7 9.3 17.2 
Switzerland 17.6 24.9 63.9 7.3 39 
Turkey 7.5 10.7 23.9 3.1 13.2 
United Kingdom 20.1 26.9 46.3 6.8 19.4 
United States 17.6 21.1 37.9 3.4 16.8 
OECD average 15.9 22.9 46.3 6.9 23.5 
Note:  Germany 1960 (before reunification) was not comparable with 2000 data. 
Source: OECD (2005) 
 
There are, however, positive ways of looking at these demographic 
arguments. Knichman and Snell (2002) show that reconceptualising the 
population ratio has a marked effect on the potential for care in the United 
States for future decades. They argue that reductions in the number of 
children with care needs offset some of the increase in older people needing 
care. Moreover, relatively few people in the 65-74 age group require 
long-term care and an increasing share of persons in that age group 
contributes to providing care and supervision to both young people and the 
very old. This improves the ratio of potential caregivers to those needing care. 
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Nevertheless, the utility of these positive views might be offset by prolonged 
life expectancies. Demographic forecasts are problematic because the factors 
driving mortality decline, particularly at a higher age, are poorly understood 
(OECD, 2005: 100). In the past, demographers and actuaries consistently 
underestimated predictions of life expectancy (Cutler and Maera, 2001; 
Wilmoth, 1998). Therefore, it is possible that the dependency ratio of very old 
people will be even greater than expected. 
 
Changes in people’s life styles constitute another factor that increases the 
long-term care demand. These changes include decreasing family size, greater 
life expectancy for older people, geographical dispersion of families, and the 
tendency for women to be educated and to work outside the home in most 
countries (Figure 2-5).16  Thus, family members can no longer afford to play 
the role of caregiver.   
 
What is certain is that the demand for long-term care will continue to increase 
in the OECD member nations. Governments will have to respond to these 
increasing needs with increasingly limited resources. 
 
                                                   
16 Sweden has an extra exception in this figure. 
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Figure 2-5. Female Labour Force Participation Rate 
Female labour force of all ages divided by female population 15-64 years old 
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Note:  The following data was not available: Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Korea, 
Poland, and Turkey. The data for Germany in 1980 is for former West Germany. 
Source:  OECD Labour Force Statistics (2000). 
 
Marketization of Long-Term Care Provision 
Market provision of long-term care began to occur in the mid-1960s and this 
form of long-term care provision is likely to accelerate as governments try to 
manage increasing costs and demand. The United States initiated market 
utilisation, in general, in 1980. Since then, other governments, including the 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan, have gradually implemented 
marketization. Table 2-5 lists the benchmark events in the history of long-term 
care in selected countries, and the specific changes are explained below. 
 
In the United States, the utilization of non-governmental organizations was 
greatly encouraged under the Reagan Administration. Regulations related to 
home and community long-term care were reduced and eligibilities for 
Medicare and Medicaid were expanded. Since then, the market for elderly 
care has greatly increased. The market for nursing homes has increased 9.5% 
on average from 1986-1995 and the market for home care grew 19.6% in the 
same period (MHLW, 2000). 
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In the United Kingdom, local municipalities traditionally provided elderly 
care, but the Community Care Reform, starting in 1992, changed this system 
from the direct provision of services by local governments17 to the purchase 
of services from the non-governmental sector (private companies and 
non-profits). After this major shift, care managers from local authorities had 
to judge the demands of those who needed care and prepare a comprehensive 
care plan. This resulted in the expansion of non-governmental elderly care 
provision (MHLW, 2000). 
 
 
                                                   
17 After judgment of the needs of respective services (e.g. day service or home help 
service) and decisions on each of these services, 
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Table 2-4. Benchmark Events in the History of  
Long-term Care Policies in Selected Countries (1965-2007) 
Year Country Event 
1965 US Enactment of Medicare and Medicaid 
Medicaid (medical support for low-income citizens) began to support nursing 
home fees, including private nursing homes. 
1966 Australia The federal government commenced grants for nursing homes, including 
private ones. 
1969 US The Department of Housing and Urban Development began supporting the 
opening of new nursing homes, including private ones. 
1980 US Amendment of the Social Security Act 
Medicaid covered the fees for home care (assisted living) services, including 
private organizations. 
1980 UK The Supplementary Benefit Regulations of 1980 supported private nursing 
homes. 
1981 US Enactment of the Home and Community-based Long-term Waver Option 
authorized state use of Medicare. 
1985 Australia The Aged Care Reform Strategy started. 
The Home and Community Care Act encouraged assisted living services. 
1989 Germany Enactment of the Health Reform  
Health reform allowed for assisted living services to include medical activities. 
1989 Japan The government began to utilize private companies by outsourcing nursing 
home services. 
1990 UK Enactment of the National Health Service and Community Care Act 
1990 US Personal care benefits authorized states to allow personal care attendants to 
accompany clients and provide services outside the home. 
1990 Japan Amendment of Social Welfare Laws 
Decentralization of government involvement in social welfare encouraged 
private companies to provide long-term care services. 
1991 Australia The federal government lifted the ban on the private sector’s participation in 
hostels.18 
1991 Australia Financial support for those who were eligible to stay at hostels commenced. 
1992 UK The Community Care Act was implemented, encouraging the  
utilization of the private sector in long-term care provision. 
1992 Sweden Edel Reform (1998) 
The transformation of the authority of long-term medical facilities from 
landstings to kommuns encouraged the private sector to enter the elderly care 
market. 
1993 UK Community Care Reform 
1994 Germany Establishment of long-term care insurance 
1995 Germany The private sector entered service provision for assisted living care (home 
care). 
1996 UK The Community Care (Direct Payment) Act of 1996 encouraged assisted living 
care. 
1995 Germany Introduction of the Long-Term Care Insurance 
1997 France Establishment of the Law of Long-term Care 
2000 Japan Introduction of the Long-Term Care Insurance 
2007 S. Korea Introduction of the Long-Term Care Insurance 
 
Traditionally, in Germany, elderly care services were mainly provided by six 
philanthropic organizations, including the Red Cross and Caritas. The 
government gave them financial support and the market share of the six 
                                                   
18 In Austria, a hostel is a type of nursing home for lower dependency residents 
whereas a home for higher dependency residents is called a nursing home. 
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organizations reached 50% of the entire sector of long-term care service. 
However, with the introduction of Long-Term Care Insurance in 1995, the 
government began giving financial support to non-profit organizations and 
private companies outside of the six philanthropic organizations. Since then, 
many companies and non-profit organizations have entered the market 
(MHLW, 2000). 
 
In Australia, private philanthropies who received financial support from the 
government traditionally provided nursing home service. Then, in order to 
respond to diversified public needs, the government implemented the Aged 
Care Reform Strategy, in 1985. As a result, financial support for hostel 
services for lower dependency elderly began in 1991. Moreover, based on the 
Home and Community Care Act, assisted living services have been 
increasingly provided by the non-government sector with support from the 
government (Australian Institute of Health and Welfare, 1995). 
 
Sweden is known as a social democracy. Elderly care in Sweden is mainly 
provided by the public sector. However, utilization of the non-government 
sector has gradually increased since the Edel Reform of 1992. This tendency 
can be seen, especially in big cities, such as Stockholm and Gothenburg, 
where assisted living services are in demand (MHLW, 2000). 
 
Finally, in Japan, since the Long-Term Care for Older People Law (Rojin 
fukushi hou) of 1963, public institutions have predominantly provided 
long-term care services. However, from the late 1980s forward, long-term care 
services from the private sector have gradually increased. The Long-Term 
Care Insurance Law of 2000 deregulated private sector access to the market 
for almost all elderly services and now about 40% of long-term care providers 
are private companies (MHLW, 2002). 
 
Together these changes mean that private companies currently play a 
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significant role in the provision of long-term care across most OECD countries. 
The study lacks accurate data to compare the forms of long-term care service 
provision internationally due to the absence of a tangible measurement of 
providers’ share19. Nevertheless, according to Nissei Life Insurance (NLI) 
Research Institute (1998) (see Table 2-5), the private sector is the main 
provider of these services in both the United States and the United Kingdom, 
though government and non-profit sector provisions still comprise the 
majority in Sweden. Japan, Germany, and Australia assume a middle position 
between these two extreme cases, with about the half of the provisions relying 
on the private sector. 
 
Table 2-5. Long-term Care Provision by the Private Sector in Selected Countries 
Institution by the private sector Home care by the private sector 
United States 75% Japan 70% 
United Kingdom 60% The United States 65% 
Germany  45% Germany   50% 
Japan 40% Sweden 8% 
Australia 30%   
Note: The rest are provided by both governments and non-profit organizations. . 
Source: Nissei Life Insurance Research Institute (1998) 
 
 
The Problem of Quality in the Long-Term Care Market 
 
A significant challenge of marketization is how to ensure the care quality. 
Like any other fields of human service, long-term care covers a very diverse 
field of needs. Although much researcher has been done on this matter to 
ensure the service quality in market, there is still some room for 
improvement. 
 
Governments have tried hard to cope with this care quality assurance. Table 
2-6 lists care quality assurance policies on long-term care in the United States, 
the United Kingdom, Germany, Australia, and Japan. The service providers 
that do not follow these policies are in danger of being eliminated from the 
                                                   
19 For example, the number of institutions, capacity, or income-base. 
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market. Moreover, the outcomes of these performance measurements are 
publicly available via websites (e.g., nursing homes in the United States and 
community-based service providers in Japan). A user’s choice should, 
therefore, eliminate the provision of poor quality care and eventually meet the 
user’s needs. 
 
Table 2-6. Care Quality Assurance Policies for Long-term Care Provision  
in OECD Countries  
Country System 
US Home Care Quality Assurance Act of 1987 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 
State-level long-term care service guidelines 
UK Registered Homes Act (1984) 
Germany Quality Form system (voluntary) 
Australia Aged or Disabled Persons Act of 1972 
Nursing Home Assistance Act of 1974 
Home and Community Care Act of 1986: the investigations of the Standard 
Monitoring Team 
Aged Care Act of 1997: the introduction of Accreditation Standards (1998) 
Sweden Customer questionnaire survey by communities 
Facility inspection by the Handicap Institute 
Japan Introduction of yearly inspections by local municipalities, as well as third-party 
evaluators (2001) 
 
In spite of these efforts, however, the public’s dissatisfaction with the quality 
of care has reached serious levels. The OECD (2005) claimed that the poor 
quality of long-term care provision was still a common issue. Even the United 
States, which has the longest history of LS implementation of long-term care 
provision, has not been able to solve this problem. In fact, Harrington (2001) 
reported that “despite efforts towards quality control, poor quality care for 
the 1.6 million people in nursing homes has existed for 25 years” in the 
United States. There are worldwide accounts in the media of the abuse and 
neglect of frail, elderly people, both in nursing homes and in community care 
(Braithwaite, 2006: p. 443). Although governments have implemented quality 
assurance policies, the problem of unsatisfactory care provision has not yet 
been solved.     
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Public Administration Theories 
 
The previous sections have identified long-standing care quality issues in the 
market with the following chronological steps: 
a) Due to the notion of welfare states, governments need to ensure the 
provision of human service. 
b) Due to financial and technical constraints, governments need to provide 
the necessary human service through a competitive market instead of 
through direct provision. 
c) In order to assure the quality of care in a competitive market, which tends 
to sacrifice service quality for profit maximisation, governments have 
implemented various regulatory policies. 
d) However, unsatisfactory care quality issues still remain in the market. 
 
The findings indicate that the established enabling/outsourcing policies 
regarding the human service market are not effective.  
 
The next step is to examine possible causes of the problem. To do so, we need 
to step back from the field of human service and investigate the care quality 
problem in the bigger picture of public administration theory. One assumes 
that the current market-utilizing, public administration theory has defects 
because the care quality problems of human service provision remain, in spite 
of the governments’ efforts. Certainly, market-utilising, public administration 
theory behind outsourced public service provisions has improved the quality 
of services in many fields. For example, the fields of telecommunication 
services, parcel delivery services, and public transportation are often 
presented as success cases. Nonetheless, the theory has not been able to apply 
as effectively to human service provisions. The next section reviews public 
administration theory and investigates the causes of the long-standing care 
quality issues in human service provisions. 
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From Bureaucracy to Market Utilisation 
Public administration theories have gradually shifted the model from 
bureaucracy to market utilisation. This section first gives an overview of the 
transition. Then it investigates the different outcomes between human service 
and other public services. 
 
The history of public administration theory begins in the late 19th century. 
One of the earliest contributions to the field of public administration was 
made by Max Weber, who believed that the requirements of the Industrial 
Age necessitated the use of a highly centralized, rule bound, expert-driven 
hierarchic system in public sector management. This form of organisation 
represents a bureaucracy.   
 
For the first half of the 20th century, bureaucracy was assumed the best 
method for providing public services (Ostrom, 1989). According to Albrow 
(1970), the elements of bureaucracy include developing a division of labour 
and specialisation of function, establishing a hierarchy with clearly defined 
roles and explicit rules, and making employment decisions (such as selection 
and promotion) based on merit. 
 
The idea of bureaucracy was widely accepted because it fit very well with the 
social needs at the time. Bureaucracy was originally developed to 
accommodate the needs of mass-production in the Industrial Age. 
Furthermore, the feature was also required in response to far reaching events, 
such as the Great Depression and the World Wars. Because of the success of 
bureaucracy, public administration, as a model of organisation, became 
associated with a belief in “social engineering” to correct market failure 
(Boyne, 1996).   
 
However, bureaucracy began to expose its functional fragilities once the 
post-war period was over. The biggest factor was the growing diversity of the 
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needs for public service. The industrial structure had gradually shifted from 
heavy (e.g., iron and steel) to compact (e.g., service) knowledge. Human 
service was required to respond to detailed care needs. In response to this 
trend, bureaucracy was a rigid administrative theory (Dubois, 1979). Certainly, 
bureaucratic forms of organisation are stable conditions, but they have 
difficulty in learning from their mistakes and are slow in adapting to 
changing circumstances (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Crozier, 1964). In fact, the 
features of bureaucracy began to be criticised as weaknesses. For example, 
Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987) claimed that the assumption of a clear 
distinction between policies/policy making and administration had been 
found to be impractical. Merton (1952) argued that the rule-governed basis of 
bureaucracy was dysfunctional because the means tended to displace the 
ends, resulting in the punctilious adherence to rules.   
 
Furthermore, the assumption of bureaucracy that politicians and 
administration staff act in the public interest also began to be criticised as 
naïve. Many researchers, such as Crozier (1964), Selznick (1949), and Tullock 
(1970), argued that public employees do not have a special type of motivation, 
but act in order to maximise their self-interest in terms of income, prestige, 
and power. They claimed that this resulted in state budget inflation, that 
public officials increased their authorities by maximising their department 
budgets, and that politicians worked for their ambitions by spending a lot of 
public money to secure their votes. 
 
Initial Shift from Bureaucracy to Market Utilisation 
As a result, the idea of ‘public choice’ became more accepted as a solution to 
these problems. It appeared to be a way of addressing the human behaviour 
of self-interest by minimising the role of the state, limiting the discretionary 
power of politicians, reducing public monopolies to a minimum, and 
maximising the use of the market. That is, proponents of ‘public choice’ 
seemed to recognize that, as departments have a vested self-interest, they 
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should not both advise on policy and implement it; the ‘public choice’ 
solution claimed that advisory, regulatory, and delivery functions should be 
separated and undertaken by different agencies (Boston, 1991).   
 
Many academics reinforce the challenges of public service provision through 
markets. In fact, the phenomenon goes by several names: government by 
proxy (Kettl, 1993), third party government (Smith and Lipsky, 1993; Salamon, 
1989), hollow government, the hollow state (Milward, 1994; 1996), virtual 
government (Sturggess, 1996), the hollow crown (Weller, Bakvis, and Rhodes, 
1997), shadow government and the contracting regime (Kettl, 1988). The 
argument is that public organisation needs management, not 
administration–where public management means the fulfilment of goals 
rather than the careful observation of procedures (Lane, 1993).   
 
Ideas to introduce managerial methods into the public sector developed apace 
during the 1970s and 1980s. This trend emphasized focusing on the ends, not 
the means. The trend also focussed on the establishment of semi-autonomous 
public sector agencies in which managers were given greater discretion to 
manage. By the 1990s, this distinctive approach to public sector management, 
“New Public Management (NPM),” was shaped by both private sector 
management techniques and ideas from the public choice theory. This trend 
emerged in many OECD countries (Hood, 1991; Hughes, 1998). The ideas of 
NPM, according to Aulich et al (2001), are summarised in Table 2-7.  
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Table 2-7. The Ideas of New Public Management (NPM) 
· A shift from input controls and rules to a reliance on quantifiable output measures 
and performance targets 
· Separation of policy making from service delivery 
· Disaggregation of large bureaucratic structures into quasi-autonomous and 
specific purpose agencies 
· Contractual relationship between decentralised service providers and central 
service purchasers 
· Preference for private ownership, outsourcing, and contestability in public service 
provision 
· The pursuit of the user for greater efficiency of public funds by: 
 greater publication of performance information, 
 targets for efficiency savings, 
 the introduction of competition where possible. And 
 strengthened audit arrangements. 
· More commercial styles of management practice, including: 
 human resource management (HRM) policies (for example, short-term labour 
contracts and performance-related reward systems), 
 strategic and business planning, 
 internal trading arrangements, 
 flatter organisational hierarchies, 
 greater customer orientation, and 
 revised corporate governance arrangements. 
 
The overall transition of public administration theories towards market 
utilisation is identified in Table 2-8. The two public administration theories 
listed in Table 2-8 describe the transition from centralised bureaucratic 
theories to networked/outsourced market-oriented theories in terms of the 
provision of public services. The left-hand side was designed to capture the 
traditional theory of public administration, dominated by process, inputs, 
hierarchy, and the use of the public sector for service delivery. In the 
right-hand side, the role of the market (i.e., private sector) had expanded and 
that of the public sector had contracted in the provision of services, and 
competition and outcomes became crucial in public service provisions. Within 
each theory, there is room for substantial variation in practice. In some 
countries, it is also possible to recognise a sequence of stages in public sector 
reform, with movement flowing from the traditional administrative state to 
the market state.   
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Table 2-8. The Transformation of Public Administration Theory 
Characterisation Traditional public 
bureaucracy 
Market utilisation 
Dominant values Administration Competition 
Performance 
measure 
Process  Outcome 
Role of 
government 
Dominant Provider Enabler/purchaser 
Structure Centralised and 
hierarchical 
Networked, 
outsourced 
State fiscal policy Broad Narrow, contracted 
spending 
Relative 
importance of 
public and private 
sectors 
Public sector 
dominant 
Private sector 
dominant 
   Source: Aulich, et al (2001) 
 
 
Causes of Long-standing Care Quality Issues in Human Service Provision 
 
As seen above, the public service provisions today are in market utilisation. 
However, the features of market utilisation have caused the long-standing 
care quality issues in human service provision. They have fundamentally 
clashed with the earlier-mentioned nature of human service in two ways. 
 
Competition versus Discretion 
“Competition” is a dominant value of the market-utilising public 
administration theory and this conflicts with the requirement for discretion in 
human service provision. As the needs of human service are quite diverse,20 
providers need to customise their services for each user. However, this 
indicates that the users need to observe the quality carefully, as well as the 
price, when purchasing a service. The quality of such discretionary care 
services inevitably varies by provider. When p indicates price and q means 
quality, the purchasing market model can be expressed as Y = x (p, q); the 
model accommodates ‘inexpensive but poor quality,’ as well as ‘expensive but 
                                                   
20 For instance, the need of long-term care varies based on the individual. 
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good quality.’  Consider an example: some long-term care providers 
respectfully respond to every single need of care recipients while other 
providers neglect care recipients and sometimes even abuse them physically 
and mentally. This model is simply not acceptable in public service provisions, 
because, unlike that of consumer items, any poor quality treatment in public 
services often causes significant damage to a person’s life. 
 
The conflict is unique in human service. In most other public services, which 
do not customise the services provided, all users receive the same level of 
quality. This means that the market model works as Y = xp. In successful cases, 
such as previously mentioned telecommunication services, delivery services, 
and public transportation, the players in the market treat all users equally.21  
As a result, the quality of these services is standardised. For instance, the 
internet connection services provided by Telstra are very similar to those by 
Optus in Australia, and the speed of both internet connections is at the same 
level. In the United States, the United States Postal Service (USPS), United 
Parcel Service of America (UPS), and FedEx deliver parcels in a similar way 
and their punctuality is at more or less the same level. Likewise, Japan 
Railways (JR) runs trains just like other private railway companies do in Japan, 
and there are no differences between them in terms of safety and punctuality. 
In other words, such similarities have led to the success of these provisions 
through the market. Due to the simple price competition in the market, (i.e., Y 
= xp), the players become financially motivated to enhance the efficiency of 
the service provisions. Therefore, the expense of governments and consumers 
is minimised.   
 
Competition alone, however, does not translate into similar success in the 
human service sector. Since the requirement for discretion in the provision of 
human service produces diverse levels of service quality, the public 
                                                   
21 That is, train services treat all passengers equally, compared with human service 
providers who cannot treat care recipients who are at different levels of care needs in 
the same way.   
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administration theory for the human service market needs to direct the 
competition towards enhancement of service quality. Nonetheless, the theory 
does not do so. Including quality together with price in the equation of the 
market model, the market-utilising, public administration theory 
accommodates a range of service quality from extremely good to completely 
unacceptable, in terms of human welfare and dignity. This is the 
long-standing service quality issue.  
 
One way for governments to solve the care quality issue is to overcome the 
contradiction between competition and providers’ discretion. Since the 
providers’ discretion is necessary for human service provision, governments 
need to redesign the market to control the competition. This leads to the first 
research question of this thesis: 
  
How should governments design the human service market in order to keep the 
capacity to ensure the quality of service? 
 
This question will be answered in Part I. 
 
Outcomes versus Ambiguous Policy Goals 
Another important question that remains is how to measure the quality of 
care. What is good quality of care and how can we measure it? Conflict occurs 
in performance measurement: a fundamental disagreement exists between the 
outcomes-oriented public administration theory and the ambiguous policy 
goals of human service.   
 
Measuring outcomes inevitably requires tangible goals. Since a policy’s 
outcomes indicate how much the policy has achieved its goals, the goals need 
to be clear; otherwise, it is not possible to measure them.   
 
Nonetheless, the policy goals of human service tend to be ambiguous (Lipsky, 
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1980). Statements like “long-term care for the peaceful and respected life of 
elderly people” are not measurable. How can one objectively measure the 
peacefulness of, or the respect for, someone’s life? One might think that the 
user’s satisfaction is a useful measure, but a significant number of long-term 
care users suffer from dementia.  
 
Such ambiguity is, indeed, unique to human service markets. The 
performances of many other public services provided through the market are 
measurable. For instance, the safety and accuracy of public transportation is 
measurable by the accident rate and delay time, respectively. This is also the 
case with telecommunication and delivery services. 
 
Since the outcomes of human service are not measurable, governments need 
to introduce an alternative approach. This leads to the second research 
question of this thesis: 
   
How should governments set performance measurement? 
 
Part II of this thesis investigates this problem. 
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Part I. Care Quality Model for the Human Service 
Market 
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Chapter 3. Presenting Ideal CQM 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of this Part I is to answer how 
governments should design the human service market in order to keep the 
capacity to ensure the quality of service. To do so, this chapter first identifies 
the problems of an existing care quality model (hereinafter, Existing CQM) 
and presents an alternative ‘Ideal CQM’ to answer the question. The 
following Chapters 4-6 justify Ideal CQM in terms of empirical applicability, 
empirical workability, and financial practicability, respectively. 
 
 
Defining Care Quality Model 
 
In this thesis, the term ‘care quality model’ indicates the market design that 
directs market competition in terms of care quality. In competitive markets, 
providers naturally aim at profit maximization and behave opportunistically. 
As a result, they provide goods within a wide range of quality and purchasers 
who do not have money are discriminated against or ignored. This is not a 
bad thing in the consumer products market. However, it is typically seen as 
negative in the field of human service as human service is provided to ensure 
people maintain a minimum standard of living. Moreover, expectations about 
the standard quality of care have risen in the human service market over time. 
In long-term care, for example, Activities of Daily Living (ADL) support used 
to cover only such areas as meal preparation and room cleaning but it has 
now extended to include mental aspects such as reduction of isolation and 
depression. Thus, a “care quality model” must automatically improve the 
level of care quality in the market while also eliminating low quality service 
and opportunistic behaviour.  
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Theoretical Foundation of Care Quality Model 
 
Care quality models in the field of human service can be designed on the 
assumption of either a universal or a means-tested system. A “universal” 
system means that governments are responsible for widespread access to 
services. Under a “means-tested” system, government ensures that the 
economically vulnerable have access to services while all other users in the 
population purchase services in the human service market. Theoretically, both 
systems prevent people from being ignored in the human service market. In 
practice, about half of the selected OECD members applied a universal system 
and about half applied a means-tested system (Table 3-1). The cases of 
Canada and Australia are hard to categorize, because of the huge regional 
differences in their systems, and the “slide scale” system in Australia, where 
most people are eligible for at least partial support according to income level.   
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Table 3-1. Major Public Long-Term Care Program  
in 19 selected22 OECD member countries 
 Type of care Program Type 
S. Korea Home care 
Institutional care 
Long-term care insurance Universal 
Luxemburg Home care 
Institutional care 
Dependency insurance Universal 
Mexico Institutional care Specialized services in 
Geriatrics 
All ages, all people who 
are insured 
 Home care Day centres for pensioners 
and retired 
Insured pensioners and 
retired people 
Netherlands Home care AWBZ All ages 
Universal 
 Institutional care AWBZ All ages 
Universal 
New Zealand Home care Carer Support Means-tested 
  Home Support: home help Means-tested 
 Institutional care Long-term residential care Means-tested 
Norway Home care Public long-term care Universal 
 Institutional care Public long-term care Universal 
Poland Home care 
Institutional care 
Social services Means-tested 
Spain Home care 
Institutional care 
Social care programs at 
Autonomous Community 
level 
Means-tested 
Sweden Home care 
Institutional care 
Programs at Canton level; 
health promotion for the 
elderly by Old Age 
Insurance 
Universal 
Switzerland Home care 
Institutional care 
Programs at Canton level; 
health promotion for the 
elderly by Old Age 
Insurance 
Means-tested for 
institutional care 
United Kingdom  Social service Means-tested 
 Home care (cash) Social Security Benefits Means-tested 
Australia Institutional care Residential care Partly means-tested 
 Home care Community Aged Care 
Package (CACP) 
Means-tested 
  Home and community care 
(HACC) 
Means-tested 
  Carer allowance Means-tested 
Austria Home care  Long-term care allowance Universal 
 Institutional care Long-term care allowance Universal 
Canada Home care Provincial programs Usually means-tested 
 Institutional care Provincial programs Usually means-tested 
Germany Home care Social Long-term Care 
Insurance 
Universal 
 Institutional care Social Long-term Care 
Insurance 
Universal 
Hungary Home care/ 
Institutional care 
Social protection and 
social care provision 
program 
Means-tested 
Ireland Institutional care Nursing Home Subvention 
Scheme 
Means-tested 
  Public long-term care Means-tested 
 Home care Community-based care Partly means-tested 
Japan Home care 
Institutional care 
Long-term Care 
Insurance System 
Universal 
United States Home care (in-kind)  
Insurance care 
(in-kind) 
Medicaid Means-tested 
 Source: S. Korea: Choi (2009) and others: OECD (2005) 
                                                   
22 Although OECD consists of 31 member countries, OECD (2005) reported only the 
selected 19 countries due to a lack of available data. The 19 nations included are S. 
Korea, Netherlands, Luxemburg, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Germany, Japan, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, United 
States, Australia, and Canada. 
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To date, all of the care quality models investigated in the literature in the field 
of long-term care assume a means-tested system. This limitation in the 
literature can be explained by the fact that almost all research on quality of 
care models comes from the United States, which has a means-tested system 
of long-term care. Although care quality issues in long-term care markets are 
common in many countries, the disclosure of providers’ care quality has been 
limited either to public providers or geographically, to a specific region only. 
As the disclosure of all nursing homes’ care quality, implemented by the 
United States was unique, it was natural that researchers built care quality 
models based on a means-tested system. Certainly, the United States, until 
recently, appeared to be the only nation in which the care quality data of all 
nursing homes was publicly available. However, the bias towards 
means-tested systems and, indeed, towards one country in the existing care 
quality model research literature creates problems and limitations when 
searching for data to support the definition, design and implementation of the 
best possible model for quality care.  
 
In recent years, Japan has emerged as a possible case counterbalance to this 
problem. As the result of recent reforms, Japan now publicizes all providers’ 
care quality information in its community-based services 23 . Under the 
universal long-term care insurance system implemented in 2000, Japan 
introduced a mandatory third-party evaluation system to the 
community-based services in 2006.  
 
Despite this alternative, there has been little effort to build a care quality 
model with a universal system using the Japanese data. A major reason for 
this may lie in the language barrier issue. Even among Japanese researchers, 
however, the data in Japan has been used only for the empirical investigation 
                                                   
23 Mandatory third-party evaluation (gaibu hyouka). This evaluation is, thus far, 
mandatory for community-based services only. 
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of the models developed from the case of the United States. No one has yet 
criticized the means-tested based models developed in the United States or 
tried to create a care quality model based on a universal system. 
 
 
History of Care quality Model 
 
The current care quality model derives from an earlier research by Scanlon 
(1980) that modelled the access to nursing homes. At that time, many nations 
applied a means-tested policy (e.g., Medicaid in the United States) and mainly 
used private companies to provide long-term care. Using this as his basis, 
Scanlon assumed that the nursing home maximized profits π from two types 
of care recipients: private and Medicaid. In this model, private care recipients 
pay p and have demand x (p). The nursing home receives reimbursement rate 
r for each Medicaid care recipient. The total bed supply is x . Costs )(xc  are 
the same for private and Medicaid care recipients. Therefore, as long as the 
nursing home is full, total costs are fixed. Nursing homes maximize profits 
with respect to private price:  
(1) ).())(()(max xcpxxrppxp --+=p  
 
As quality of care became an issue in long-term care provision, several 
authors expanded Scanlon’s model to quality of care (Nyman 1985; Dusansky 
1989; Gertler (1989), Gertler (1992), Gertler & Waldman (1992). Norton (2000) 
compiled those models into one model, assuming that private care recipients 
care about quality, and that the cost function depends on quality. The model 
is described in the formula: 
(2) ).|()),((),(max, xqcqpxxrqppxqp --+=p  
 
The nursing home takes Medicaid reimbursement r and its own bed supply 
x  as given, and chooses private price p and quality of care q to maximize 
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profits π. 
 
This model (hereinafter, Existing CQM) does not possess the mechanism to 
enhance the quality of care in order to solve the problem of poor quality of 
care. As argued in Chapter 2, the care quality model that possesses both price 
and quality components, at the same time, will inevitably accommodate 
‘inexpensive but poor quality as well as ‘expensive but good quality.’ The 
following section further explains the weaknesses of the model. 
 
 
Weaknesses of the Existing Care Quality Model 
 
Existing CQM has significant weaknesses on directing market competition to 
enhance the quality of care. First, Medicaid care recipients may not pay 
attention to care quality since the reimbursement rate r is independent of care 
needs and care quality24. That is, Medicaid care recipients go to a nursing 
home, not necessarily because they really need care (note: the Medicare 
reimbursement is in-kind25 only), and if they do not actually need care, they 
probably are not concerned about the quality of care26. The nursing home, on 
the other hand, responds to their needs opportunistically: they admit the 
Medicare recipients who require a smaller amount of care in order to 
minimize their costs. Moreover, the nursing home makes more profits by 
increasing care recipients’ reimbursement, despite the quality of care they 
provide. Therefore, the nursing home tends to lower quality of care with an 
increase in Medicaid reimbursement rate because the pool of care recipients 
able to pay for quality shrinks (Norton, 2000). This reduction of the private 
care recipients’ ratio raises the marginal cost of quality among the remaining 
private care recipients and results in reduced quality. Nyman (1988) found 
                                                   
24 The reimbursement rate paid to nursing home depends on historical costs and is 
independent of a care recipient’s health (Norton, 2000).   
25 The benefit is a care service, not cash. 
26 They would care for something irrelevant to the quality of care (e.g., the beauty of 
the nursing home building), rather than the quality of care. 
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that in markets where excess demand was likely, an increased percentage of 
Medicaid care recipients were associated with a lower quality of care. In 
contrast, where excess demand was unlikely, an increased percentage of 
Medicaid care recipients were unrelated to lower quality care. In Existing 
CQM, therefore, the market does not possess the mechanism to improve 
quality of care since a group of users in the market do not care about the 
quality of care.  
 
Second, although private care recipients pay for quality, Existing CQM does 
not eliminate poor quality of care from the market. Figure 3-1 illustrates the 
behaviour of private care recipients in the quality of Existing CQM. As 
Existing CQM deals with price and quality for care recipients choosing a 
provider, one assumes that care recipients look for high-quality care (q) and 
inexpensiveness per unit of care (i) 27. The indifference curve (U) represents 
care recipients’ in different combinations of high quality and inexpensiveness: 
U = u (q, i). Note that the price becomes inexpensive to the right of the figure, 
unlike many other explanations in microeconomics. That is, at each point on 
the curve, care recipients do not prefer high quality over inexpensiveness and 
vice versa. The line (y = qx + ix) indicates the necessary care amount for care 
recipients. Therefore, the utility of care recipients (U) is commonly maximized 
at (X*): the breaker point of the indifference curve and the necessary amount 
of care (y = qx + ix). Importantly, nevertheless, the scale of (q) and (i) is unique 
to each care recipient. The demand for lower quality care continues to exist as 
long as there are care recipients who cannot afford expensive and good 
quality care (e.g., non-wealthy private care recipients). The quality (q*) is very 
poor if the price (i.e., inexpensiveness) (i*) is very cheap. Therefore, Existing 
CQM does not solve the issue of low care quality. 
 
One might think that governments can still eliminate poor quality of care via 
                                                   
27 The term “inexpensive” may sound strange in economics, but the term is necessary 
to describe price component in the association with quality in indifference curve: the 
utility needs to be greater to the right (or the above) of the figure. 
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regulatory policies. In this Existing CQM, however, the workability of 
regulations is very limited. Suppose governments intervene in the market and 
remove the quality below (q**), setting (q**) as the minimum quality standard. 
Care recipients, then, feel that the care level (q**) is too expensive because (q**) 
meets the necessary care amount line (y = qx + ix) at (X2), which is located on 
the left (i.e. expensive) side from the break point (X1), where care recipients 
feel happy about the quality-inexpensiveness combination. In other words, 
care recipients see that (q**) is overpriced as much as (i1-i2). As a result, care 
recipients are dissatisfied with the minimum quality standard and some even 
lose access to long-term care due to the price rise.   
 
Figure 3-1. Care Differentiation and Equilibrium 
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Ideal CQM:  
Directing Market Competition to Improve Quality of Care 
 
This section presents an alternative care quality model (Ideal CQM), which is 
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tested and discussed throughout the remaining chapters of this thesis. As 
shown above, the current means-tested based Existing CQM does not solve 
the care quality problems in the long-term care market.   
 
The following section modifies Existing CQM in two ways. The first 
modification is to remove the care recipients who do not care about quality of 
care from the market, associating reimbursement r with care recipients’ health 
conditions. If standardized contents of care are provided according to care 
recipients’ conditions, care recipients can compare the quality of care of 
providers. In addition, providers cannot behave opportunistically as long as 
the data shows, in public, the condition of the recipients they serve. The 
nursing homes, thus, focus on the competition for a better quality of care. The 
second modification removes price p from Existing CQM. As seen earlier, 
price p leaves low quality in the market, as there is always a group of people 
who cannot afford expensive, high quality care. If quality q is the only factor, 
those who care about quality naturally give nursing homes incentives to 
enhance quality of care because they choose nursing homes based on quality 
of care. In sum, these adaptations redirect market competition away from 
financial competition and towards care competition so that the competitive 
climate works to improve quality of care and, thus, to eliminate poor quality 
of care. 
 
Unlike Existing CQM, Ideal CQM is based on a universal system. Under such 
a system, the people co-purchase necessary long-term care and distribute it 
according to individual needs dictated by health conditions. Setting certain 
criteria for each level of care needs, the government outsources distribution to 
the providers in the market.   
 
In Ideal CQM, therefore, the providers (i.e. nursing homes) compete for a 
better quality of service. As for the providers’ profit maximization, accepting 
the care recipients who need constant care certainly increases their income, 
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but it also consumes many resources (the expenses of the nursing home 
increases) and vice versa. As long as there is competition in the market, the 
nursing homes with low quality of care are unlikely to be chosen by care 
recipients. 
 
In Ideal CQM, universal long-term care insurance holders28 h (i.e. all care 
recipients) care about quality. The providers, therefore, maximize profit with 
respect to quality of care:  
(3) ),|()(max xqcqhxq -=p  
 
where q is quality, c is cost, and x is total bed supply.  
 
In sum, because Existing CQM in the literature does not possess the 
mechanism to solve the problems in the human service market, an alternative 
care quality model is necessary. The alternative is Ideal CQM, which directs 
market competition solely for better care quality. It requires three conditions 
for application: a) a universal long-term care system, b) standardized content 
of care according to care recipients’ conditions, and c) no price competition. 
 
 
Questions Regarding Ideal CQM 
 
Ideal CQM logically solves the care quality issue in the market because low 
quality of care is automatically eliminated by market competition in the 
model. Nevertheless, several empirical and theoretical questions remain 
regarding Ideal CQM. The first is its empirical applicability. Is it possible to 
meet the following requirements: a) universal long-term care system, b) 
standardized content of care according to care recipients’ condition, and c) no 
price competition? Chapter 4 will answer this question in investigating a case 
                                                   
28 This indicates the universally insured people, meaning the same people under the 
universal long-term care system with taxation. 
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that introduces Ideal CQM.  
The second question is about the empirical workability of Ideal CQM. Ideal 
CQM assumes that all care recipients have access to a provider’s care quality 
information and can compare providers based on their care quality. However, 
that assumption conflicts with information asymmetry models in the care 
market. That is, these models claim that care recipients do not have access to 
the signals of providers’ care quality and thus cannot choose a provider based 
on care quality. This issue is addressed in Chapter 5. 
 
The last issue is the financial sustainability of Ideal CQM. As indicated, Ideal 
CQM is based on a universal system, in which governments are responsible 
for service provision to all people. Compared to a means-tested system, many 
researchers claim that a universal system is more costly because coverage is 
much wider. Since the demand on human service is increasing, Ideal CQM, 
based on a universal system, may not be realistic. This argument is examined 
in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4. Testing the Ideal CQM: Applicability 
 
 
The previous chapter presented an Ideal CQM, which theoretically overcomes 
the tension between quality and price that has hampered government efforts 
to ensure quality in the field of human service markets. This chapter begins to 
test the Ideal CQM by assessing whether the three conditions for that model 
can be realised in practice. Specifically, the research underpinning this 
chapter examined the systems of long-term care provided across OECD 
nations to identify whether any existing system fulfilled the three 
preconditions of Ideal CQM: 
(Condition 1) a universal long-term care system; 
(Condition 2) standardized content of care according to care recipients’ 
conditions; and  
(Condition 3) no price competition.   
 
An initial survey of OECD countries showed that the long-term care market 
in Japan was the only country to fulfil all three conditions of the Ideal CQM. 
Across the OECD, eight nations apply universal long-term care (insurance or 
taxation) systems: Austria, Germany, Japan, Luxemburg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, and S. Korea (see Table 3-1). Among these eight nations, 
only four have systems that standardize content of care according to care 
recipients’ conditions: Germany, Luxemburg, Japan, and S. Korea. Japan is the 
only country that excludes price competition in the long-term care market. 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter demonstrates that the three 
preconditions of the Ideal CQM are sustainable in practice and, therefore, 
provides support for the theoretical model tested in this thesis. The three 
sections of this chapter describe how each of the conditions is met by the 
Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) market in Japan. As the first study of this 
type, the exploration of each condition contributes to the empirical 
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knowledge on practice in this area of study. More importantly for the aims of 
this thesis, the evidence of this chapter provides empirical support for the 
practical workability of the Ideal CQM.  
 
 
Condition 1: The Long Term Care System in Japan is Universal  
 
The Government of Japan implemented a universal, public, long-term care 
system, which is centrally funded and universally available. The so-called 
“long-term care insurance” (LTCI) was introduced in 2000, in response to 
increasing social needs. Half of the funding comes from insurance 
contributions and the rest from general taxes, including 25 percent each from 
local and central governments. Those who are aged 40 or above pay an 
insurance fee according to their income (see Table 4-1 for details).  
  
Table 4-1. Insurance Fee, according to income level 
Income Level Insurance fee (per a year) Remarks 
1 JPY20,400 (AUD 255) Family receiving public assistance 
2 JPY20,400 (AUD 255) 
3 JPY35,700 (AUD 446) 
4 JPY51,100 (AUD 639) 
5 JPY66,400 (AUD 830) 
6 JPY71.500 (AUD 894) 
7 JPY86,800 (AUD 1,085) 
Lower income 
↑ 
Standard fee 
↓ 
Higher income 
Source: Niigata City (2008) 
 
In return, insurance holders29 receive necessary care when needed. Ninety 
percent of the cost of care is covered by the LTCI and the remaining 10 
percent falls to the care recipients (Figure 4-1). There are two significant 
features of a LTCI market: a) every organization can enter the LTCI market as 
a service provider as long as it registers with the local governments, and b) 
the prices of all services in a LTCI market are publicly fixed. These 
characteristics are due to the government’s intention to let the providers focus 
                                                   
29 The insurance holders include all care recipients in Japan aged 65 or above plus 
those aged 40 or above who suffer from elderly-related diseases such as Alzheimer’s. 
For those who are not eligible for LTCI but still require long-term care, other national 
programs such as handicapped care and the health care program are available. 
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on competition for better service quality. 
 
Figure 4-1. LTCI Benefit and Source of Fund 
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Condition 2: The Long Term Care System in Japan Provides Standardized 
Content of Care According to Care Recipients’ Conditions 
 
The overall process of LTCI benefits is described in Figure 4-2. First, the 
insurance holders (everyone aged 65 or above and aged 40 or above with 
elderly-related disease) apply for the eligibility test. The eligibility test 
consists of three parts: a) Quantitative Computer Analysis based on the 
standardized 82 criteria, b) Qualitative Analysis based on interviews and 
observations by Publicly Certified Investigators (Kaigo Shien Senmon-in), and 
c) personal physicians’ opinions. The results are examined by the Care Level 
Assessment Committee (Kaigo Nintei Shinsa Kai), a group of specialists in the 
fields of healthcare, medicine, and welfare. Then, the applicants are classified 
by eight grades (seven eligible grades plus “not eligible”), according to their 
health conditions.   
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Figure 4-2. Overall Process of LTCI Benefit 
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Note: Orange colour indicates governments (and/or public bodies). 
 
The approximate standards of these grades are seen in Table 4-3. Support 1 
indicates the lightest condition, whereas Care 5 means “bed-ridden.” The 
elderly with Care 3 or above require full ADL support and many of them 
suffer from dementia. As seen in Table 4-3, each grade occupies 
approximately 8-20 percent of the beneficiaries.    
 
Table 4-2. LTCI Beneficiaries by Grades (as of April 2006) 
 Support 
1 
Support 
2 
Care 1 Care 2 Care 3 Care 4 Care 5 
Ratio* 
Number 
(thousand) 
Total: 2,506 k 
8.2% 
(206.5) 
9.1% 
(227.2) 
19.9% 
(499.6) 
18.7% 
(469.8) 
16.5% 
(413.4) 
14.6% 
(365.7) 
12.1 
(303.8) 
* The rest, 0.8% (20.1 k), receive benefits as a care grade interim measure.   
Source: MHLW (2008a: p. 16) 
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Table 4-3. Approximate Standards of the seven Grades 
Support 1 Support 2 Care 1 Care 2 Care 3 Care 4 Care 5 
Overall 
Needs daily 
methodological 
support to keep 
their condition  
Needs some 
assistance for 
daily life 
Needs  partial 
care 
occasionally 
Needs  partial 
care for daily life 
Needs  constant 
care  
Difficult to live 
daily life without 
constant care 
Not capable of  
spending daily life 
without constant 
care 
Standing and moving on 
foot  
Needs some 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs some 
assistance 
Needs some 
assistance 
Needs some 
assistance Not capable Not capable 
Standing up/keep 
standing on a single leg 
Needs some 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs some 
assistance 
Needs some 
assistance 
Needs some 
assistance Not capable Not capable Not capable 
Excretion    
Needs partial 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs partial 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs full 
assistance 
Needs full 
assistance 
Eating     
Needs partial 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs partial 
assistance 
Needs partial 
assistance 
Daily routine such as 
nail cutting and 
changing clothes 
Needs partial 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs  partial 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs  partial 
assistance 
occasionally 
Needs  partial 
assistance 
Needs full 
assistance 
Needs full 
assistance 
Needs full 
assistance 
Symptoms of Decreasing 
Comprehension 
can be seen 
occasionally 
can be seen 
occasionally 
can be seen 
partially 
Can be seen 
partially can be seen entirely can be seen entirely can be seen entirely 
Abnormal Behaviour can be seen occasionally 
can be seen 
occasionally 
can be seen 
occasionally 
Can be seen 
occasionally 
can be seen 
occasionally 
can be seen 
occasionally can be seen entirely 
Source: Niigata City (2008)
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Those who are eligible can choose to combine a range of long-term care services. 
Table 4-4 indicates the benefit limit of each grade (note that benefits are in-kind, 
not paid in cash).   
 
Table 4-4. Benefit Limit of Each Grade 
Grade Monthly maximum coverage 
Support 1 JPY 49,700  (AUD 621) 
Support 2 JPY 104,000 (AUD 1,300) 
Care 1 JPY 165,800 (AUD 2,073) 
Care 2 JPY 194,800 (AUD 2,435) 
Care 3 JPY 267,500 (AUD 3,344) 
Care 4 JPY 306,000 (AUD 3,825) 
Care 5 JPY 358,300 (AUD 4,479) 
   Source: Niigata City (2008) 
 
There are diverse care services available in the Japanese market. Table 4-5 
indicates available types of services. Users usually choose a suitable type 
service from the choices. For example, if users choose a Group Home for elderly 
with dementia (hereinafter, Group Home) provider, the cost of care is seen in 
Table 4-6. As mentioned earlier, the users’ expense for care service is 10 percent 
of the whole cost and the reset is covered by the insurance benefit.  
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Table 4-5. Choice of Major Care Services 
At-home care Institutional care 
Home-visit services 
- Home-help service 
- Home-visit nursing 
- Home-visit bathing service 
- Home-visit rehabilitation 
 
Commuting services 
- Day care service 
- Day rehabilitation service 
 
Short-stay services 
- Short-stay for the elderly requiring 
care 
- Short-stay for the elderly requiring 
medical care 
Community-based services 
- Group Home for the elderly with 
dementia 
 
Facility Services 
- Health Services Facilities for the 
elderly 
- Special Nursing Homes for the elderly 
- Sanatorium-type Medical Care 
Facilities 
Note: The names for care services are often confusing, because care services usually have two different 
names: the address term and law term. Special Nursing Homes for the elderly indicates 
Kaigo-Roujin-Hoken-Shisetsu (or Tokubetsu-Yougo-Roujin-Houmu), which is sometimes translated as 
Assisted Nursing Homes.  In addition, Health Service Facilities for the elderly means 
Kaigo-Roujin-Hoken-Shisetsu (or Rouken-Shisetsu), which is sometimes translated as Intermediate 
Nursing Homes (see Sugahara, 2010 for an example). 
. 
Table 4-6. Cost of Group Home for elderly with dementia 
Level Cost (per a day) Personal Expense (per a day) 
Support 2 JPY 8,310 (AUD 104) JPY 831 (AUD 10.4) 
Care 1 JPY 8,310 (AUD 104) JPY 831 (AUD 10.4) 
Care 2 JPY 8,480 (AUD 106) JPY 848 (AUD 10.6) 
Care 3 JPY 8,650 (AUD 108) JPY 865 (AUD 10.8) 
Care 4 JPY 8,820 (AUD 110) JPY 882 (AUD 11) 
Care 5 JPY 9,000 (AUD 112) JPY 900 (AUD 11.2) 
Note: Support 1 is not eligible to use for Group Home services. Care 2 or below cannot reside at a 
Group Home.   
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Condition 3: There is No Price Competition  
in the Long-term Care Market in Japan 
 
A unique feature of the LTCI in Japan is the exclusion of price competition. In 
the LTCI market, therefore, care is provided based on necessity, not preference. 
Even if economically wealthy elderly people with Care 1 want to reside at a 
Group Home, for example, they would not be allowed (see Note in Table 4-6) 
because it is not necessary for their condition. In addition, care providers do not 
provide/receive anything other than the designated care/price. 
 
Nevertheless, insufficient ‘quantity’ of care provision automatically creates a 
new market that has price competition outside the managed market. As 
discussed earlier, an important purpose of human service provision is to ensure 
a certain quality level. If human service provided through the managed market 
does not achieve the purpose, people have to look for necessary care outside the 
market.   
 
In that case, the effect of “no price competition” in the managed market would 
be limited, because the markets outside the managed one would have price 
competition. Therefore, we need to investigate whether sufficient care is 
provided through the LTCI market in order to confirm the workability of the 
condition: no price competition. The following section investigates this, 
examining the possible long-term care market outside of the LTCI scheme in 
Japan. 
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Market Outside of LTCI scheme 
While several private long-term-care-related markets exist in Japan, they 
operate only as a supplement to the managed LTCI scheme. As for facility 
services, a type of provider called Elderly Home (Keihi Roujin Houmu) serves the 
semi-independent elderly in Japan. The Elderly Home is classified into type A 
to C; type A and B are accommodations only, whereas type C offers meal 
service as well. Although they must register with the local government to open 
the business, service price can be set freely, except for the administration fee, 
which has to be progressive according to a resident’s financial condition30. 
However, these Elderly Homes may not provide long-term care. Although they 
serve the elderly particularly, they do not provide anything other than 
hostel-type services such as accommodations, meals, and laundry. If care 
recipients (i.e., residents) require “care” with entitled grades, they must either 
move to institutional care service providers or request at-home care services 
providers (see Table 4-5 on page 65) while living at the Elderly Home.   
 
Similarly, the market of home-delivery services outside of the LTCI scheme 
cannot substitute for the LTCI scheme. Although many private companies 
deliver several Activities of Daily Living (ADL) related services, including meal 
delivery, personal shopper, and electric device replacement (e.g., electric bulbs) 
for the elderly, they do not provide “care.”   
 
                                                   
30 The ranges of the administration fee are 0-120,000 yen [0-1,500 AUD]/month for type 
A; 15,000-30,000 yen [188-375 AUD]/month for type B; and 10,000-90,000 yen 
[125-1,125 AUD]/month for type C. 
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As for insurance, some companies offer private long-term care insurance, but 
the impact is, again, limited. There are logical reasons for this. First, compared 
with other insurances, such as health and car, selling long-term care insurance 
tends to be costly. Selling insurance becomes most attractive principally when 
“risk” is the care recipient’s adverse choice. This works to sell health and car 
insurance because insurance holders normally try hard not to suffer from 
sickness or accidents. In the case of long-term care, however, a care recipient’s 
expectation of being in a nursing home is highly positively correlated with 
purchasing long-term care insurance, even after controlling for observable 
expenditure risks such as health status (Sloan and Norton, 1997). Insurance 
companies, therefore, have to invest a great amount of money to screen for bad 
“risks.” According to Norton (2000), they typically have to deny 10 to 20 
percent of elderly applications. This screening procedure certainly adds to the 
burden of making profits. According to the study of Cutler (1996), the 
administrative load is typically half to two-thirds of the total cost. High costs 
raise the premiums, which in turn, reduces demand. For these reasons, private 
long-term care insurer rates among the Japanese are very small: 5.4% for age 
40s; 4.6% for age 50s; 6.9% for age 60s or above (The General Insurance 
Association of Japan, 2002). Private long-term care insurance, as a result, 
occupies only 1.3% of the entire private insurance market in Japan (The Life 
Insurance Association of Japan, 2002). 
 
In sum, the private long-term care market in Japan plays only a supplemental 
role to the LTCI market, and both markets are uncompetitive. Therefore, the 
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LTCI feature that excludes price competition remains in Japan. 
  
 
Access to Care Quality Information: A Fourth Condition to Ideal CQM 
 
The evidence thus confirms that the Japanese LTCI meets the three conditions 
of Ideal CQM, but the research also highlights the importance of access to care 
quality information in ensuring the operation of the LTCI system. The section 
below discusses the necessity for transparency in the dissemination of 
information regarding the quality of care associated with all care providers in 
the market. All recipients must have access to the same care quality evidence to 
support care choices.  The significance of this factor suggests that access to care 
quality information should be established as a condition required to make Ideal 
CQM work. Therefore, it is the fourth condition to introduce Ideal CQM that 
governments publicise providers’ care quality information. 
 
Overall Care Quality Assurance System in Japanese LTCI 
The Japanese LTCI market has two types of provider care-quality-assurance 
systems: annual facility inspections by local governments and annual external 
evaluations by certified examiners. The facility inspection is mandatory for all 
providers; it establishes that the providers meet the basic requirements. 
Disqualified providers are ordered to suspend business. The external 
evaluation consists of three types, which are summarise in Table 4-7 and 
discussed below.   
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First, Care Service Information (CSI) is mandatory for all providers, aiming to 
provide users with objective information about the providers in the market. CSI 
provides two types of information: a basic report and a surveyed report. 
Whereas the basic report includes the capacity and staff allocation of a provider, 
the surveyed report mentions matters that are more detailed: “whether or not 
the provider has a guideline for staff training,” and “whether or not the 
provider has a database of provided service.” A significant feature of SCI is that 
all the included information holds “objectivity” that is based on fact. SCI does 
not provide any “subjective” report: the provider has a “good” guideline for 
staff training. Instead, SCI states facts like, “the provider has a guideline for 
staff training.” Care recipients, therefore, can get non-biased information on 
providers. 
 
Table 4-7. Quality Assurance systems in Japanese LTCI 
Name of evaluation Target providers Remarks 
Care Service Information 
(Kaigo jouhou saabisu jouhou) 
All and mandatory -CSI consists of self report and 
investigated report 
-All information is based on 
facts 
-CSI aims to provide care 
recipients unbiased 
information  
Third-party evaluation 
(Daisansha hyouka) 
All but optional -The evaluation aims to 
enhance providers’ care 
quality by giving them a 
consultation 
Mandatory third-party 
evaluation of care quality 
(Gaibu hyouka) 
Community-based services 
(i.e., Group Home) providers 
and mandatory 
-The evaluation assesses the 
care quality on behalf of frail 
elderly 
 Source: Health and Welfare Statistics Association, Japan (2008) The system of care service information 
(kaigo saabisu jouhou no kouhyou seido) 
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Second, third-party evaluation is available to all providers, but it is optional. 
The purpose of this evaluation is to enhance providers’ care quality by 
professional consulting. Examining a provider’s care service and managerial 
structure, the evaluators, licensed by the municipality, give feedback to the 
provider. The outcome is open to the public. However, care recipients do not 
usually utilize the information to compare providers, because not all providers 
are evaluated. Some municipalities strongly encourage providers to use the 
evaluation annually, but most municipalities still leave this as an option. 
 
Third, third-party evaluation of care quality is mandatory for community-based 
service providers. Most care recipients at community-based services are 
dementia-suffering elderly who cannot exercise their rights as consumers. 
Therefore, certified third-party evaluators31 assess the providers’ care quality 
on behalf of care recipients. The care quality indicators are designed by the 
central government and updated every three years. The outcome is public and 
care recipients are expected to use this information when choosing a provider.    
 
Despite implementing these quality assurance systems, the Japanese LTCI 
system is still cautious of measuring care quality. In fact, mandatory third-party 
evaluation of care quality is the only system that publicizes care quality 
information in order for care recipients to choose a provider. Care recipients, 
therefore, have access to care quality information only when choosing a 
community-service provider. 
                                                   
31 They are licensed by a municipality. 
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Community-based service in the LTCI market consists of several services, 
including Group Homes. However, because Group Homes occupy a very 
significant portion of community-based services, the terms Group Home and 
community-based service are often used interchangeably in this thesis. From 
here onwards, therefore, this chapter specifically investigates mandatory 
third-party evaluations in the Japanese Group Home market.  
 
Mandatory Third-party Evaluation 
The content of mandatory third-party evaluation of care quality (hereinafter, 
mandatory third-party evaluation) covers a diverse field of quality of care. 
FY2005/2006 introduced this evaluation system to the Group Home market to 
publicize/enhance service quality32. Table 4-8 indicates the index of mandatory 
third-party evaluation of service quality.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
32 There was a two-year trial period prior to the introduction: the providers that had 
already entered the market before 2005 had to disclose evaluation outcomes at least 
once within the trial period. 
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Table 4-8. The Index of Mandatory Third-party Evaluation33 
Index Sub-index 
ⅠCorporate philosophy  1) Publicity about the corporate philosophy (4 items) 
2) Homely living space (4 items) ⅡLife environment 
3) Customized living space (6 items) 
4) Care management (7 items) 
5) Basic care implementation (8 items) 
6) ADLi support (10 items) 
7) Life support (2 items) 
8) Medical and health support (9 items) 
9) Community life 
(1 item) 
ⅢCare service 
10) Interaction with family (1 item) 
11) Administrative procedures (10 items) 
12) Response to complaints (2 items) 
13) Interaction between GH and family (3 items) 
ⅣManagerial structure 
14) Interaction between GH and community (4 items) 
Note: GH indicates Group Home 
Source: Welfare And Medical Service Agency (2010a) 
 
Like any other measurement, certainly, the mandatory third-party evaluation is 
not an absolute indicator of quality of care. However, this evaluation covers 
important details of care, including some background of care implementation: 
Life environment and Managerial structure. Moreover, the items of each 
sub-index mention details; these are particularly important in quality of 
long-term care because many care recipients today cannot always express their 
complaints adequately (Braithwaite, 2006). Wiener, et al. (2007), who 
internationally compared quality assurance for long-term care, points out the 
comprehensiveness of the mandatory third-party evaluation, saying, “Japan 
appears to be the only country to have developed special approaches to assure 
the quality of care in facilities for people with dementia” (p.8).    
 
 
                                                   
33 The index has been gradually updated since 2008, but this thesis uses the old index, 
which was used mainly prior to 2008, due to data accessibility.  
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Summary and Discussion 
 
This chapter confirmed that Ideal CQM, presented in the previous chapter, is 
possible in practice by demonstrating that the conditions for implementation 
are met in the LTCI in Japan. Specifically the LTCI system in Japan 
incorporates: a) a universal long-term care system, b) standardized content of 
care according to care recipients’ conditions, and c) no price competition.   
 
Nevertheless, in order for Ideal CQM to work, the LTCI system in Japan shows 
that providers’ care quality information needs to be publically available. 
Otherwise, care recipients are not able to compare the care quality of providers 
and choose one based on its delivery of quality care. To this end, the care 
quality information of all community-based service (i.e., Group Home) 
providers in Japan is publicly available. Publicizing providers’ care quality 
information, the fourth condition, is therefore necessary for Ideal CQM to work 
in the market.   
 
The next chapter takes a further step in testing the Ideal CQM by examining 
whether the ‘access to quality information” condition can resolve the problem 
of information asymmetry in the market.   
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Chapter 5. Testing Ideal CQM: Empirical Workability 
 
 
In presenting Ideal CQM, this paper has claimed that care recipients ought to be 
able to choose a provider based on quality of care, so that the market 
competition sustainably enhances quality of care. So far, we have found that in 
the Group Home market in the Japanese LTCI scheme, the detailed evaluation 
of quality of care seems to serve as an almost single factor to choose a provider. 
Does the case of the Group Home market justify the validity of Ideal CQM? If 
so, the case should be able to achieve the following three conditions: a) care 
recipients choose a provider based on quality of care, b) the competition among 
providers enhances quality of care, and c) new market entries bring increased 
qualified care into the market because they know that providers are chosen 
based on quality of care. Under these conditions, Ideal CQM is justified and 
quality of care concerns are resolved. 
 
Nevertheless, there are three models that conflict with the idea that these 
conditions can be achieved, because of possible information asymmetry 
between care recipients and providers in the long-term care market:   
a) the Contract Failure model, which claims care recipients perceive 
non-profit providers as a sign of good service quality.  
b) the Medical Arms Race (MAR) model, which argues that competition in 
the care market tends to lower quality of care. 
c) Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model, which claims that new entries in the care 
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market do not contribute to improvement in the market’s quality of care.   
This chapter, therefore, specifically examines the validities of the three models 
that disagree with the achievement of Ideal CQM, investigating the outcomes of 
the mandatory third-party evaluation in the Group Home market in Japan. 
 
 
Reviewing Testing Models 
 
In order to investigate the validity of Ideal CQM, this section discusses the 
details of the three, above-mentioned, testing models of service quality 
improvement in the long-term care market. This examination uses the analysis 
of 1,093 Group Home providers’ care quality data in the Japanese LTCI market. 
 
 
The Contract Failure Model:  
The Care Recipients May Not Choose a Provider Based on Service Quality 
 
The Contract Failure model introduced by Hansmann (1980)  claims that in the 
care market, care recipients cannot choose a provider based on service quality 
because there is information asymmetry between care recipients and providers. 
Thus, the care recipients see the ownership of providers as a signal of service 
quality; they therefore choose non-profit providers rather than for-profit 
providers whom, they believe, tend to behave opportunistically (Hansmann, 
1980; Hirth, 1999). 
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However, this does not necessarily mean that the care quality of non-profit 
providers is actually better than that of for-profits (Endo, 1995; Suzuki, 2002). 
There are three arguments for this proposition. First, due to the limitation of the 
ownership, non-profits do not have incentives to improve cost-effectiveness and 
service quality as much as for-profits do (James and Rose-Ackerman, 1986). 
Second, the incentive to improve service quality is difficult to identify, 
regardless of the ownership of providers, if the market is protected from price 
competition (Tuckman and Chang, 1988; Nanbu, 2000). Third, the development 
of information technology that minimizes information asymmetry may benefit 
the for-profit providers (Ben-Ner, 2002). 
    
Many empirical studies reflect this dispute. On one hand, Weisbrod (1980)  and 
Cohen and Spector (1996)  investigated the long-term care market in the United 
States and concluded that the service quality of non-profits was superior to that 
of for-profits. Gertler (1984), who also surveyed the care market in the United 
States, claimed the opposite. However, Nyman (1988)  and O’Brien et al (1983)  
concluded there was no significant difference. Endo (2006)  argued that these 
different outcomes stemmed from the absence of a clear definition of service 
quality. 
   
Nevertheless, the hypothesis of “contract failure” may be true. Certainly, as 
Hansmann (1980) says, if the service quality of non-profits is better than that of 
for-profits, the care recipient’s “signal” would be correct. This means there is no 
“contract failure.” However, as seen above, the correlation between the 
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provider’s ownership and the service quality is still not clear. 
 
The solution to this “contract failure” is for the care recipients to be able to 
access service quality information from the providers. Hirth (1999) points out 
that repeat purchasing helps care recipients grasp a provider’s service quality 
level. Although this may not be realistic in purchasing long-term care services, 
it is still important to fill the information gap between the care recipients and 
providers, as information asymmetry is the condition of “contract failure.”  
  
The LTCI market in Japan has been actively involved in filling the information 
gap. Implementing the LTCI in 2000, the Japanese government has shaped a 
standardized care quality measurement and built a database of evaluation 
outcomes. The optional third-party evaluation system (daisansha-hyoka) in 2003, 
mandatory third-party evaluation system (gaibu-hyoka seido) for community 
services in 2005, and LTCI information disclosure scheme (kaigo service johou 
koukai seido) in 2007 are all examples of this measurementii. As for the database 
that makes this information available to the public, the Welfare and Medical 
Service Network (WAM-NET) system has been operating since 2001.    
 
Nevertheless, the dispute over whether or not the ownership of providers 
affects care quality is evident in Japan as well. Morozumi (2007)  surveyed 
Group Home providers for the elderly with dementia (hereafter, Group Home) 
in the Tokyo metropolitan area and Osaka city. She claimed that non-profits 
provide better quality care recipient transfers than those of for-profits because 
 79 
of diversification. Suzuki (2002), on the other hand, surveyed at-home care 
providers in the Kanto area in 2001 and claimed that there was no significant 
difference between the ownerships of providers in care quality, yet 75 percent 
of the market share in that year was occupied by non-profits. Suzuki (2002) 
pointed out that this was “contract failure.” Six years after Suzuki’s claim, the 
market share of for-profits increased to nearly 50 percent of the market share. 
Sakurai (2008) analysed the service quality of Group Home providers in Kyoto 
and Shiga prefectures and claimed that there was still no significant difference 
between non-profits and for-profits in service quality; he implied that the 
difference in service quality between non-profits and for-profits reflected the 
market share (Figure 5-1). This meant there was no “contract failure” in the 
Japanese LTCI market. 
 
Figure 5-1. The transition of market share by the type of provider  
(as of October in each year)    
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
Government
For-profit
Nonprofit
 
Source: MHLW (2007)  and Health and Welfare Statistics Association (2007; p. 189-191). 
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This paper, on the proposed model Ideal CQM, aimed to rectify two 
deficiencies in previous research. The first was about the quality and quantity of 
the data to be analysed. The sample size of the surveys by Suzuki (2002) and 
Morozumi (2007) was only a few hundred people (Suzuki: 437; Morozumi: 108), 
though those sample sizes were acceptable for the research environment at the 
time. Sakurai’s (2008) research utilized data in only two prefectures out of 47. 
These outcomes have left a question about the validity of the data. The second 
aspect was about the investigation of the reasons for the dispute over whether 
the ownership of providers influences care quality or not. This paper, therefore, 
analysed the features of providers’ ownership. 
 
 
Medical Arms Race (MAR) Model:  
Competition May Not Enhance Service Quality 
 
The MAR model argues that the competition in the care market tends to lower 
care quality. To be competitive in the market, providers spend money on 
advertising or renovation of buildings and equipment rather than on improving 
care quality itself (Hersch, 1984; Luft et al., 1986; Robinson, 1988).   
 
This model has been actively researched in the healthcare market in the United 
States, and many providers have acknowledged the phenomenon. Defining 
competitiveness as market intensity34, Wilson and Jadlow (1982) claimed that 
                                                   
34 The intensity of competitiveness was measured by (referral) radius × (hospital 
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the more competitive a market, the less technically efficient it is. According to 
Farley (1985), care tends to be expensive at hospitals in competitive markets. 
However, Robinson and Luft (1985)  found the opposite was true. Zwanziger 
and Melnick (1988) claimed that this phenomenon was due to the 
over-prescription of the hospitals in competitive markets. Devers et al. (2003) 
and Berenson et al. (2006) argued that over-prescription was spreading from 
medical treatment to the amenity of hospitals. 
     
There are a few criticisms of the MAR model. Dranove, Shanley, and Simon 
(1992)  claimed that hospitals in competitive markets needed to respond to the 
need for high-tech medical treatment, introducing the latest equipment. Thus, it 
was natural that treatment at such hospitals cost more, and this was not a 
matter of inefficiency. Moreover, by defining “care quality” as mortality, and 
“market competitiveness” by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), Shortel 
and Hughes (1988) denied the correlation between care quality and the market 
mechanism. Kessler and McClellan (1999) also denied the hypothesis of the 
MAR model, claiming that market competitiveness lowered the mortality rate. 
As for the research on nursing homes in the United States, Gertler and 
Waldman (1992) claimed that the market mechanism enhanced the service 
quality; Nyman (1994) criticized the policy that regulated nursing homes’ 
capacity in order to avoid the MAR syndrome, claiming that the policy 
discouraged providers’ efforts to be effective.   
 
                                                                                                                                                     
density) × (population density) (Wilson and Jadlow, 1982: p.447). 
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There is little research on this issue in the Japanese LTCI market. The notable 
exceptions are the theoretical research of Nanbu (2000) and the empirical study 
of Zhou and Suzuki (2004). Pointing out that there is no price competition in the 
market, Nanbu (2000) discussed the possibility that market competition would 
lead providers to compete for a better care quality, not just rent seeking and 
advertising. Zhou and Suzuki (2004) surveyed the long-term care providers in 
the Kanto area in September 2001, right after the implementation of the 
Japanese LTCI, and claimed that there was little correlation between care 
quality and market competitiveness. 
 
This paper investigated the relationship between care quality and market 
competitiveness many years after the implementation of the Japanese LTCI. If 
there were relationships between them, the research also searched for the 
reasons behind the relationship. 
 
 
Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) Model:  
New Entries May Not Bring a More Qualified Service into the Market 
 
Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model claims that new entries in the care market do 
not contribute to improving the market’s care quality. In general, new entries 
are expected to bring a more qualified care into the market, but in the case of 
the care market, they may spend resources on advertisement rather than on 
care quality improvement. Suzuki and Satake (2001) point out that the 
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advertisement costs out of the total cost of new entries is greater than that of old 
entries, surveying 445 at-home care providers in the Kanto area in 2000. 
 
Nanbu (2000) presented a different view. He assumed that new entries entered 
the market with the break-even price (Ps), which was lower than that of existing 
providers (Pr). Thus, they might use their excess profit (Pr-Ps) for the 
improvement of care quality. In this case, however, Pr-Ps might still be spent on 
something other than care quality improvement (e.g., advertisement), as Suzuki 
and Satake (2001) argued. This competition on advertisements could also drag 
Pr up into balance with Ps. 
 
However, Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model still needs to be validated. The 
model was investigated right after the implementation of the Japanese LTCI. 
The existing providers at the time were dominantly non-profits, whereas the 
majority of new entries were for-profit, due to the market deregulation at the 
time. In addition, as mentioned above, the government has made efforts to 
solve this problem, bridging the information gap between care recipients and 
providers. Thus, this paper on this model investigates whether new entries 
bring a more qualified level of care into the market today. 
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Methodology 
 
Method 
 
In order to examine the validity of the above-mentioned three models, this 
research primarily investigates the correlation between providers’ quality of 
care (i.e. the outcome of mandatory third-party evaluation) and providers’ 
various attributes. These attributes are the ownership for the Contract Failure 
model, the market competitiveness of the providers’ located area for the MAR 
model, and the timing of market entry for Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model.   
 
 
Data Source 
 
The data source used is the WAM-NET database 35  for the Group Home 
providers of the fiscal year (FY) 2006/200736. The sample was 1,093 Group 
Home providers37 in six prefectures in the Kanto area38, which occupied 13 
percent of all Group Home providers in Japan. Table 5-1 indicates the 
distribution of providers by ownership. Although the overall distribution of 
this research is similar to the national census, there are slightly more for-profits 
                                                   
35 WAM-NET is a search engine of long-term care providers run by the Social Welfare 
and Medicaid Agency. 
36 The data of FY 2007/2008, the latest fiscal year in which this research was conducted, 
were not available in a uniform way, because the evaluation criteria in many 
prefectures were modified during the fiscal year. 
37 This was all Group Home providers in the market at the time. 
38 The Tokyo metropolitan area was not included in this research because its care 
quality evaluation was exceptionally different from that of other prefectures. 
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and fewer medical corporations in the investigated area. This research does not 
investigate public providers.  
 
Definition of Group Home 
As mentioned earlier, Group Home in Japanese long-term care insurance 
scheme indicates a small sized community-based service for the elderly with 
dementia. According to Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010a), the 
definition include a) the number of care recipients per unit (i.e., building) must 
be 9 or less (up to 3 units in one place); b) the care recipients must have a 
private room39; c) the residents must be with care grade 3 or above (see Table 
4-3 for the definition of care grade). 
 
Table 5-1. Distribution of Providers by Ownership 
Ownership This research National census 
For-profit providers Stock corporations, 
limited private 
companies 
646 (60.43%) 4,417 (52.9%) 
Social welfare 
associations 
196 (18.33%) 1,826 (21.9%) 
Medical corporations 144 (13.47%) 1,554 (18.6%) 
Cooperative 
associations 
0 (0%) 31 (0.4%) 
Civil corporations 1 (0.09%) 29 (0.3%) 
Specified NPOs 81 (7.48%) 453 (5.4%) 
Non-profit providers 
Other organizations 1 (0.09%) 23 (0.3%) 
Local public 
organizations 
0 (0%) 17 (0.2%) Public providers 
Social welfare 
corporations 
(excluding social 
welfare associations) 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Sum  1,069 (100%) 8,350 (100%) 
Note: The national census data is as of October 2007 and quoted from MHLW (2007). The 
categorizations of ownership refer to Shimizutani and Suzuki (2002: 17) 41). There are 24 providers 
missing ownership information due to a broken link; they are excluded from this table. 
                                                   
39 This is not the case if the care recipient shares the room with his/her spouse. 
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Quantifying Providers’ Quality of Care 
Providers’ quality of care is quantified by the average item-achievement rate of 
each sub-index in the mandatory third-party evaluation (Table 5-2). All items 
indicated in Table 5-2 are the standardized sub-index measurement 
implemented by the central government. Although prefectural governments 
may add some local items of sub-indices to the standardized content, this 
research only considers a standard format in order to collect the data by 
inter-prefecture. The outcome of the mandatory third-party evaluation shows 
what items a provider passes or fails with some remarks. In this research, 
therefore, the achievement rate of each sub-index is calculated by the number of 
the item a provider clears, out of the total item number(s) in the sub-index. For 
example, sub-index 11, Administrative procedure, has 10 items. If a provider 
clears 6 items out of 10, the providers gets a 0.6 (or 60%) achievement rate in the 
sub-index. That applies to all sub-indices. The total score of care quality 
(hereinafter, “total score”) is the average achievement rate of all 14 indices.    
 
Table 5-2. Mandatory Third-party Evaluation 
Index Sub-index Item 
ⅠCorporate philosophy  1) Publicity about the corporate 
philosophy (4 items) 
a)Publicity 
b)Clear indication 
c)Staff members’ tasks 
d)Education 
2) Homely living space (4 items) a) The atmosphere of entrance 
b) The atmosphere of common place 
c) The atmosphere of living room 
d) Customizing own room (bedroom) 
ⅡLife environment 
3) Customized living space (6 items) a) Supportive devices 
b) Layout 
c) Noise proof and lighting 
d) Air infiltration  
e) Clock display 
f) Facilities 
ⅢCare service 4) Care management (7 items) a) Care planning 
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Index Sub-index Item 
b) Sharing care plans among staff members 
c) Meeting care recipients’ requests 
d) Reviewing care plan 
e) Care recording 
f) Communication 
g) Team building 
5) Basic care implementation (8 
items) 
a) Respecting care recipients 
b) Friendly attitude 
c) Respecting care recipients’ past experiences 
d) Respecting care recipients’ life styles 
e) Hearing care recipients’ request 
f) Respecting care recipients’ independence 
g) Respecting care recipients’ physical freedom 
h) Unlocking door policy 
6) ADLiii support (10 items) a) Hearing meal requests from care recipients 
b) Eating utensils 
c) Customized cooking method 
d) Recording nutritional needs 
e) Enjoyable cuisine 
f) Customized elimination support 
g) Mental aspects in elimination support 
h) Customized bathing support 
i) Hair/facial treatment support 
j) Support for quiet sleep 
7) Life support (2 items) a) Management of care recipients’ property 
b) Recreation 
8) Medical and health support (9 
items) 
a) Assisting medical consultation 
b) Collaboration with medical institutions 
c) Supporting care recipients’ routine health 
checkups 
d) Exercising 
e) Troubleshooting 
f) Assisting dental care 
g) Assisting medicine taking 
h) First aid 
i) Policy on infection and disease 
9) Community life 
(1 item) 
a) Interaction with local community 
10) Interaction with family (1 item) a) Interaction with family 
11) Administrative procedures (10 
items) 
a) Locus of responsibility 
b) Hearing the voices of care staff members 
c) Sufficient number of staff members 
d) Staff training 
e) Stress control 
f) Application screening process 
g) Supporting care recipients’ move-out 
h) Hygienic 
i) Item control 
j) Reporting and knowledge management 
12) Response to complaints (2 items) a) Accepting external evaluator 
b) Setting complaint office 
13) Interaction between GH and 
family (3 items) 
a) Hearing the voice of care recipient’s family 
b) Reporting to care recipient’s family 
c) Management of care recipient’s financial 
property 
ⅣManagerial structure 
14) Interaction between GH and 
community (4 items) 
a) Interaction with local municipality 
b) Interaction with local residents 
c) Public relations 
d) Facility sharing 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010a) 
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In addition, this research also utilizes the quality care score of the principal 
component. The above-mentioned total score treats all sub-indices equally. For 
example, however, sub-index 3, customized living space, may not be as 
important as sub-index 4, care management, and vice-versa. Calculating each 
sub-index’s principle component score, therefore, this research weights the 
score of each sub-index. As Table 5-3 indicates, the percent of variance in the 
primary component (i.e., component 1 in the table) is only about 20 percent and 
the rest is less than 10 percent each. Thus, it is certainly reasonable to clean the 
data by combining similar sub-indices, such as sub-index 2, Homely living 
space, and sub-index 3, Customized living space, in order to increase the 
percent of the variance. This research, nevertheless, leaves all sub-indices as 
they are, because they are exactly what care recipients investigate on choosing a 
provider. Instead of combining sub-indices, therefore, this research uses 
component 1 only, multiplying the score of each sub-index by the weight of 
component 1 (see Table 5-4). The score of the principal component of index 1 is, 
for example, 0.556n. The total score of the principal component is the average of 
each sub-index’s score of principal component.   
 
Furthermore, this research investigates the improvement of care quality. 
Collecting care quality information from the previous year, the research 
compares the yearly care quality transitions of the providers. The improvement 
score is thus the subtraction of the score in the researched FY from that in the 
previous year. Thus, the numbers above 0 mean improvement and those below 
0 indicate decline: the size of the number is the degree. 
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Table 5-3. Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigen values Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 2.898 20.696 20.696 2.898 20.696 20.696 
2 1.280 9.141 29.838 1.280 9.141 29.838 
3 1.149 8.205 38.042 1.149 8.205 38.042 
4 .979 6.990 45.032     
5 .973 6.947 51.979     
6 .938 6.698 58.677     
7 .857 6.123 64.800     
8 .829 5.922 70.723     
9 .785 5.609 76.332     
10 .743 5.304 81.636     
11 .695 4.966 86.602     
12 .670 4.788 91.390     
13 .621 4.432 95.822     
14 .585 4.178 100.000     
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Table5-4. Component Matrix (a) 
  Component 
Sub-Index 1 2 3 
1) Publicity about the corporate philosophy .556 .215 -.080 
2) Homely living space .415 -.550 -.067 
3) Customized living space .435 -.478 -.253 
4) Care management  .474 .200 -.362 
5) Basic care implementation .456 -.328 .178 
6) ADLiv support .521 -.090 .115 
7) Life support .368 .110 .371 
8) Medical and health support .567 .114 -.296 
9) Community life .360 -.312 .464 
10) Interaction with family .275 .102 .552 
11) Administrative procedures .636 .149 -.321 
12) Response to complaints  .251 .455 .168 
13) Interaction between GH and family .381 .426 .115 
14) Interaction between GH and community .498 .051 .088 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a)  3 components extracted. 
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Quantifying the Attributes 
This research first investigates the Contract Failure model, comparing care 
quality between for-profit and non-profit providers. In the case of the Japanese 
market, for-profit provider indicates Stock Corporations and Limited Private 
Companies, whereas non-profit provider means Social Welfare Associations, 
Medical Corporations, Cooperate Associations, Civil Corporations, Specified 
NPOs, and other non-profit organizations (e.g. voluntary associations). This 
research does not consider Public providers that consist of Local Public 
Organizations and Social Welfare Corporations (excluding Social Welfare 
Associations), because the sample is too small (see Figure 5-1).   
 
In regards to the MAR model, this research measures market competitiveness 
by the HHI. The HHI is probably the most used measurement of market 
competitiveness in economic research, but no one has applied it to the study of 
the Japanese LTCI market until this paper. The HHI in this research is estimated 
as follows.  First, the market share of each provider is defined as providers’ 
capacity divided by the whole capacity in the municipality40  because the 
occupancy rate of Group Homes was nearly 100 percent in the fiscal year41 and 
the care fee in the market was uniformly regulated. Second, the HHI formula is 
applied; 
                                                   
40 Because Group Home is categorized as a community-based care service in Japan 
(MHLW, 2006a), it can be assumed that the market of Group Home providers indicates 
the municipality.   
41 According to the census of MHLW, the average number of Group Home care 
recipients (excluding short-term care recipients) in Japan in FY2006/2007 was 
11,9433.3 per month (MHLW, 2008: p.95), whereas the capacity of whole Group Home 
providers (as of Oct, 2006) was 123,580 (MHLW, 2007). This indicates about 97 percent 
occupancy rate through the year. The occupancy rate is, therefore, about 97 percent. 
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For example, in a market where two providers each have a 50 percent market 
share, the HHI equals 0.502 + 0.502 = 0.5. Therefore, the correlation between a 
provider’s quality of care and HHI examines/determines the validation of the 
MAR model.  
   
As for Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model, this research defines providers as new 
providers, first evaluated in the data-collected fiscal year (FY); the providers 
first evaluated prior to the FY are old providers. The care quality comparison of 
the new and old providers assesses the validation of Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) 
model.  
 
Quantifying Other Attributes 
This research also utilizes some other attributes to eliminate possible data biases. 
First, it utilizes a subsidiary business as a provider’s attribute. In the Japanese 
LTCI scheme, as mentioned earlier, care recipients can freely choose/combine 
care services within the limit of the benefit. As shown earlier in Table 4-4 and 
4-6, Group Home residents can look for additional care services, because the 
benefit of Group Home residents (i.e. grade 3 or above) is more than the Group 
Home’s residential fee. These care recipients with grade 3 or above might 
possibly choose a Group Home provider based on its additional service choices, 
not just quality of care. Therefore, this research sets dummy variables (i.e. if 
‘yes’ it is 1, otherwise 0) of Group Home providers’ major subsidised 
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businesses: day care, community at-home care, and at-home care. 
 
Second, we consider the provider’s capacity. Although the maximum resident 
number per provider is regulated (9 residents per unit at most and the 
maximum unit number is 3), capacity varies by provider. The size of the 
residence may affect the provider’s quality of care. The collected data indicates 
that the maximum capacity is 28, the minimum 5, and the standard deviation is 
15.4. Considering the gap to other variables that are smaller than or equal to 1, 
however, this research converts the original data into a natural logarithm: y = ln 
(n), where n is capacity. If capacity is 9, therefore, ln (9) is 2.20. 
This research, however, does not consider the providers’ rent and meal fees that 
are outside of the care fee regulation. Sugahara (2010), who wrote an invited 
counter argument to this research42, pointed out the fact that the prices of room 
rent and meal fees at Group Homes are not regulated. He then claimed that care 
recipients might consider these prices when choosing a provider rather than the 
quality of care. Unlike the care fees, certainly, the price of rent and meal fees at 
Group Homes vary by provider. The room rent at some Group Home providers 
costs even more than 100,000 yen (about AUD 1,250) per month (MLHW, 
2006b). Nevertheless, the influence of these price components is very limited. 
The room at a Group Home is almost unexceptionally a studio type. The care 
recipients at Group Homes do not need a larger room due to their limited ADL 
                                                   
42 The empirical part of this chapter was already published in Journal- Kadoya, Y 
(2010) Managing the Long-Term Care Market: The Constraints of Service Quality 
Improvement, Japanese Journal of Health Economics and Policy, Vol.21 (E1): 247-264. 
Corresponding to the paper, Sugahara wrote an article under the title of “Invited 
Counter Argument for “Managing the Long-Term Care Market.” 
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capabilities43. As for the meals, the prices cannot be very different due to the 
municipality’s Group Home facility inspection. Moreover, the meal satisfaction 
is already taken into account as part of care quality. (See the care quality criteria 
in Table 5-2, especially items c), d), e) in 6) ADL support.) Therefore, the 
influence of the different prices is considered to be small. 
 
Table 5-5 indicates the descriptive statistics of all quantified data used in this 
research. 
 
Table 5-5. Descriptive Statistics 
  N Min Max Mean Std. Deviation 
New entry dummy 1090 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.42 
Subsidiary business dummy 
Day care  
 
1078 
 
0.00 
 
1.00 0.78 0.29 
    Community at-home care 1078 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 
    At-home care 1078 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.12 
Ownership (for-profit) dummy  1069 0.00 1.00 0.60 0.49 
ln (Capacity) 1070 1.61 3.33 2.65 0.42 
HHI 1076 0.01 1.00 0.22 0.25 
New entry dummy 2005/2006 407 0.00 1.00 0.86 0.34 
Total service quality score 1093 0.47 1.00 0.92 0.08 
Total service quality score of 
principle component 1093 0.23 0.51 0.47 0.04 
Improvement service quality score 409 -0.35 0.37 0.06 0.08 
Improvement service quality score 
of principal component 409 -0.17 0.18 0.03 0.04 
Note: The reason the sample number of improvement scores is small is that many providers failed to 
disclose the evaluation outcome through WAM-NET within FY2005/2006, the initial year of the annual 
mandatory third-party evaluation system. MHLW later urged municipalities to instruct providers to 
disclose this data within the fiscal year (MHLW, 2006).      
 
 
 
 
                                                   
43 The residents of a Group Home are at grade 3 or above (see Table 4-3 for the details). 
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Analysis 
 
Result 1: Contract Failure Model was Not Supported 
 
The Contract Failure model claimed that care recipients in the care market do 
not choose a care provider based on care quality due to the information 
asymmetry between care recipients and providers. Specifically, according to 
Hansmann (1980), care recipients tend to choose non-profit providers because 
they assume that non-profit care quality is better than for-profit care quality. 
This argument has provoked controversy among researchers. Therefore, the 
first part of this section investigates the assumption of non-profits’ superiority 
and the syndrome of contract failure. Then, the latter part of the section further 
discusses the cause of the disputes in previous literature by describing the 
implication of the examination.    
 
Simple Comparison between For-profits and Nonprofits 
Table 5-6 employs the 14 sub-indices seen in Table 5-2 to present the mean 
scores by ownership of two types of providers (for-profit and non-profit). This 
study prepared two sets of scores to measure quality of care. As explained 
earlier, the “total score” is simply the average achievement rate of all 14 indices. 
The “total improvement score” is the subtraction of the “total score” in 
FY2005/2006 (note) from that in FY2006/2007. Thus, the numbers above 0 mean 
improvement and those below 0 indicate decline: the size of the number is the 
degree. The “principal component score” and “principal component 
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improvement score” are estimated by principal component analysis, in which 
each index is evaluated with different weights. The column (simple) next to 
these numbers indicates the significance of the difference by means of the 
independent-samples t test. “F” indicates that the score of for-profits is 
significantly higher than that of the score for nonprofits, while “N” refers to the 
reverse. The column “controlled” will be explained later in this section. 
 
Table 5-6. Comparison of Service Quality by Ownership of the Providers 
  For-profit Non-profit Simple Controlled 
1 Publicity about the corporate philosophy 0.87(0.19) 0.88(0.19)   
2 Homely living space 0.94(0.14) 0.94(0.13)   
3 Customized living space 0.95(0.11) 0.95(0.10)   
4 Care management 0.90(0.16) 0.91(0.15)   
5 Basic care implementation 0.95(0.10) 0.96(0.08) N** N* 
6 ADL support 0.95(0.08) 0.95(0.09)   
7 Life support 0.91(0.19) 0.92(0.18)   
8 Medical and health support 0.92(0.11) 0.93(0.10) N* N* 
9 Community life 0.95(0.22) 0.94(0.23)   
10 Interaction with family 0.98(0.13) 0.99(0.08)   
11 Administrative procedures 0.89(0.13) 0.92(0.11) N** N** 
12 Response to complaints 0.95(0.15) 0.95(0.15)   
13 Interaction between GH and family 0.94(0.16) 0.92(0.17) F** F* 
14 Interaction between GH and community 0.77(0.26) 0.80(0.24) N*  
 Total score (average score of all indices) 0.92(0.08) 0.93(0.07)   
 Score of the principal component 0.47(0.04) 0.47(0.04)   
 Improvement score 
(average improvement score of all indices) 0.05(0.08) 0.06(0.08) 
  
 Improvement score of the principal 
component 
    
0.03(0.02) 0.03(0.02) 
  
Note: The numbers in brackets indicates the standardized deviation.   
* means 5% significant level.   
** means 1% significant level.   
 
First, we look at the overall difference between for-profits and nonprofits. 
For-profit providers and non-profit providers have an average achievement 
score of 0.92 and 0.93, respectively. The score of non-profit providers is slightly 
higher than that of for-profit ones, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. This is also the case for the principal component score. In addition, 
because the improvement scores are similar, the outcome does not seem to be 
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temporal. There is, thus, no significant difference in service quality between 
for-profits and non-profits. 
 
Controlled Comparison 
However, this simple comparison could be misleading, because providers’ 
other variables were not controlled. This research thus investigated the 
following variables of the providers: 1) HHI as market environment, 2) 
subsidiary businesses, and 3) timing of market entry (whether or not the 
providers newly entered the market)44. Table 5-7 illustrates the distribution of 
these variables by ownership. For-profit providers appear to accommodate 
more care recipients, have day service as a subsidiary business, and have more 
entries that are new. 
 
Table 5-7. The Distribution by Ownership of the Providers 
 For-profits Nonprofits 
Sample 646 423 
Market environment Herfindahl Index of the 
market (average) 
0.2186 0.2133 
Day service 63 (10%) 21 (5%) 
Community At-home 
care service 
18 (3%) 3 (1%) 
Subsidiary business 
At-home care service 14 (2%) 1 (0%) 
Timing of market 
entry 
New entry 167 (26%) 75 (18%) 
Size Capacity (average) 15.70 14.95 
 
Table 5-8 shows the outcomes of regression analysis with the care quality “total 
score” and “principal component score” as dependent variables, respectively. 
The ownership dummy does not scientifically affect either “total score” or 
                                                   
44 The providers that participated in the mandatory third-party evaluation for the first 
time in FY2006/2007 are defined as new entries. 
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“score of the principal component” (total score: p value=0.319>0.05; score of the 
principal component: p value=0.236>0.5). This means, against Hansmann’s 
(1980) argument, there is still no significant difference in the care quality 
between for-profits and non-profits. 
 
Table 5-8. The Influence of Other Variables 
Total score Score of the principal 
component 
Dependent variable 
Std. coefficients (p 
value) 
Std. coefficients (p 
value) 
Market environment Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index 
-0.092 (0.003**) -0.090 (0.004**) 
Day service dummy 
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 
0.071 (0.038*) 0.071 (0.037*) 
Community at-home 
care service dummy  
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 
-0.016 (0.673) -0.017 (0.653) 
Subsidiary business 
At-home care service 
dummy  
(1=yes, 0=otherwise) 
-0.038 (0.309) -0.040 (0.284) 
Timing of market entry New entry dummy 
(1=new, 0=otherwise) 
-0.093 (0.003**) -0.093 (0.003**) 
Size ln (capacity) -0.045 (0.139) -0.044 (0.152) 
Ownership Ownership dummy 
(1=for-profit, 
0=non-profit) 
-0.031 (0.319) -0.037 (0.236) 
Adj. R2 0.016 0.016 
 
The difference in the care quality by ownership appears to be reasonable. The 
comparison of for-profits and non-profits in care quality indicates the difference 
in market share, which represents the care recipients’ choice, as seen in Figure 
5-1. As a result, the market contained no contract failure syndrome.  
It is, nevertheless, hard to conclude that care recipients in the market chose a 
provider based on its care quality. The variables related to the care recipients’ 
choice, other than the ownership, of course, need to be controlled. More 
importantly, many of the care recipients in FY2006/2007 might not even have 
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been able to choose a provider due to the excess of demand over supply in the 
market. In fact, almost all Group Home providers in the market were fully 
occupied through the year (see footnote 16). As seen in Table 5, more for-profits 
entered the market. Many care recipients chose for-profits simply because they 
were the only available Group Home providers. Therefore, it may be necessary 
to wait until the market provides sufficient supply over demand before 
drawing conclusions that “contract failure” exists.  
 
Empirical Implication to the Model:   
The Reason for the Disputes in Existing Literature 
This study examines the controversy of this Contract Failure model in existing 
literature, looking at the feature of service quality by ownership. The last 
column of Table 5-8 shows the difference in the service quality between 
for-profits and non-profits, with other variables controlled by regression 
analysis and each index as a dependent variable.   
 
The result is characteristic. Whereas non-profits are superior in the indices for 
care service itself, including “Basic care implementation,” “Medical and health 
support,” and “Administrative procedure,” for-profits excel in relations with 
families. The reason for this is that the families represent the voice of the care 
recipients who tend to be very dependent45; for-profits are more sensitive to the 
voice of independent care recipients.   
 
                                                   
45 Group Home residents need to hold Care level 3 or above (see Table for the details). 
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These characteristic differences between for-profits and non-profits are the 
cause of the disputes in previous literature: depending on the viewpoint, both 
ownerships could perform better. Morozumi (2007), for example, preferred the 
non-profits, assessing their service quality from care recipients’ viewpoints only. 
Suzuki (2002), on the other hand, claimed that the for-profits were possibly 
superior, including the aspect of information disclosure46 to the index of service 
quality.  
 
 
Result 2: MAR Model was Not Supported 
 
The MAR is the argument that market competitiveness lowers care quality. 
This section first presents the measurement of market competitiveness, and 
then compares care quality between providers in competitive markets and 
those in non-competitive markets. Lastly, the section discusses the 
implication of the outcomes.  
 
Although the negative correlation between care quality and HHI has already 
been shown in Table 6, this section further investigates the impact, categorizing 
the providers into two groups: the HHI 0.1 or below as the competitive market, 
and the HHI 0.18 or above as the non-competitive market47.   
 
                                                   
46 This includes issuing a newsletter for the members (care recipients’ families). 
47 According to Parkin and Bade (2006), HHI 0.18 or above indicates concentration (i.e., 
low competition), whereas HHI 0.1 or below means un-concentration (i.e., high 
competition). 
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Comparison between “Competitive” and “Non-competitive” 
Table 5-9 illustrates the distribution of the variables of each market. The 
competitive market has more new providers. The capacity of the providers in 
the competitive market is greater. 
 
Table 5-9. The Distribution by Market Competitiveness of the Providers 
 Competitive Non-competitive 
Sample 435 426  
Ownership For-profit 256 (59%)  252 (59%) 
Day service 32 (7%) 44 (10%) 
Community at-home 
care service 
9 (2%) 12 (3%) 
Subsidiary business 
At-home care service 9 (2%0 6 (1%) 
Timing of market entry New entry 119 (27%) 73 (17%) 
Size Capacity (average) 16.1 14.7 
 
Table 5-10 presents the mean scores of care quality indices by providers’ market 
competitiveness. The “principal component score” and “principal component 
improvement score” are estimated by different weights based on principal 
component analysis. The Independent-Samples t test compares both markets in 
the “simple” column. In the “controlled” column, on the other hand, the 
comparison is weighted by the variables seen in the table, by regression 
analysis. “C” indicates that the score of the providers in the competitive market 
is significantly higher than that of non-profits, while “N” refers to the reverse. 
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Table 5-10. The Comparison of Care Quality 
by Market Competitiveness of the Providers 
  Competitive Non-competitive Simple Controlled 
1 Publicity about the corporate 
philosophy 0.91 (0.16) 0.85 (0.20) 
C** C* 
2 Homely living space 0.95 (0.13) 0.93 (0.15) C**  
3 Customized living space 0.97 (0.09)  0.95 (0.12) C**  
4 Care management 0.93 (0.13) 0.89 (0.16) C** C* 
5 Basic care implementation 0.97 (0.10) 0.94 (0.07) C**  
6 ADL support 0.96 (0.07) 0.95 (0.08) C*  
7 Life support 0.94 (0.16) 0.90 (0.20) C**  
8 Medical and health support 0.94 (0.09) 0.91 (0.11) C**  
9 Community life 0.96 (0.19) 0.94 (0.24)  C* 
10 Interaction with family 0.99 (0.10) 0.99 (0.12)   
11 Administrative procedures 0.92 (0.11) 0.89 (0.14) C**  
12 Response to complaints 0.96 (0.14) 0.95 (0.15)   
13 Interaction between GH and 
family 0.95 (0.14) 0.92 (0.18) 
C** C* 
14 Interaction between GH and 
community 0.81 (0.24) 0.75 (0.26) 
C**  
 Total score (average score of all 
indices) 0.94 (0.07) 0.91 (0.07) 
C** C** 
 Score of the principal 
component 0.48 (0.19) 0.46 (0.04) 
C** C** 
 Improvement score  
(average improvement score of 
all indices) 0.04 (0.08) 0.07 (0.08) 
N**  
 Improvement score of the 
principal component 0.02 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02) 
N**  
Note: The number in brackets indicates the standardized deviation.   
* means 5% significant level.   
** means 1% significant level.   
   
The outcome shows that the overall care quality of “provider in the competitive 
market” (hereafter “competitive”) is significantly better than “provider in the 
non-competitive market” (hereafter “non-competitive”) is. The total score is 
0.94 for competitive and 0.91 for non-competitive; the score of competitive is 
higher than that of non-competitive and the difference is statistically significant. 
This is also the case for the “score of the principal component.” The resultd, 
therefore, fail to support the hypothesis of the MAR model. 
 
The MAR model suggested that market competition lowers service quality. 
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Some critics of the MAR model argue that there is also little incentive to 
improve service quality in the non-competitive market, but they were not 
correct. The improvement score describes the transformation of the service 
quality of the providers for the two years that the data are available for 
(FY2005/2006 and FY2006/2007). The scores of competitive and 
non-competitive are 0.04 and 0.07, respectively. Both numbers are positive, 
which indicates the improvement of care quality. This is also the case for the 
improvement score of the principal component. 
 
Empirical Implication of the Model 
“Competitive” (the providers in competitive markets) appears to excel, 
especially in the indices related to public relations, such as “publicity about the 
corporate philosophy,” “community life,” and “interaction between GH and 
family.” However, their strength also reaches the categories of life environment 
and care service. This paper is the first empirical study of MAR with the HHI 
and a comprehensive service quality evaluation in the long-term care market. 
The outcome indicates that the mandatory third-party evaluation that makes a 
provider’s service quality information available to the public is very useful to 
prevent MAR syndrome, which is caused by the information gap between care 
recipients and providers. 
 
This minimized information gap also creates incentive for “non-competitive” 
(the providers in non-competitive markets) to enhance the care quality. As seen 
in Table 8, the average improvement score of non-competitive is even higher 
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than that of competitive. As a result, the mandatory third-party evaluation 
enhances the service quality of the market. 
 
 
Result 3: Suzuki and Sateke’s Model (2001) was Partly Supported 
 
Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model assumed that new entries do not enhance 
service quality in the care market. To investigate the validity of this assumption, 
this research defined the providers that were first evaluated in FY2006/2007 as 
new entries and the providers first evaluated prior to FY2006/2007 as old ones. 
This section presents the comparison between them and the implications from 
the model. 
 
Comparison Between New and Old Entries 
Table 5-11 illustrates the distribution of the variables of new and old entries. 
New entries tend to enter a more competitive market. An old entry is more 
likely to have a day care service as a subsidiary business. 
 
Table 5-11. The Distribution by Market Entry of the Providers 
 New Old 
Sample 241 849 
Subsidiary business Day service 10 (4%) 74 (9%) 
Community at-home 
care service 
3 (1%) 12 (1%) 
At-home care service 0 (0%) 4 (0%) 
 
Market environment 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index 
0.17 0.23 
Size Capacity (average) 15.1 15.5 
Ownership (for-profit dummy) 164 (68%) 481 (57%) 
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Table 5-12 indicates the mean scores of service quality indices by the timing of 
market entry of the providers. The “principal component score” and “principal 
component improvement score” are estimated by different weights based on 
principal component analysis. The Independent-Samples t test compares both 
types of providers in the “simple” column. In the “controlled” column, on the 
other hand, the comparison is weighted by the variables seen in the table by 
regression analysis. “N” indicates that the score of the new entries is 
significantly higher than that of non-profits, whereas “O” refers to the reverse. 
 
Table 5-12. Comparison of Service Quality by Market Entry of the Providers 
  New Old Simple Controlled 
1 Publicity about the corporate 
philosophy 0.86 (0.19) 0.88 (0.19) 
  
2 Homely living space 0.93 (0.15) 0.94 (0.13)   
3 Customized living space 0.87 (0.13) 0.92 (0.10) O* O** 
4 Care management 0.95 (0.18) 0.95 (0.15) O* O** 
5 Basic care implementation 0.95 (0.10) 0.95 (0.09)   
6 ADL support 0.95 (0.08) 0.95 (0.08)   
7 Life support 0.92 (0.19) 0.92 (0.19)   
8 Medical and health support 0.90 (0.12) 0.93 (0.10) O** O** 
9 Community life 0.95 (0.23) 0.95 (0.23)   
10 Interaction with family 0.99 (0.11) 0.99 (0.12)   
11 Administrative procedures 0.89 (0.13) 0.90 (0.13)   
12 Response to complaints 0.93 (0.17) 0.95 (0.14) O* O** 
13 Interaction between GH and 
family 0.90 (0.19) 0.94 (0.15) 
 O** 
14 Interaction between GH and 
community 0.75 (0.27) 0.79 (0.25) 
 O* 
 Total score (average score of all 
indices) 0.91 (0.09) 0.93 (0.07) 
O** O** 
 Score of the principal component 0.46 (0.05) 0.47 (0.04) O** O** 
 Improvement score  
(average improvement score of 
all indices) - 0.06 (0.03) - - 
 Improvement score of the 
principal component - 0.02 (0.01) - - 
Note: The numbers in brackets indicate the standardized deviation.   
* means 5% significant level.   
** means 1% significant level.   
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The total score in Table 5-12 is 0.91 for new entries and 0.93 for old entries. The 
score of old entries is slightly higher than that of new entries, and the difference 
is statistically significant. This is also the case for the principal component score. 
The outcomes, thus, support the hypothesis of Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) 
model. 
 
Suzuki and Satake (2001) also suggested that new entries spend their “excess 
profit” not on improving service quality, but on something else, like advertising. 
To investigate the validity of this explanation, Table 11 presents the 
transformation of the service quality of the “old” providers for which data is 
available for both years (FY2006/2007 and FY2005/2006). Moreover, among 
them, this study redefines the providers that entered the market in 
FY2005/2006 as “new” entries and the rest as “old” entries, so that the 
improvement of new and old entries can be compared. As Nanbu (2000) 
suggested, however, Table 5-13 shows that new entries improved care quality 
better than old ones. 
 
Table 5-13. Comparison of Care Quality Improvement  
by Market Entry of the Providers 
  New Old Simple Controlled 
 Improvement score  
(average improvement score of all 
indices) 0.06 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02) 
N** N** 
 Improvement score of the 
principal component 0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
N** N** 
Note: The number in brackets indicates the standardized deviation.   
* means 5% significant level.   
** means 1% significant level. 
   
The results, thus, demonstrate that new entries do not bring a competitive care 
quality into the market. They do, however, improve care quality, possibly 
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spending excess profit towards that improvement. 
 
Empirical Implications to the Model 
The score of each index in Table 5-12 describes the features by the timing of 
market entry. It appears that the old entries perform better in the sub-indices in 
the index 48  of management structure, such as “response to complaints,” 
“interaction between Group Home and family,” and “interaction between 
Group Home and community.” On the other hand, in the category of care service, 
there is, with the exception of “medical and health support,” very little 
difference between new and old entries. This implies that experience is more 
important in the management aspect of long-term care.   
 
 
Summary and Discussion 
 
In order to investigate the empirical workability of Ideal CQM, this chapter 
examined the validity of three care-market information-asymmetry models that 
conflict with Ideal CQM. These information asymmetry models are a) Contract 
Failure model, b) MAR model, and c) Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model. The 
analysis was based on the examination of 1,093 Group Home providers’ care 
quality data in the long-term care market in Japan.   
 
This chapter presented three major empirical findings. First, there was no 
                                                   
48 There are four indices for the sub-indices, as seen in Table 5-2. 
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non-profit superiority in the care quality in the market. The preference in care 
quality might vary depending on the viewpoint—care recipients might prefer 
the care of non-profits, whereas the family might chose the family-interaction of 
for-profits. However, the overall difference in care quality between for-profit 
and non-profit was not statistically significant. Second, the disclosure system of 
providers’ care quality information bridged the care information gap between 
care recipients and providers, which led the market competition to enhance care 
quality. Third, although new market entries were inferior to old entries 
(existing providers) in care quality, the improvement of new entries in the 
following year was greater than that of old entries. The challenge of new entries 
was rather the managerial structure of care than care itself.  
 
In conclusion, none of the three testing models was fully supported. The Group 
Home providers compete with each other for a better care quality in order to 
respond to the care recipients’ needs:  
).|()(max xqcqhx
q
-=p  
Therefore, the empirical workability of Ideal CQM was empirically proven in 
the case of a Group Home market that meets, along with the care quality 
evaluation system, the conditions to implement Ideal CQM. 
 
This chapter also justified the importance of measuring and publicizing 
providers’ care quality. Certainly, the three testing information asymmetry 
models argued that care recipients would not be able to compare the providers’ 
care quality and choose one based on care quality However, the investigations 
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of this chpater proved these models were not supported where governments 
emasure and publicize providers’ care quality information.  
 
Therefore, publicizing care-quality information becomes a fourth condition to 
introduce Ideal CQM. Now, the conditions of Ideal CQM are a) a universal 
long-term care system, b) standardized content of care according to care 
recipients’ conditions, c) no price competition, and d) publicizing providers’ 
care quality evaluation. 
 
This indicates that all other long-term care markets, including Japanese at-home 
care and institutional care, should meet these conditions to solve the long 
lasting care quality issue, directing market competition to enhance providers’ 
care quality by Ideal CQM. 
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Chapter 6. Testing Ideal CQM: Financial Practicability 
 
 
Is a Universal Care System Costly? 
 
The previous chapter concluded that all long-term care markets ought to aim 
to introduce Ideal CQM in order to solve the long-lasting care quality issue. 
However, this implementation requires several conditions: a) a universal 
long-term care system, b) standardized content of care according to care 
recipients’ conditions, c) no price competition, and d) publicizing providers’ 
care quality evaluation.   
 
Among them, the universal system is often criticized, as it is costly. In fact, 
about half of OECD nations apply a means-tested system, not a universal one, 
in the long-term market (see Table 3-1). This chapter, therefore, investigates 
Ideal CQM in terms of financial practicability. 
 
 
Finding 1: Universal Care Provision is Not Necessarily Costly 
 
One can normally assume that universal care costs more than means-tested 
care. The number of universal care recipients is certainly greater than that of 
means-tested: universal care is for everyone; means-tested care is for the 
economically vulnerable only. Therefore, one can infer that many 
governments have hesitated to introduce a universal system due to their 
responsibilities to respond to increasing long-term care needs within a limited 
budget. 
However, there is no significant cost difference between the two types of 
markets. Figure 6-1 plots: Y = expenditure of public long-term care as a 
percentage of GDP; X = share of very old people in the population; the 
bracket U indicates universal, whereas M indicates means-tested. As seen, the 
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countries with bracket U do not necessarily spend more than those with M 
do: the cost of Japan (U) and Germany (U) are less than the average, whereas 
that of Ireland (M) is above the average.   
 
Figure 6-1. The Correlation between Public Long-Term Care Spending  
and the Population Share of Very Old People (aged 80+) 
 
               Source: Figure 2-1, 2-2, and Table 3-1. 
 
The existence of universal long-term care contributes to the minimization of 
the private long-term care expenditure. Table 6-1 indicates the ratio of private 
expenditure in the total long-term care expenditure. The average private 
expenditure ratio of the countries with universal care is only about 30% of 
that of the countries with means-tested care. 
Table 6-1. Ratio of Private Expenditure to Total Long-Term Care Expenditure (%) 
Universal Means-tested Other 
Sweden 5 Ireland 16 Canada 2 
Japan 8 New Zealand 34 Australia 28 
Netherlands 9 United Kingdom 35   
Norway 14 United States 42   
Germany  3 Spain 73   
Average 13 Average 4 Average 24 
 Source: Figure 6-1. 
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Introducing a universal system is a condition to apply Ideal CQM and the 
long-term care expenditures of the countries with a universal system are not 
different from those with means-tested systems. Therefore, why have not all 
countries applied a universal system? 
 
 
The reason that a universal system is not always costly: 
Long-term care as a good 
 
To investigate the premise to the introduction of a universal system, one, first, 
needs to grasp what, on the ground, a universal system is. This section 
discusses this issue using the theory of economics. First, we argue long-term 
care as a good. Then, we examine the difference between a universal system 
and a means-tested system. 
 
Public good and Private good 
In economics, long-term care can be categorized as a private good, not a 
public good. A public good is a good that is non-rivalled and non-excludable, 
whereas a private good is the opposite. Non-rivalled and non-excludable 
means, respectively, that consumption of the good by one individual does not 
reduce availability of the good for consumption by others, and that no one 
can be effectively excluded from using the good. In the real world, there may 
be no such thing as an absolutely non-rivalled and non-excludable good, but 
economists think that some goods approximate the concept closely enough 
for the analysis to be economically useful. For example, if one citizen is 
secured by the national defence, the security of the national defence is still 
available for others in the country and it is very difficult to exclude anyone 
from the security of the country; it is thus a non-rivalled and excludable 
public good. Conversely, eating a cake reduces the amount of cake available 
to others and people can be effectively excluded from eating the cake; 
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therefore, a cake is a private good. Likewise, so is long-term care49. Unlike a 
private good, therefore, a public good cannot exclude a free rider. This means, 
in other words, the government does not necessarily provide long-term care 
in theory, because it is not a public good.  
 
Long-term care as a merit good 
Historically, as the social structure changed, governments began to provide 
many non-public goods (or private goods), with the idea of merit goods. A 
merit good, an idea introduced by Musgrave (1957, 1959), is a good, judged as 
necessary for an individual or society based on a norm other than respecting 
consumer preferences. A merit good is, in other words, a not-public good, 
which is important for a governmental region (a country in most cases), but is 
difficult for market-mechanisms to elicit its needs. 
 
As seen in Figure 6-2, for example, primary school education is not a public 
good in nature. It is excludable and rivalled to some extent. In that sense, it is 
possible to provide primary education from the private sector only, with the 
exclusion of free riders. Nevertheless, today’s governments commonly 
intervene in providing primary education, because giving a primary 
education to all citizens without exception is so beneficial for the society 
(country) that the citizens in the society share the cost by paying a tax (or 
social insurance fee). In short, a primary education is a merit good in today’s 
society. This idea is also applicable to the case of long-term care in some 
countries today. Although long-term care as a good is rather private, it is 
beneficial for the society in some countries to co-purchase necessary 
long-term care and share it with all members in the society: a universal care 
system.  
 
                                                   
49 However, long-term care may not be as “rivalled” as a cake: a care may be available 
to plural customers. 
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Figure 6-2. Idea of Good in Economics 
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What makes a merit good benefit the whole society? The factors certainly 
include a significant number of the population needing a good. For example, 
long-term care would not be a merit good in a country with little aging 
population because it benefits only a minority. Nevertheless, the size of the 
population that needs a good is not the only factor. As seen in Figure 6-1, the 
percentage of people aged 80 years and older in the United Kingdom and 
Spain, countries without a universal system, is larger than that in Japan, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, countries that apply a universal 
system.   
 
A uniformity of good is required to be a merit good. This is to exercise scale 
economics in co-purchasing a good. Increasing returns in scale economics 
refer to how the marginal contribution of a factor of production dramatically 
increases at some point as more of the factor is used, taking advantage of the 
scale merit. According to this relationship, in a production system with fixed 
and variable inputs (say capacity of institutional care and carer) beyond some 
point, each additional unit of the variable inputs yields greater and greater 
Private 
Public 
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increases in output. Conversely, producing one more units of output costs less 
and less in variable inputs. Each unit, therefore, cannot be very different.  
 
For example, ‘food’ as a good is necessary to every single member of a society. 
Therefore, many societies in history co-purchased food and distributed it to 
the members of the society, applying a universal system in the food market. 
However, this system did not work in most cases, because the preference of 
food is usually too individually diverse to exercise scale economics: some 
prefer rice, whereas others prefer bread; some like beef and others like 
chicken. Health care, as a good, has been, on the other hand, successfully 
co-purchased and distributed in many societies,50 because the content of 
health care (i.e., medical treatment against illness) is not as diverse as the 
choice of food; there is usually a certain treatment for each health condition.   
 
It was, therefore, due to scale economics that the long-term care expenditures 
of the countries with universal systems were not very expensive compared to 
those of the countries with means-tested systems.   
 
What makes human service diverse is income gap. Table 6-2 lists the 
above-mentioned countries’ market types (either universal or means-tested) 
and the Gini coefficient51. There is a clear tendency for the economical gap in 
the countries with universal care to be comparatively small; the countries 
with means-tested care are the opposite. In order to apply universal care (i.e., 
to utilize scale merit to co-purchase a good), therefore, this economical gap 
needs to be minimized. Concretely, a Gini coefficient of approximately 35% or 
below seems to be required. 
 
                                                   
50 See for example, NHS in the United Kingdom, NHI in Japan, and Medicare in 
Australia. 
51 The Gini coefficient is a measure of statistical dispersion developed by Carrado 
Gini (Gini, 1912). It is commonly used as a measure of inequality of income or wealth. 
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Table 6-2. The Gini coefficient and market type 
 Gini coefficient 
Highest 
10% market 
Japan 24.9% 21.70% U 
Sweden 25% 22.20% U 
Norway 25.8% 23.40% U 
Germany 28.3% 22.10% U 
Netherlands 30.9% 22.90% U 
Spain 32.5% 25.20% M 
Canada 33.1% 25.00% - 
Australia 35.2% 25.40% - 
Ireland 35.9% 27.60% M 
United Kingdom 36% 28.50% M 
New Zealand 36.2% 27.80% M 
United States 40.8 29.90% M 
    Source: World Bank (2005:p.74) World Development Indicators Database 
 
This reveals that the gap in long-term care needs differs according to the 
wealth of individuals. For example, the long-term care that a wealthy citizen 
wants is very different from what an economically vulnerable citizen wishes 
to receive. The larger the economic gap a country has, the harder it is for the 
country to set a certain level of service with which everyone will agree. More 
importantly, it is always harder to convince wealthy people to lower their 
requirements: a standardized level of long-term care is a bonus for the 
economically vulnerable, whereas it is the result of compromises for wealthy 
people. In a country with a large economic gap, therefore, standardized 
long-term care service units tend to be rather expensive for the budget. This 
means that people do not consider universal long-term care service as a merit 
good.   
 
 
Quality Improvement in Means-tested System 
 
The previous section explained that a universal system, a basis of Ideal CQM, 
is difficult to implement in a market with a larger economic gap. Certainly, all 
means-tested markets should intend to apply a universal system in order to 
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implement Ideal CQM that solves the long-lasting care quality issues. 
Nevertheless, minimizing the economic gap to apply a universal system 
would take a long time since gap minimization is not just a matter of 
long-term care policy. Meanwhile, then, does a means-tested system with a 
large economic gap have nothing to do with long-lasting care quality issues? 
This section discusses the solution for means-tested markets with a large 
economic gap. 
 
 
Model for the Means-tested Market with a Large Economic Gap 
 
As mentioned earlier, Existing CQM of a means-tested market is:  
),|()),((),(max
,
xqcqpxxrqppx
qp
--+=p  
where Medicaid reimbursement r and its own bed supply x  is a given, and 
people choose private price p and quality of care q to maximize profits π. 
 
First, reimbursement (r) needs to be associated with the current condition of 
each Medicaid care recipient. As stated earlier, reimbursement (r) does not 
reflect a care recipient’s condition (see Chapter 3), so it is important to 
categorize the Medicare care recipients into several grades, as seen in Table 
4-352, and pay them reimbursement (r) accordingly. Thus, Medicare care 
recipients begin to consider price and quality of care as much as private care 
recipients, and are not just given reimbursement (r): 
(2-1) ).|(),(),(max, xqcqprxqppxqp -+=p  
 
 
 
 
                                                   
52 The classification (i.e., the number of categories and their measurement) is not 
necessary to the same classification as Japan. 
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Leveraged Model 
 
The care quality control by governments needs to shift from a reputational 
approach to, what this research calls, a Leveraged Model, which enhances 
care quality without adding extra cost. As explained in Chapter 3, a 
regulatory approach by setting a minimum quality standard may dissatisfy 
care recipients due to the price rise along with the quality improvement. A 
leveraged model, on the other hand, enhances quality by shifting the 
necessary care amount line from (y = qq* +ii*) to (y = qq**+ii**). Therefore, 
care is purchased at (X**), the breaker point between the line (y = qq**+ii**) 
and care recipients’ new indifference curve (U*). (X**) is better in quality and 
inexpensiveness than (X*). In short, Governments can enhance the quality of 
care without dissatisfying any care recipients.   
 
The Leveraged Model is based on analysing the mechanism of care quality 
improvement. Revealing how providers improve their care quality, the 
Leveraged Model looks for inexpensive ways to enhance quality.    
 
Figure 6-3. Care Differentiation and Equilibrium 
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Method 
 
The method is to examine the correlations among quantified quality 
indicators by Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. Suppose 
there are n sets of variables X and Y; the formula is expressed as: 
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Table 6-3 indicates the Leveraged Model applied to the Japanese Group Home 
market. The index numbers (i.e., “no. 1,” “no. 2,” and “no. 3” in the Table) 
mean the sub-index numbers of the mandatory third-party evaluation (see 
Table for details). The outcomes mean the correlation between the indicators. 
For example, no. 1 (publicity about the corporate philosophy) significantly 
correlates with no. 2 (homely living space), and the p value is 0.244.     
Looking for the indicator that most positively correlates with the others, this 
study found that “no. 1,” that is, “leverage,” meets this criterion. The 
Leveraged Model focuses on improving leverage. What governments can do 
to implement the model is, for example, to collect the best practices at the next 
care quality evaluation and compile these practices into a handout to 
distribute to each provider. This would not cost much, but would be effective 
in enhancing providers’ care quality. 
 
 
Significance of Leveraged Model 
 
Since the Leveraged Model finds the most efficient indicator, the model is 
effective to improve care quality. It is, of course, useful for both a universal 
and a means-tested market. The cost effective feature of the Leveraged model 
is, however, particularly important in a means-tested market, where 
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not-wealthy care recipients suffer the most from the existing regulatory policy. 
In a means-tested system, not-wealthy care recipients may lose access to 
necessary long-term care because regulatory policy cannot avoid increasing 
long-term care prices in the market (see Chapter 3 for details). 
 
The concept of best practice used in the Leveraged Model is not new. Similar 
models have been actively researched in many fields, such as management. In 
long-term care, the improvement of care recipients’ physical capabilities has 
been investigated from the view of best practice. North America based 
InterRAI is known as such a research group.   
 
Nevertheless, the Leveraged Model is among the very first attempts to 
improve providers’ overall quality of care. This is mainly because providers’ 
care quality indicators, such as mandatory third-party evaluation, still remain 
unique. Unlike other evaluations, the third-party evaluation includes both 
direct and indirect factors to enhance the quality of care. For instance, the 
indicators of care implementation rather directly influence the care quality, 
whereas those of managerial structure may affect the quality of care in terms 
of the sustainability (see Table 5-2 in Chapter 5 for detailed indicators). 
Analysing the quantified data of such multi-dimensioned care quality 
measurement, Leverage Model may present the best practice of care quality 
improvement in a more comprehensive way.    
 
 
Possible Further Research of Leveraged Model: 
Mechanism to Improve Care Quality 
 
The limitation of the research on the Leveraged Model is that it has not been 
able to reveal the mechanism of care quality improvement. Certainly, the 
findings from the demonstration in the case of the Group Home market are 
useful for the Japanese market, but may not be for others. Since there is no 
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absolute care quality measurement, it is not easy to reveal the mechanism. 
This author suggests, however, if many other markets apply quality 
measurement systems such as mandatory third-party evaluation, the 
Leveraged Model will be used more frequently, and a generalizable 
mechanism to improve care quality will be found. 
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Table 6-3. The Leveraged model of the Japanese Group Home market 
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Interim Conclusion 
 
The purpose of Part I was to answer the research question: How should 
governments design the human service market in order to keep the capacity to 
ensure the quality of service? To answer this, the research takes a model-testing 
approach: the research first presents Ideal CQM that directs the market 
competition to enhance service quality along with the indicators set by 
government authority. The rest of Part I tests the model in terms of applicability, 
workability, and financial sustainability.  
 
 
Ideal CQM 
 
Removing the price component and reimbursement rate, Ideal CQM offers an 
environment in which care recipients choose a provider solely based on care 
quality. To this end, Ideal CQM requires four preconditions: a) universal 
long-term care system; b) standardized content of care according to care 
recipients’ condition; c) no price competition; and d) publicizing care quality 
information. 
 
The image of Ideal CQM introduction can be described as following. First, as 
the service provision is universal, all users are eligible to receive the service by 
applying for a care needs test. Second, since care content is standardised 
according to care recipients’ conditions, governments (or official bodies) 
examine users’ care needs. Third, with the classification of care needs, users 
choose a provider. Since, there is no price competition in the market, users 
choose a provider solely based on the service quality. However, due to the 
information asymmetry between users and providers in the human service 
market, governments (or official bodies) need to publish the providers’ care 
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quality information. 
 
Figure 6-4. Image of Ideal CQM 
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Finding 1: Ideal CQM is Applicable 
 
The research proved that Ideal CQM is applicable. Surveying the long-term care 
markets in OECD nations, the research found that the Japanese Long-term Care 
Insurance market meets all four preconditions. Together with Japan, Austria, 
Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and S. Korea meet the 
first condition of universal care. Furthermore, Germany, Luxemburg, and S. 
Korea also clear the standardized content of care according to care recipients’ 
conditions. However, Japan is the only country that meets the third condition: 
no price competition. 
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Finding 2: Ideal CQM is Workable 
 
The research endorsed that Ideal CQM is workable. Although the assumption 
that users have access to providers’ care quality information contradicts 
information asymmetry models in the care market, the research proves that 
none of these conflicted models are fully supported. Moreover, the research 
found that the more competitive the market becomes the better quality of 
service it provides, when governments (or public bodies) publicize providers’ 
care quality information. The findings also added empirical implications to the 
literature of care-market information-asymmetry models: a) Contract Failure 
model, b) MAR model, and c) Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model. 
 
 
Finding 3: Ideal CQM is Financially Sustainable 
 
The research suggested that Ideal CQM is financially sustainable. Analysing the 
long-term care expenses of OECD nations, the research discovered that the 
universal system does not necessarily cost more than the means-tested system 
does. Investigating merit good theory and scale of economics, the research 
uncovered that the cost efficiency of the universal system is rooted in the small 
income gap of the markets with the universal system. This indicates that a small 
income gap is a precondition of the universal system.   
 
Supplemental Argument to Ideal CQM  
Finding 4: the Use of Leverage Model 
The research presented a tool to improve quality, especially for the markets that 
do not meet the precondition of a universal system. The tool, named ‘Leverage 
Model,’ finds the care quality indicator that has the most positive influence on 
other indicators. Initiating providers to focus their resources on improving that 
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indicator, governments can efficiently enhance the quality of service, even in a 
means-tested system. 
 
As seen, the research proved that Ideal CQM is applicable, workable, and 
sustainable. That is, Ideal CQM sustainably directs the market competition to 
enhance the quality of service along with the care quality indicators approved 
by governments. The remaining question is, as seen in Figure 6-4, how to 
measure the providers’ care quality. The answer to this question is in Part II. 
                                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II. Performance Measurement for Human 
Service Market 
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Chapter 7. Process-based Performance Measurement Model  
for the Human Service Market 
 
 
Analysing the Group Home market in Japan, Part I demonstrated that Ideal 
CQM directs the market competition to enhance care quality according to 
performance indicators. By setting appropriate performance indicators in Ideal 
CQM, therefore, governments can logically solve the long-standing care quality 
issue, because performance measurement offers users guidance on choosing a 
provider.     
 
The purpose of Part II is to investigate the best way to measure the providers’ 
performance in order to solve the long-standing care quality issue. This chapter 
specifically compares outcome-based performance measurement and the 
alternative, process-based performance measurement. 
 
 
Clarifying Performance Measurement in This Research 
 
The terms performance measurement, or performance indicator(s), in this thesis 
are often rephrased by the terms care quality measurement or care quality 
indicator(s). Since this thesis defines providers’ care quality as the providers’ 
performance, these terms are interchangeable in this thesis. 
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Why is it necessary to measure performance? As discussed earlier, governments 
are required to assure the quality of human service because governments are 
responsible for providing people with a certain standard of living. Furthermore, 
most human service is provided through a competitive market in order to 
respond to increasing needs. Without performance measurement, it is difficult 
to ensure a level of standard care within this market. In addition, there tends to 
be information asymmetry between users and providers in human service 
markets. Without performance measurement, therefore, it is difficult for users 
to choose providers based on quality of services.  
 
A key concept in performance measurement is viewpoint. Depending on the 
point of view, what to measure varies. For example, the CEO of a care 
institution may measure profit from care services, whereas some users may 
measure the price of care services. Therefore, Behn (2003) presents a scheme to 
clarify the answer to the question “how should who hold whom accountable for 
what?” 1   As indicated in Table 7-1, How is identified with rewards and 
punishments. Who means the accountability holders, whereas Whom is the 
accountability holdees. Then, What is decided (i.e., the measurement).   
 
The definition of the performance indicators in this study clarifies the study’s 
point of view. The rewards and punishments come from a competitive market 
mechanism. If a provider performs well, it attracts more users (i.e., rewards) 
and vice versa (i.e., punishments). There are accountability holders: users who 
                                                   
1 Behn (2003) presents two different ways of answering the accountability question, but 
this research only utilizes his simple “traditional way” to clarify the viewpoint. 
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need to know providers’ care quality when choosing a provider and 
governments that manage the competitive market2 (see page 80 for details). In 
other words, users and governments are the “who”, in control of the rewards 
and punishments. Providers constitute the “whom” and should be held 
responsible for quality care provision. The performance indicators by which 
users and governments hold providers responsible are the “what”. 
Governments are in charge of performance evaluation.   
 
Table 7-1. A Way of Answering this Accountability Question:  
How Should Who Hold Whom Accountable for What? 
The Question Accountability Players 
How? With rewards and 
punishments 
Market competition 
Who? The accountability holders  Users/Governments 
Whom? The accountability holdees  Providers  
What? Standardized test scores Performance measurement 
set by public authority 
Source: Behn (2003) 
 
 
The Problem of Outcome-based Performance Measurement  
in Human Service 
 
The existing outcome-based, performance measurement conflicts with the 
ambiguous policy goals of human service. In order for governments to 
implement outcome-based, performance indicators, there needs to be clearer 
                                                   
2 In most human service provisions, providers enter the market with the licence issued 
by governments (see Chapter 2 for details). 
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goals. Along with the goals, performance measurement provides guidance for 
service users, especially when choosing a provider. Thus, market competition 
based on performance indicators directs providers to enhance service quality 
using the indicators that will lead to the achievement of the goals. “The clearer 
the goals and the better developed the performance measures, the more finely 
tuned guidance can be” (Lipsky, 1980: p. 40): providers become loyal to the 
guidance of performance indicators. On the other hand, the less clear the goals, 
the more poorly developed the indicators and the less accurate the feedback, 
the more individuals in a service provision facility will be on their own (Lipsky, 
1980: p.40). That is, non-government providers, particularly for-profit ones, aim 
at their own interests (i.e., profit maximization) rather than following the 
guidance of performance indicators. Nonetheless, the policy goals of human 
service are ambiguous. The provision of long-term care for elderly people, for 
example, commonly aims to ease aging-related ADL3 concerns and the degree 
of success in achieving such aims is very difficult to measure.   
 
One may think that such an ambiguous goal can still be achieved. If the care 
addresses the elderly people’s physical concerns such as a knee problem, for 
instance, that would ease their concerns, meaning the achievement of the policy 
goal of long-term care. In addition, one may believe that implementing 
‘customer’s satisfaction’ measures by questionnaires is a good idea to measure 
the outcome of care.   
 
                                                   
3 Activities of Daily Living 
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These ideas have merit. However, these methods cannot solve the care quality 
issue, as they are applicable only to a group of care recipients. Many care 
recipients today have suffered from unrecoverable conditions such as dementia. 
In the United States, for example, Alzheimer’s disease prevalence is estimated 
to be 1.6 percent in the 65-74- year-old age group, with the rate increasing to 19 
percent in the 75-84-year-old group and to 42 percent in the 
greater-than-84-year-old group (Hebert et al, 2003). The number of patients may 
continue to increase, as people’s life expectancies become longer. Moreover, in 
most case, the care recipients with such cognitive problems are incapable of 
answering the questionnaire. The ambiguous policy goals of human service still 
get in the way of outcome-based performance measurement.   
 
The ambiguity of the goals comes from human service’ idealized dimension 
(Lipsky, 1980), which is unexceptionally evident in official policy statements. 
For instance, the Japanese long-term care system aims “to facilitate a system in 
which the society as a whole supports those who are facing the need of 
long-term care, society’s major cause of concern in terms of becoming old.” 
Such goals, to respond to “concerns” regarding people’s living, are indeed 
“more like receding horizons than fixed targets” (Landau, 1973).   
 
The origin of human service contributes to the above-mentioned idealized 
dimension of goals, making the ambiguity of these goals inevitable. That is, as 
discussed in chapter 2, human service originates from the idea that 
governments ensure people a certain standard of living. In the case of long-term 
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care, therefore, goals like “easing aging-related ADL concerns” surely derive 
from the nature of human service.   
 
 
Process-Based Performance Measurement 
 
Process-based performance measurement, used in traditional public 
bureaucracy (see Table 2-8 in Chapter 2), suits the ambiguous policy goals of 
human service. Unlike outcome-based performance measurement that focuses 
on how much is done, process-based performance measurement pays attention 
to how it is done. As process-based performance measurement does not look for 
the result but the process, this approach can accommodate the ambiguity of the 
policy goals. 
 
The measurement specifically assesses the behaviour and training of front-line 
care workers (Lipsky, 19804). As an example of the measurement, suppose one 
assesses a nursing home’s meal service by behaviour. Instead of evaluating how 
much is done towards goals, the measure constructs the evaluation, assessing 
the process of meal service including choice of utensils, customized cooking 
methods, taking meal requests, and recording nutritional needs. Such services 
are also assessed in terms of caregivers’ skill-training backgrounds. Certainly, 
many ADL-related supports do not seem to require an experience and/or a skill, 
but a slight difference in experiences and skills can make significant differences 
                                                   
4 Lipsky (1980) describes such front-line care workers as “street-level bureaucrats.” 
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in the quality of care. For example, undressing frail care recipients is a simple 
but very delicate task and care to the elderly with cognitive problems often 
requires well-above-normal communication techniques. These surrogates 
represent qualities that are hypothetically associated with good performance 
(Lipsky, 1980). 
 
 
Problem of Process-based Performance Measurement 
 
Process-based performance measurement has a significant weakness. The 
measurement requires very close communication between policy makers and 
front-line care workers, because the measurement of care worker’s behaviour 
and training is all about know-how of the service. As mentioned in Chapter 2, 
nonetheless, governments today do not have the know-how of the service, as 
they no longer provide care directly. Indeed, the distance between governments 
and providers is one of the main reasons that outcome-based performance 
measurement is applied to the current marketing utilisation governance 
scheme. 
  
To make matters worse, another nature of human service makes the problem of 
process-based measurement even more serious. Unlike lower-level workers in 
most organizations, care workers in the field of human service have a 
considerable amount of discretion in determining the nature, amount, and 
quality of benefits and sanctions provided by their agencies (Lipsky, 1980). The 
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needs of human service are quite diverse and care workers need to customise 
their service for each user. For that reason, human service is very complicated 
and it is difficult to make ‘manuals’ that would have general applicability. This 
makes process-based measurement even more difficult in the era of market 
utilising, public administration schemes.  
 
 
Process-based Outperforms Outcome-based in the Field of Human Service 
 
This chapter has reviewed the weaknesses of both outcome-based and 
process-based performance measurement in the field of human service. As seen 
in table 7-2, both measurements have positive and negative aspects due to the 
nature of human service.   
 
Table 7-2. Strengths and Weakness towards the Features of Human Service 
 Outcome-based Process-based 
Ambiguous goals - + 
Discretion of front-line workers + - 
 
Nonetheless, this thesis claims that process-based measurement outperforms 
the existing outcome-based performance measurement. Whereas one can 
compensate for the weaknesses in process-based performance measurement, 
the downside of outcome-based performance measurement is crucial to the 
very quality of human life. For further discussion, this research first explains 
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the most important considerations for performance measurement. 
 
Citizen’s Demands as the Most Important Factor 
Performance measurement focuses on reflecting citizen demands for evidence 
of program effectiveness (Wholey, 1997). As human service and all other public 
services are for the benefit of the people, performance indicators need to 
coincide with people’s demands. This value, in its purest form, is a basis of 
today’s democratic societies. The people’s (or citizens’) demands in human 
service indicate service users (care recipients). 
 
It is widely believed, therefore, that policy makers need to hear the voices of the 
current/potential service users to reflect their voices in the services. In fact, 
most successful public services have been designed, implemented, and 
modified based on the users’ voice. The earlier-mentioned cases of 
telecommunication, delivery, and public transportation services are good 
examples.  
 
Nonetheless, in the field of human service, this ‘valuing users’ voice’ has served 
as an obstacle to service quality improvement. First, the demands of human 
service do not often come from the users themselves. In many cases, their 
family members are the source of the demands. Focusing on the users’ voice, 
the measurement tends to overlook this aspect of users’ needs. Second, more 
importantly, many of the users who need care the most are not capable of 
expressing their needs. Due to physical and cognitive constraints, a significant 
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number of the users cannot properly deliver their needs to the policy makers. 
Moreover, unlike in the fields of telecommunication and public transportation, 
‘a little voice’ in human service does not mean ‘unnecessary’ at all. The purpose 
of human service is rather to respond to such ‘a little voice’.   
 
In human service, those who know the best about the users’ needs are the 
front-line care workers. They are the only players who interact with both users 
and their families. Constantly interacting with users, only care workers can 
uncover hidden but very important care needs.  
 
In sum, performance measurement in human service must always include the 
voices of front-line care workers, because this is the only way to reflect users’ 
needs in measurement. For that reason, the weakness of process-based 
performance measurement is compensable. In human service, policy makers 
always need to interact with care providers.  
 
Outcome-based Performance Measurement as a Crucial Cause of Low Quality Care 
The weakness of outcome-based performance measurement is a crucial cause of 
the long-standing care quality issue in the human service market. Human 
service, under this performance measurement, is likely to end up with the 
following two scenarios. First, government manages to set up a tangible policy 
goal to measure providers’ performance, but any goal dissatisfies the users. As 
previously indicated, this is the nature of human service. In human service, a 
tangible (i.e., measurable) goal inevitably dissatisfies a group of users. For 
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example, resident’s longevity may sound like a reasonable goal that can 
measure the performance of nursing homes. That is, the measurement assumes 
that the better care the nursing home provides, the longer the residents live. 
Nevertheless, achieving the goal does not necessarily satisfy the users. Due to 
the measurement, the nursing home may no longer accept unhealthy users. In 
addition, users may suffer from ‘unwanted care’ that expands the residents’ life 
expectancies. In this case, those who lose the access to nursing homes and the 
residents who dislike the life lengthening ‘care’ would feel unhappy about the 
goal along with the performance measurement.  
 
Second, outcome-based performance measurement is inevitably inflexible. The 
measurement does not easily reflect updated behaviour of the front-line care 
workers, because the relationship between governments and care providers is 
based on ‘outsourced contracts.’ The users’ needs are, on the other hand, 
continuously changing. For example, only a few decades ago, there was little 
demand for care for the elderly with dementia. Today, however, such care 
occupies a significant portion of long-term care needs. Changes in people’s life 
styles, socio-economic factors, and technological developments dramatically 
influence human care needs and responses to them. Those who know the best 
about these changes are front-line care providers, not high-ranking bureaucrats. 
The absence of front-line ideology and/or meaningful connections makes it 
difficult for governments to adjust to the changing needs5. 
                                                   
5 It may be thought that the market mechanism solve the gap between actual needs and policy goals.  However, we must 
remember that care related markets have information asymmetry between users and providers as mentioned in Chapter. 
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The long-standing care quality issue in human service has been partly caused 
by the use of outcome-based performance measurement, as both of the above 
scenarios indicate. The weakness of process-based measurement is 
compensable whereas the weakness of outcome-based measurement is crucial 
in terms of the care quality in human service. This thesis, therefore, argues that 
governments need to replace the existing outcome-based performance 
measurement with the alternative process-based performance measurement. 
 
 
Modifying Public Administration Theory 
for the Use of Process-based Measurement 
 
In order to replace outcome-based performance measurement with 
process-based performance measurement, governments need to modify the 
current public administration theory. The current theory is designed to suit the 
use of outcome-based performance measurement, which does not require a 
close interaction between governments and providers. Such interactions are, on 
the other hand, necessary for the use of process-based performance 
measurement. 
 
However, this modification does not aim to shift back from the current public 
administration theory to the traditional bureaucratic theory. This thesis agrees 
with human service provision through a competitive market, as Chapter 2 
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shows that such provision through market is necessary to respond to increasing 
service needs. Moreover, Part I in this thesis justifies the market use in terms of 
the care quality model. 
 
The purpose of this section is to explain how governments and providers 
connect within the scheme of current governance of market utilisation. This 
section specifically investigates how the interaction between governments and 
providers has been underestimated, analysing “a logic of governance” 
presented by Lynn et al (2000) in the era of the current governance scheme. The 
research, then, gives a theoretical modification to the logic of governance in 
order to promote government-provider interaction, which is an important 
condition for the use of process-based performance measurement.   
 
Change of Governance Theory 
Since the 1970s, governments have become less hierarchical, more decentralized, 
and increasingly willing to cede their role as dominant policy actor to the 
private sector (Kettl, 2000). The last few decades have seen the rise of such 
governance and a reduction in its role as a direct supplier of public services. As 
a result, the role of governments has shifted to management of the service 
market, ensuring that the competition among the service providers leads to 
enhancement of the quality of public services, not letting the market 
competition sacrifice service quality over cost. 
 
These changes inevitably influenced a good deal of existing public 
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administration theory. To keep up with the new reality, public administration 
scholars have been forced to re-conceptualize their theoretical foundations. For 
example, Peters and Pierre (1998) argue that four basic elements characterize 
discussion of governance. They are 1) dominance of networks; 2) the state’s 
declining capacity for direct control; 3) blending of public and private 
resources; and 4) use of multiple instruments. According to their model, 
governance is a body of theory that comprehends lateral relations, 
inter-institutional relations, the decline of sovereignty, the diminishing in 
importance of jurisdictional borders, and a general institutional fragmentation. 
In addition, Kettl (2000) sets out six core issues of New Public Management 
(NPM) – a nominal designation of the new style of governance. The six core 
issues are 1) productivity; 2) marketisation; 3) service orientation; 4) 
decentralization; 5) policy; 6) accountability (see Appendix 2 for the details). 
NPM particularly characterizes a global public management reform movement 
that has redefined the relationship between government and society. This is, in 
fact, evident in nations associated with the Westminster model6 (e.g., Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and the United Kingdom), where NPM followed on 
from serious attempts to reform the public sector by defining and justifying 
what government should and should not do, and to reshape public service 
provision by attacking the pathologies of bureaucracy (Kettl, 2000).     
 
                                                   
6 Another model is reinventing government, which came much later and is unique to the United 
States, where there is less privatization because local, state and national governments in the United 
States share responsibility in most policy arenas and are subject to different political motivations. 
There is no central agent powerful enough to force functional re-organizations on the scale pursued 
by the Westminster model (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). 
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Nevertheless, among the most significant contributions to the literature of the 
current public administration theory is the work of Lynn et al (1999, 2001; 
Heinrich and Lynn, 2000). Lynn et al compiled and analysed the dispute of 
governance, laid the logic of governance, and then, based on the logic, 
presented the governance model for government research. 
 
Lynn et al’s (2000) Model 
As a result of the discussion, Lynn et al. (2000) present “a logic of governance” 
to model the market-utilising public administration theory. From here, this 
thesis calls the logic Lynn et al’s (2000) model. As a step towards meeting 
governance’s changing definition, this model intends to establish a logic of 
governance to help support systematic research (Frederickson and Smith, 2003). 
In reduced form, Lynn et al. (2000: p.15) present their logic of government as a 
model that takes the following form: 
 
O = f [E, C, T, S, M] 
 
O = Outputs/outcomes. The output/outcomes indicate the product of a 
governance regime. 
E = Environmental factors. These can include political structures, level of 
authority, economic performance, the presence, or absence, of competition 
among suppliers, resource levels, and dependencies, legal frameworks, and 
the characteristics of a target population. 
C = Client characteristics. They include the attributes, characteristics, and 
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behaviour of clients. 
T = Treatments. These are the primary work or core processes of the 
organizations within the governance regime. They include organizational 
missions and objectives, recruitment and eligibility criteria, methods for 
determining eligibility, and program treatments or technologies. 
S = Structures. These include organizational types, levels of coordination and 
integration among the organizations in the governance regime, relative 
degrees of centralized control, functional differentiations, administrative 
rules or incentives, budgetary allocations, contractual arrangements or 
relationships, and institutional culture and values. 
M = Managerial roles and actions. These include leadership characteristics, 
staff-management relations, communications, and methods of 
decision-making, professionalism/career concerns, and mechanisms for 
monitoring, control, and accountability. 
 
Although Lynn et al’s (2000) model is useful for conceptualizing today’s public 
administration theory, there has been some criticism. By trying to encompass 
governments’ complexity, the model is ambiguous. Ellwood (2000) claims that 
the model comes “close to the economist’s criticism of political science: by 
including everything, one runs the danger of explaining nothing.” 
 
Nevertheless, these criticisms may turn out to be premature. Lynn et al. did not 
claim to have a fully functional theory of public administration; their goal was 
simply to foster a research program that theoretically and empirically 
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addressed the governance of public policies and contributed to improving their 
criterion, implementation, and administration (see Lynn et al. 2000). That 
research program has already attracted scholars to its standard (Frederickson 
and Smith, 2003). 
 
Theoretical Challenge 
The challenge of building a close relationship between governments and 
providers is illustrated as Figure 7-1, with the comparative traditional public 
administration theory shown in Figure 7-2. In the traditional theory, public 
services were predominantly provided by governments, based on the people’s 
pressure through politicians. Thus, the governments could easily measure the 
service process7 for its own service provision.  
 
Figure 7-1. Structure of Traditional Public Administration Theory 
 
 
In the current public administration theory, on the other hand, public services 
are mainly provided by outsourced non-government sectors based on the 
                                                   
7 This includes the behaviour and the training of service providers (i.e., street-level 
bureaucrats in this case). 
Public 
Needs 
Politician Law 
 
Government 
 
Accountability 
Service Traditional Public Bureaucracy 
 
 144 
“treatment” (i.e., performance measurement) set up by the governments. This 
model is thus, as Lynn et al (2000) described, “O = f (E, C, T, S, M).” The policy 
“Outcome” depends on governance in that the government: 1) grasps the public 
needs by observing the “Social Environment”; 2) sets up the “Treatment (i.e., 
performance measurement),” based on the “Client Characteristics”: 3) builds 
the “Structure” of the market outsourcing of public service provision to 
non-government sectors; and 4) finally “Manages” the public service market.     
 
The current public administration theory works well with outcome-based 
performance measurement, which is useful in many fields of public services. As 
mentioned earlier, the services such as telecommunication, delivery, and public 
transportation, for example, tend to have tangible goals and providers are 
usually expected to work precisely along the targets. Therefore, the outsourcing 
relationship between government and providers works effectively, even though 
they do not closely interact. Such conditions of tangible goals allow 
governments to measure the outcome-based performance of providers. 
 
Figure 7-2. Structure of Current Public Administration Theory 
Governments
Social 
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Client 
Characteristics
Treatment
Provider
Set up
Service
Official Body
Public Needs Observation
’
’
Contract 
(Licensing)
-
’
Law
 
Note: The dotted arrows indicate observation 
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Nonetheless, the current public administration theory is not suited for 
process-based performance measurement. The theory tends to treat the 
relationship between public administration (i.e., governments in a broad sense) 
and providers as a contract-based, outsourcer-outsourcee relationship. In 
human service provision, however, it is very difficult to implement 
outcome-based performance measurement due to the ambiguity of the policy 
goals and the considerable discretion of providers. On one hand, the current 
public administration theory has achieved decentralized policy networks; on 
the other hand, the theory is devoid of government-provider interaction.   
 
Certainly, this does not mean that current public administration theory has 
completely overlooked the importance of the interaction between governments 
and providers. Lynn et al recognize the need of the interaction in their logic of 
governance. According to Lynn et al (2000, 2001), any public governance regime 
is the outcome of a dynamic process that can be summarized by a core logic. 
The process may be expressed in a set of hierarchical interactions in logic of 
governance (Figure 7-3). The concept of governments-provider interactions is 
mentioned specifically in processes (d) and (e) in the logic. 
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Figure 7-3. Hierarchical Interaction in Logic of Governance 
between (a) citizen preference and interests expressed politically and (b) public 
choice in enacted legislations or executive policies; 
 
 between (b) public choice and (c) formal structures and processes of public agencies; 
 
 between (c) the structures of formal authority and (d) discretionary organization, 
management, and administration; 
 
 between (d) discretionary organization, management, and administration and (e) 
core technologies, primary work, and service transactions, overseen by public 
agencies; 
 
 between (e) primary work and (f) consequences, outputs, outcomes, or results; 
 
 between (f) consequences, outputs, outcomes, or results and (g) stakeholder 
assessments of agency or program performance; and, to close the circuit. 
 
 between (g) stakeholder assessments and (a) public interests and preferences. 
Reference: Lynn et al (2000; 2001) 
 
Nonetheless, the public administration theory does not satisfactorily highlight 
the importance of the interaction. Their model of public administration theory 
(i.e., O = f [E, C, T, S, M)] does not include such interactions. As mentioned 
earlier, this would be fine for the provision of other public services such as 
telecommunication, but it is not fine for the provision of human service. The 
model, thus, needs to be modified in order to fit the features of human service 
provisions.  
 
 
Modifying the Current Public Administration Theory 
 
This thesis suggests a modification to the current public administration theory. 
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The modified model adds care workers’ behaviour (B) and the original model 
becomes O = f (E, C, B, T, S, M). Because receiving and acknowledging the input 
of provider’s behaviour is very important to access users’ needs and to reflect 
the needs in performance measurement, this modification would solve the 
existing mismatch between performance measurement and users’ needs.   
 
The modified model of public administration theory is described in Figure 7-4. 
Besides the observation of social environment and client characteristics, 
government receives updated care workers’ behaviour8. Then, the government 
inevitably listens to the voice of the front-line care workers. As a result, the 
treatment (i.e., performance measurement) truly reflects the users’ needs. 
 
Figure 7-4. Modified Public Administration Theory 
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8 Care workers’ behaviour indicates, for example, how care workers (i.e., providers) 
serve meals for care recipients.  See Table 5-2 for the details. 
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Summary 
 
Outcome-based performance measurement in the current public administration 
theory was questioned in Chapter 2. This chapter compared outcome-based 
performance measurement and the alternative process-based performance 
measurement. The chapter found weaknesses in both measurements. 
Process-based performance measurement did not fit the current public 
administration theory; outcome-based performance measurement did not fit the 
ambiguous policy goals of human service. Favouring process-based 
performance measurement in terms of solving the care quality issue, the 
research then modified the current public administration theory to fit the use of 
process-based performance measurement. 
 
 
Questions Regarding the Process-based Performance Measurement  
 
Process-based performance measurement, with modified public administration 
theory (hereinafter “process-based performance measurement model”), 
logically solves the care quality issue in the market, because the measurement 
reflects the users’ needs and guides users to choose a provider based on its care 
quality.  
 
Nevertheless, several empirical questions remain regarding the process-based 
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performance measurement:  Is it empirically applicable? Is it really possible to 
implement the process-based performance measurement model? Chapter 8 will 
answer this question, investigating a successful case in which the measurement 
reflects users’ needs. This study will specifically examine the case with the 
comparison of another case, based on existing outcome-based performance 
measurement.   
 
The second question issue is about the training of care workers. This chapter 
claimed that training improves the quality of care, but what kind of training is 
needed? In addition, it is assumed that training all care workers is very costly, 
especially when the number of care workers has been increasing in the era of an 
aging society. Is the necessary training financially sustainable? Chapter 9 will 
answer questions regarding cost, explaining the impact on care quality 
improvement and national economies.  
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 Chapter 8. Investigating the Empirical Applicability of 
Process-based Performance Measurement in Human Service 
Provided Through a Competitive Market 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the empirical validity of the 
presented process-based performance measurement model, in the human 
service market. To do so, this chapter specifically compares two typical cases: 
the Japanese long-term care market that favours the presented process-based 
performance measurement and the United States long-term care market that 
focuses more on the existing outcome-based performance measurement. 
Certainly, both ‘process’ and ‘outcome’ are sometimes interchangeable. For 
instance, care workers’ skill up is a process toward providing a good quality of 
care, but such achievement could also be recognised as the outcome of a short- 
term goal toward providing a good quality of care. There is in reality no 
absolute process-based performance measurement nor outcome-based 
performance measurement. Nonetheless, the cases of Japan and the United 
States, as later mentioned, clearly show their preferences. 
 
The bottom line is that care quality in the Japanese market is less problematic 
than that in the United States with the hollow governance model. Weiner et al 
(2007) compares quality assurance for long-term care internationally in the 
selected OECD member nations and areas9. Using the extent to which care 
                                                   
9 The research compares England, which is a part of the United Kingdom, together with 
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quality is perceived as a problem, they rate nursing homes in the United States 
as the most problematic, whereas those in Japan are rated as the least 
problematic. Because the definition of long-term care varies by nations, this 
does not necessarily mean that care quality in Japan is superior to that in the 
United States. Nonetheless, the result indicates that Japan, with process-based 
performance measurement, responds better to perceived care needs.   
 
The following sections, therefore, after defining the providers in both countries, 
first analyse how outcome-based performance measurement fails to take users’ 
needs into account in the United States, and how process-based performance 
measurement succeeds in reflecting them in the performance indicators in 
Japan.   
 
Table 8-1. Models and Cases  
Case Performance Measurement Public Administration Theory 
The United States Outcome-based O = f(E, C, T, S, M) 
Japan Process-based O = f(E, C, B, T, S, M) 
Note: O = policy outputs/outcomes; E = environmental factors; C = client characteristics; B = care 
workers’ behaviour; T = treatment (i.e., performance measurement); S = structure; M = management. 
See chapter 7 for details. 
 
 
Definition of Care Worker in the United States and Japan 
 
As mentioned above, the definition of long-term care is slightly varied by 
                                                                                                                                                     
the United States, Germany, Japan, and Australia.  
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nation and so are the definitions of providers (i.e., street-level bureaucrats). 
That is, we need to identify who provides care in both nations. As seen in Table 
8-2, in the United States, the care worker is often called a Direct-Care Worker. 
Furthermore, Direct-Care Workers consists of three categories: a) Nursing 
Aides, b) Home Health Aides; and c) Personal and Home Care Aides.  . In the 
case of Japan, on the other hand, the term ‘care worker’ usually indicates 
Certified-Care Worker, and Trained Home-Helper. Certainly, Assistant Nurses 
in Japan often works for long-term care providers as well, but this chapter does 
not include them, because their main work place is hospitals, not long-term care 
providers’ facilities (see page 193 for details). For these reasons, ‘care worker’ in 
this chapter indicates Direct-Care Worker, Certified Care Worker, and Trained 
Home-Helper; otherwise, Direct-Care Worker is used only in the context of the 
United States and Certified Care Worker and Trained Home-Helper in the 
context of Japan. 
 
Table 8-2. Care workers in the United States and Japan 
 The United States Japan 
Nursing Aides, 
Orderlies and 
Attendants 
Certified Care 
Workers (CCW) 
Home Health Aides Care Workers 
Direct-Care Worker 
(DCW) 
Personal and Home 
Care Aides 
Trained Home 
Helpers (THH) 
 
 
Outcome-based Performance Measurement in the United States 
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The Minimum Data Set (MDS), a uniform instrument used in nearly every 
nursing home in the United States, has served, and continues to serve, as the 
source of outcome-based performance measurement. That is, to clarify ‘human 
service’ ambiguous goals, the government has utilized MDS as the providers’ 
performance measurement tool.   
 
Background of Introducing Outcome-based Performance Measurement 
The MDS was originally developed to assess the conditional status of nursing 
home residents. Responding to the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1987, which 
was concerned about nursing homes’ care quality issues, the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) first designed MDS to assess the functional, medical, mental, 
and psychosocial status of each resident (IOM, 1987; p.74). Licensed healthcare 
professionals (usually registered nurses) who worked at the nursing home 
conducted the assessments. 
 
The MDS committee recognized that the collected data could and should be 
used in a regulatory capacity (IOM, 1986). Surveyors could use the data to draw 
their resident samples and governments could use the outcome data to evaluate 
care providers’ performance. That is, governments interpreted residents’ 
functional, medical, mental, and psychosocial status as indicators of care 
quality10.  
                                                   
10 This outcome-based performance measurement is heavily influenced by Donabedian 
(1965)’s model, which uses the concept of structure, process, and outcome. The model 
claims that outcome is assumed to result from process; process is assumed to require 
structure. In the model, therefore, a good outcome justifies the process and then the 
structure. 
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This was the turning point where the United States began to apply 
outcome-based performance measurement. As in human service, the goal of 
long-term care in the United States contains ambiguity. The service is provided 
under the governmental aim of “providing essential human services, especially 
for those who are least able to help themselves.”11   Due to the ambiguity of 
this goal for long-term care, the government had not previously measured the 
performance of providers. When poor care quality became a social issue, 
however, the government conducted actual condition surveys by investigating 
the physical and mental conditions of nursing home residents. Analysing the 
results of resident assessments, the government began to examine the use of 
outcome-based performance measurement to evaluate nursing homes’ care 
quality. In other words, the government translated the goal of “essential human 
services” into the care to maintain (or improve) the users’ physical and mental 
conditions.   
 
Since then, the MDS has been used to develop publicly reported quality 
measures based on these conditional statuses of residents (Rahman and 
Applebaum, 2009).   Table 8-3 indicates the development of MDS-based (i.e., 
outcome-based) performance measurement. In 1999, Centres for Medicare and 
Medicaid Service (CMS) started requiring surveyors to use MDS-based 
measurement to guide their nursing home evaluations. In 2002, CMS launched 
the Nursing Home Compare Web site, a consumer information site that 
                                                   
11 Department of Health and Human Services, The United States < 
http://www.hhs.gov/about/ > 
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presents MDS-based quality ratings for virtually all nursing homes. Certainly, 
the MDS was initially criticized on its data collection.   The data collection 
method was not well instructed, for example, and the time frame for assessment 
was based on a resident’s admission, and then, on assessments undertaken 
every 90 days only, although major resident changes that happened after the 7- 
or 14-day look-back period were supposed to trigger a new assessment 
(Mehdizadeh and Applebaum, 2005). As the MDS has actively been revised, 
however, the instructions for data collection have been repeatedly updated and 
many nursing homes have gradually introduced assessment that is more 
frequent. 
 
As a result, there have been undeniable improvements in resident outcomes 
(Rahman and Applebaum, 2009). According to the study of Feng et al (2006), for 
example, the pressure ulcer incidence of residents has clearly dropped, despite 
increases in resident acuity, and restraint use has decreased for those provided 
with care. As for the extent that the use of the MDS, or the MDS-based 
performance measurement, contributed to care quality improvement, a series of 
studies, reported in 1997, evaluated the effect of MDS use on selected resident 
outcomes (Fries et al, 1997; Hawes et al, 1997; Philips et al, 1997). On the whole, 
the researchers found improvement in outcome measures from pre- to 
post-MDS implementation.  
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Table 8-3. History of MDS 
Year Development 
1990 First MDS introduced 
1991 First MDS nationally implemented 
1991 Enhanced MDS, the MDS+, developed for resource utilization group and 
quality indicator development project 
1995 MDS 2.0 nationally implemented 
1995 Zimmerman et al (1995) report on 24 MDS-based quality indicators 
1998 Nursing homes required to electronically submit MDS data to CMS 
1999 State surveyors required to use the quality indicators to guide nursing 
home evaluations 
2006 Nursing home Pay-for- Performance demonstration project launched 
2008 MDS 3.0 final draft published 
2010 MDS 3.0 nationally implemented (planned in October) 
Source: Rahman and Applebaum (2009) 
 
Nonetheless, nursing home care quality in the United States has been perceived 
as problematic. Weiner et al. (2007) compared quality assurance for long-term 
care in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, and Japan.  
They rated the nursing homes in the United States, together with England, as 
problematic in the category of the extent to which [care] quality is perceived as 
a problem. Due to the absence of a common measurement, this did not 
necessarily mean that the care quality of the United States’ nursing homes was 
among the worst. However, to be perceived as problematic by the public is a 
serious matter in the provision of human service that aims to ensure people’s 
minimum standard of living.   
 
 
Outcome-based Performance Measurement as a Cause of Users’ Dissatisfaction 
This care problem in public perception is not due to a lack of effort to develop a 
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quality assurance system. As mentioned in Chapter 3, in fact, only the United 
States and Japan have introduced nation-wide providers’ care quality, 
evaluation systems, which target all providers in the long-term care market and 
the United States has a longer history of developing a viable system than other 
countries do. 
 
The failure in the case of the United States is a result of its theoretical base: the 
outcome-based performance measurement with the existing public 
administration theory. Faced with requirements for tangible goals, necessary for 
outcome-oriented performance measurement, the government simplified the 
original ambiguous goals of long-term care by translating the physical and 
mental conditions of residents into enhanced, measurable outcomes.   
 
Certainly, such conditional status of residents may have occupied a significant 
component of the original goals, initially. Nevertheless, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, human service needs continuously change. Although most 
users wanted to improve their conditional status when the performance 
measurement was implemented, such desire has gradually decreased (or 
become an assumption of basic care) and residents, and their families, have 
begun to look for other conditions, programs, and environments promoting 
‘quality of life.’ Today, in fact, many elderly people suffer from incurable 
conditions, such as dementia (see page 131). Those who suffer from such 
conditions find no value in the outcome-based performance measurement, 
because the condition is not curable. It is natural for these residents to prefer 
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other factors, such as peaceful environments and relaxed atmospheres, to the 
MDS-based rehabilitations.   
 
Many researchers have also questioned the MDS’s value as a performance 
measurement tool, citing problems with its dearth of residents’ quality-of-life 
indicators (Ouslander, 1997; Schnelle, 1997; Uman, 1997; Bates-Jensen et al, 2003; 
Schnelle et al, 2003; Simmons et al, 2003; Rahman and Applebaum, 2009).   
However, there is no tangible definition of “quality of life.” Conducting a 
research survey, Slevin et al (1998) revealed that the correlation between 
medical doctors' definitions of “quality of life” and patients' definitions of 
"quality of life" was very poor. Outcome-oriented approaches cannot be 
implemented in the field of human service that deals with “quality of life.”   
 
This is, indeed, what the previous chapter mentioned: the weakness of 
outcome-based performance measurement in the human service market. The 
measurement creates gaps between the measures and users’ needs and the gaps 
cause the users to be dissatisfied. In the case of long-term care in the United 
States, as health concerns and trends change, many users value their quality of 
life over the improvement of their physical and mental conditions. 
Outcome-based performance measurement has not accommodated the changes, 
because the measurement systematically lacks input from care workers. As a 
result, the voice of users who do not intend to (or cannot) improve their 
conditions is overlooked and many who suffer from incurable conditions lose 
access to long-term care because the more improvement that can be shown in 
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the users’ conditions, the better the assessment of the nursing home and the 
better the services the nursing home is perceived to provide in the context of 
outcome-based performance measurement.   
 
 
Process-based Performance Measurement in Japan 
 
The care quality in Japan’s long-term care market is perceived as least 
problematic (Weiner et al, 2007). The process-based performance measurement 
in the Japanese market is based on the modified public administration theory, 
which adds “care workers’ behaviour” into the existing model: O = f (E, C, B, T, 
S, M). Like all other human service markets, the Japanese long-term care market 
aims at ambiguous goals. The strength of process-based performance 
measurement is, however, the measurement that can accommodate the 
ambiguous goals as they are.   
 
 
Background of Introducing Outcome-based Performance Measurement 
Process-based performance measurement in Japan originates from the idea that 
society should adjust to the convenience of frail elderly. As seen in Table 8-4, 
the government declared the reconstruction of the social security system for 
long-term care provision. Although responding to long-term care needs is 
commonly a social security issue in OECD nations, the emphasis is, indeed, 
slightly different from the case of the United States that has perceived 
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elderly-related issues as ‘danger of (to) individual’s independent life’ and 
challenges from the physical constraints of aging.   
 
A major reason for Japan’s strong attitude towards long-term care is, of course, 
the intensive increase of the long-term care needs. In fact, unlike the United 
States and many other OECD nations, the proportion of elderly in Japan’s 
population suddenly began to increase around 1990 (Figure 8-2). Furthermore, 
according to MHLW12 (2002), about 13 percent of the elderly, 65 or above, in 
2000, needed long-term care13 and the proportion is expected to reach up to 16 
percent14 in 2025. 
 
However, the approach to the long-term care issue also comes from the idea of 
long-term care service as the substitute for family care giving. Since the 
preparation period of the long-term care insurance policy (approximately 
1987- ), the government has actively surveyed the demography of insufficient 
family caregivers15 and planned the policy to back up the absence. These 
surveys included the condition of care recipients (Table 8-5), demography of 
bedridden elderly (Figure 8-2) and the future estimation (Figure 8-3), care 
givers for bedridden elderly (Figure 8-4, 8-5), and female labour participation 
ratios (Figure 8-6). In addition, the training for the licensing of Certified Care 
                                                   
12 Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Government of Japan. 
13 The elderly people who need care in 2000 (2800,000 people)/elderly population in 
2000 (21,700,000) = 12.9 percent 
14 The elderly people who need care in 2025 (5200, 000 people)/elderly population in 
2000 (32,400,000) = 16 percent. 
15 The survey entitled Comprehensive Survey of Living Conditions of the People on 
Health and Welfare is well known and has been revised every 3 years since 1987.  
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Workers began prior to 1987.    
 
In sum, because Japan considers long-term care service as the substitute for care 
recipients’ families’ tasks, it is natural for performance measurement to focus on 
the care process rather than the care outcome.   
  
Table 8-4. Objectives of Japanese Long-Term Care Insurance Policy  
(implemented in 2000) 
· To facilitate a system in which society as a whole supports those who are 
facing the need for long-term care, society’s major cause of concern in terms 
of becoming old. 
· To establish a system in which the relationship between benefits and burdens 
is made clear, by way of introducing a social insurance approach, which can 
easily gain public understanding. 
· To reconstruct the present, vertically divided system (health, medical, and 
welfare services) and to establish a system of comprehensive services from a 
variety of institutions, chosen at the user's discretion  
· To separate long-term care from the coverage of health care insurance, and to 
establish a system which aims to decrease cases of “social hospitalization” as 
the first step toward restructuring the social security system as a whole. 
 
Figure 8-1. Percentage of Population Aged 65 and Above 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
195
0
196
0
197
0
198
0
199
0
200
0
201
0
202
0
203
0
204
0
205
0
Japan
Germany
Australia
UK
USA
New Zealand
 
Source: United Nations (2006). World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision Population 
Database. 
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Table 8-5. Conditions of Care Recipients 
        (Unit: 10,000 people) 
Category 1993 2000 2010 2025 
Physically weak elderly persons 100 130 190 260 
Suffering from dementia and in need of needs long-term care (except for the bedridden 
elderly) 10 20 30 40 
Bedridden elderly (including bedridden and suffering from dementia) 90 120 170 230 
Total (elderly needing long-term care etc.) 200 280 390 520 
Population of elderly persons (aged 65 or over) 1,690 2,170 2,770 3,240 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Japan (2002) 
Figure 8-2. The Percentage of Bedridden Persons by Bedridden Periods 
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Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan16 (1995) 
 
                                                   
16 This ministry changed the name from “Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan” to 
“Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Japan” in 2001. 
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Figure 8-3. Future Estimation of the Bedridden Elderly/ 
 Elderly Persons Suffering from Dementia 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1993 2000 2010 2025
(year)
10
,00
0 p
eo
pl
e
Bedridden elderly (including
bedridden and suffering from
dementia)
Suffering from dementia and needs
long-term care (except for the
bedridden elderly)
Physically weak elderly persons
 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare, Japan (2002) 
 
Figure 8-4. Care Givers for the Bedridden Elderly (Age Group) 
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*Main care givers who live with bedridden persons aged 65 or over: 244,000 persons 
Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan (1995) 
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Figure 8-5. Care Givers for the Bedridden Elderly (Male and Female) 
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Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, Japan (1995) 
 
Figure 8-6. Female Labour Participation Ratio in Japan 
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Process-based Performance Measurement as a Guide for Care Implementation 
Process-based performance measurement has reflected care workers’ behaviour 
into the measurement. In Japan, there are three types of providers’ quality 
information available in the market, as shown in Table 4-7 in Chapter 4, and all 
of them evaluate how care is implemented, not how ‘successful’ the care is. For 
example, instead of asking how much the collaboration among health, medical, 
and welfare services has achieved, the performance indicators enquire whether 
or not the provider has a database of provided services (see page 70). In 
addition, as shown in Table 5-2 in Chapter 5, the indicators describe the details 
of the care process – choice of utensils, arrangement of meals, and atmosphere 
of dining - instead of the outcome – as the achievement of meal provision. 
These detailed process measurements serve as a guide for care implementation. 
 
 
Modification of Public Administration Theory:  
Promoting the Interaction between Governments and Providers 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, process-based performance measurement requires 
a close interaction between governments and providers in order to reflect users’ 
needs in care workers’ behaviour to measure. While the existing public 
administration theory does not possess that function due to its 
‘outsourcer-outsourcee’ relationship, the modified theory systematically 
includes the interaction. This section investigates how the Japanese market 
applies the modification into the system, with a comparison to the United States 
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market with the existing theory. 
 
The Japanese long-term care market implements the theoretical modification by 
giving care workers career path opportunities to be involved in the process of 
policy making/implementation. Table 8-6 indicates care workers’ career 
advantages compared with the United States. In Japan, the work experiences of 
care workers serve as a gateway to higher positions of care eligibility judgement, 
care planning, performance indicator setting, and the implementation of 
measurement, whereas no such system exists in the United States. The 
followings are the details of the Japanese case. 
 
 
 167 
Table 8-6. Summary of Care Workers’ Career Path Advantages to Policy-making Positions 
Setting and Implementation of 
Performance Measurement   
 Japan  United States 
Care worker’s involvement/precedence ✓ (no eligibility grades exist) Judging the Users’ Eligibility 
Grade Remarks Certified Care worker is to be a 
member of the care level 
assessment committee 
(no eligibility grades exist) 
Care worker’s involvement/precedence ✓ - Making Care Plan 
Remarks Care plan is made by Certified 
Care Manager whose eligibility 
requires 5 years’ work experiences 
as a certified care worker. 
Certified nurse, Medical 
doctor 
Care worker’s involvement/precedence ✓ - Setting Performance 
Indicators (i.e., Japan: 
Third-Party Evaluation, US: 
Minimum Data Set) 
Remarks Government’s Performance 
Indicator Setting Committee17 that 
includes several activists with care 
worker experience as well as 
representatives of care providers. 
MDS committee of IOM 
Care worker’s involvement/precedence ✓ - Implementing the 
Performance Measurement Remarks Certified evaluator (those who 
have experience as care workers 
are eligible to skip some part of 
the training) 
Usually licensed healthcare 
professionals (e.g., certified 
nurse), employed by the 
nursing home (CMS, 2010). 
                                                   
17 Kaigo saabisu no shitu no hyouka ni kansuru chosa kenkyuu iinnkai 
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Judging the Users’ Eligibility Grade 
In Japan, a prefectural Care Level Assessment Committee (CLAC), which 
includes care workers as members, assesses the users’ eligibility grades. The 
CLAC membership must include specialists in the field of healthcare, medicine, 
and welfare (Article 14-15, LTCI Act; Article 9, LTCI Government Order). 
Municipalities assign them (2-year terms) based on advice from local 
professional associations such as medical associations. In most cases, a medical 
doctor18 represents the field of medicine; a public health nurse represents the 
field of healthcare; and a certified care worker (or certified care manager) 
represents the field of welfare. Each assessment requires a computer-based 
eligibility test and further assessment from 5 randomly chosen CLAC members 
with at least one from each field. Table 8-7 indicates the job title of CLAC 
members in Kakogawa city, Hyogo, a typical mid-sized city in Japan. The total 
number of CLAC members varies by the size of the municipality: a bigger 
number for a more populated municipality and vice versa.     
 
In the United States, on the other hand, there is no system of eligibility grade, 
though the assessment of MDS may be very close to it. However, certified 
nurses, working as providers, not care workers (CMS) predominantly assess the 
MDS.  
Table 8-7. Job titles of CLAC members: the example of Kakogawa city 
Municipality 
(population) 
Medicine Healthcare Welfare Total member 
Kakogawa city 
(about 268,830) 
Medical Doctor: 
24 
Dentist: 2 
Pharmacist: 2 
Nurse: 13 
Occupational 
Therapist: 1 
Physical 
Therapist: 1 
Dental Hygienist: 
1 
Certified Care 
Worker: 6 
Certified Social 
Worker: 2 
Mental Health 
Welfare 
Professional: 1 
Social Welfare 
Officer: 1 
58 
Note: All job titles require official certificate. Nurse indicates both Certified Nurse and Assistant Nurse. 
Source: Hakit 21 (2010)  
 
                                                   
18 Medical doctor also serves as the chair of assessment in most cases. 
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Making Care Plan 
Only a Certified Care Manager can suggest a care plan for each user.  
Although care workers cannot directly carry out the process of making a care 
plan, the working experience of care workers is, nevertheless, advantageous to 
becoming a Certified Care Manager (Figure 8-7). To take the national exam of 
Certified Care Manager, the applicants are required to have working 
experiences with care related licenses. Together with other care related 
professionals, such as medical doctors and nurses, care workers (i.e., Certified 
Care Worker and Trained Home-Helper) are entitled to take the national exam 
with 5 years working experience at the positions. 
 
There is no such system in the United States. As the outcome-based 
performance measurement aims at improving users’ conditional (i.e., physical 
and mental) status, care plans are usually suggested by medical professionals.   
 
The modified public administration theory in Japan, therefore, systematically 
takes the voices of the care workers into the care plan. Those who make care 
plans for users inevitably have care worker experience; new officers keep 
coming up from the ‘front-line’ with current experiences and understandings of 
the changing long-term care market. This allows the care plan to reflect updated 
care needs.   
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Figure 8-7. How to become a Certified Care Manager 
 
Note: Official Training by prefecture indicated in the figure is the case of Tokyo metropolitan. The 
content of the official training may be slightly varied by prefecture. 
Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Foundation for Social Welfare and Public Health (www.fukushizaidan.jp) 
 
 
Eligibility 
a) 5 years working experience in one of the following national-licensed care-related fields: 
               1) Medical Doctor, 2) Dentist, 3) Pharmacist, 4) Public health nurse,  
5) Accouter, 6) Nurse, 7) Assistant nurse, 8) Physical therapist,  
9) Occupational therapist, 10) Social welfare counselor,  
11) Certified Care Worker, 12) Orthoptist, 13) Prosthetist,  
14) Dental hygienist, 15) Speech therapist, 16) Japanese traditional massager,  
17) Acupuncture/Moxacautery master (hari kyu shi),  
18) Judo-Orthopedics master 
 
b) 5 years working experience as a consultant at a designated care-related facility (e.g., 
handicapped care and long-term care). 
 
c) 5 years working experience as one of the following licensed care-related workers. 
               1) Certified case worker (shakaifukushi shuji) 
               2) Trained home helper (2nd grade) 
 
d) 10 years working experience as a non-licensed care assistant in a related position at a 
designated care facility 
 
National Exam (140,277 applications; 23.6% pass rate, 2009) 
Official Training by prefecture 
(Usually 5-day lecture, 1-month Intern, and 2-day seminars) 
 
Certified Care Manager 
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Setting Performance Indicators 
While medical professionals at the Institute of Medicine (IOM) create the MDS 
in the United States, Japanese third-party evaluation is developed by front-line 
care workers. Table 8-8 indicates the job titles of the Japanese performance 
indicator-setting committee at the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, 
Government of Japan. The committees includes 11 job titles from long-term care 
providers and their professional organizations, out of 17, – or 7 members from 
long-term care providers and their professional organizations out of a total of 
13 members. Moreover, 45 providers and Certified Evaluators contribute to the 
model survey of the performance indicators. It is natural that the third-party 
evaluation in Japan reflects the voice of the front-line care workers.
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          Table 8-8. Job Titles of Performance Indicator-Setting Committee 
Committee Member 
 
Summary 
6 from professional organizations  
5 from long-term care providers 
2 from research institutes 
1 from medical provider (hospital) 
1 from local government 
2 from public utility organizations 
Total: 17 (13 members) 
*doubling positions included 
 
-Vice president of Public utility organization, Japan Group Home for the elderly with 
dementia association (kouekishadan houjin nihon ninchishou group home kyoukai), 
President of a Health Service Facility for the elderly 
- Chief courier of All Japan Group Home network 
- Member of Public utility organization for dementia elderly and family at Chiba 
prefecture 
- Administrator of Group Home for the elderly with dementia 
- Executive director of Public utility organization, Japan Group Home for the elderly 
with dementia association (kouekishadan houjin nihon ninchishou group home 
kyoukai), President of Special Nursing Homes for the elderly. 
- President of Hospital 
- Courier of All Japan Group Home network, President of Nagano prefecture’s Group 
Home Association 
- Member of Public utility organization for dementia elderly and family at Chiba 
prefecture 
- Chief researcher of Dementia Care Information Network 
- Member of Welfare research institute 
- Chief of Social Welfare Department, Fukuoka prefecture 
- President of Health Service Facilities for the elderly 
- President of Okayama prefecture’s day service association, President of All Japan 
Group Home network, Okayama prefecture 
Note: underline indicates the committee chair. 
 
Model survey participant 
45 Community-based service providers (36 Group Home providers, 9 
Community-based One-stop Home- Care Service for Small Group of Users providers) 
14 members of performance measurement committee 
 
Note: nderlined president of hospital is the chair of the committee. 
Source: MHLW (2006c) 
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Implementing Performance Measurement 
In Japan, Certified Evaluators conduct third-party quality evaluation, many of 
whom have experience as street-level bureaucrats. As Figure 8-8 shows, care 
worker’s experience is one step to becoming a Certified Evaluator. Since the 
third-party evaluation has a strong focus on care workers’ behaviour, it is 
reasonable for local governments to provide care workers with ways to become 
Certified Evaluators. As a result, the implementation of performance 
measurement reflects the care workers’ views.  
 
Figure 8-8. How to be an Evaluator 
Application eligibility 
- 1 year working experience as Certified Care Manager 
-  
- 3 years care-related working experience in the field of Medicine, Healthcare, and 
Welfare (or equivalent, e.g. trainer /lecturer experiences in a related field).  
-  Not to belong/relate to any long-term care provider 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The certificate is valid for 5 years. After the term, evaluators need to participate in the 
prefectural training to renew the certificate. 
Source: MHLW (2008a) 
 
 
Prefectural Training 
Certified Evaluator* 
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The Positive Effect of Process-based Performance Measurement  
with Modified Public Administration Theory 
 
Having many policy makers who have experiences as care workers, the 
governments can reflect detailed care needs in long-term care policy. Table 8-9 
shows all services within the Japanese LTCI scheme. A wide range of programs 
is available, from rehabilitation to dementia care, from day care to night care, 
from care prevention to sanatorium-type medical care and even house reform 
for elderly people living at home as a choice.   
 
Table 8-9. Choice of Care Services (detailed) 
At-home care Institutional care 
Home-visit services 
- Home-help service 
- Home-visit nursing 
- Home-visit bathing service 
- Home-visit rehabilitation 
- Management & guidance for in-home care 
 
Commuting services 
- Day care service 
- Day rehabilitation service 
 
Short-stay services 
- Short-stay for the elderly requiring care 
- Short-stay for the elderly requiring 
medical care 
- Residential care facility for the elderly 
requiring care 
- Rental service for welfare equipments 
- Sales of designated welfare equipments 
 
Community-based services 
- Community-based one-stop home care 
service for small group of users 
- Night care service 
 
Others 
- House reform 
Community-based services 
- Group Home for the elderly with dementia 
 
Support to Prevent the Need for Care 
Community-based Services 
- Community-based one-stop home care 
service for small group of users 
- Day care service for the elderly with 
dementia 
 
Community-based Prevention Programs 
- Projects to prevent the need for care 
- Comprehensive support projects 
- General counselling support projects 
- Right-advocacy projects 
- Comprehensive and continuous care 
management support projects 
- Care management projects to prevent the 
need for care 
-   Optional projects 
 
Facility Services 
- Health Services Facilities for the elderly 
- Special Nursing Homes for the elderly 
- Sanatorium-type Medical Care Facilities 
Source: MLHW (2008a) 
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Combining the diverse services, users can receive comprehensive long-term 
care. Figure 8-9 shows a sample service combination, in a case in which the user 
decides to stay home and not live with facility services (i.e., nursing homes). A 
local government19 suggested the example. The users expect to receive such 
services20 with 90 percent of the fees covered by the universal insurance21.The 
users can choose multiple home-visit services, including (medical) nursing care, 
rehabilitation, home care (ADL support), and counselling. They can also use 
commuting services such as day service (or day care) to socialize with other 
elderly people and not just to receive comprehensive ADL support or 
rehabilitation. If the users become bedridden, they can expect to receive visiting 
services 3-4 times a day, plus night service as necessary. Needless to say, the 
users can expect to receive even more comprehensive, long-term care when 
they choose to stay at facility services, because care workers do not need to 
commute for care giving, as in at-home care. Such comprehensiveness of 
long-term care services is a clear indicator of how the care workers’ voice (i.e. 
uses’ needs) reflects in the policies of Japan’s system, applying the 
process-based performance measurement with modified public administration 
theory. 
                                                   
19 The source is the handbook in Niigata city, a local city in the northwest of Japan. 
20 This may not be the case if in a remote area. 
21 The users pay from only AUD 62 (support 1) to AUD 447 (care 5) per month at most, 
depending on the grade. 
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Figure 8-9. A Standard Weekly At-home Care Plan (Support 1- Care 5) 
Support 1 
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In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 8 days per month. 
 
Support 2 
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In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 14 days per month. 
 
Care 1 
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In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 21 days per month. 
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Assisted device (renting): Wheel chair 
In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 23 days per month. 
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Care 3 
 Mon Tue Wed Thu Fri Sat Sun 
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Assisted device (renting): Wheel chair, special bed, and mattress 
In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 29 days per month. 
 
Care 4  
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Assisted device (renting): Wheel chair, special bed, mattress, and air pad 
In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 31 days per month. 
 
Care 5 
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Assisted device (renting): Wheel chair, special bed, mattress, and air pad 
In case the care recipients choose only a short stay, the service is available up to 35 days per month. 
Source: Niigata city (2008) 
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The Virtuous Circle of the Process-based Performance Measurement Model 
 
The positive effect of process-based measurement with modified public 
administration theory is not just the excellent response to care needs, but also 
the sustainability of such response conditions. Table 8-10 and 8-11 indicate the 
outcome of the top three concerns in nursing home care and at-home care 
policies, from a survey of twelve selected OECD nations’ public officers. 
Among the concerns, the recruiting of skilled care workers is the most common 
issue. A common challenge in long-term care provision, then, is to recruit and 
train capable and skilful care workers. The career path to be a policy maker, 
offered by process-based measurement with modified theory, keeps attracting 
such workers in Japan.   
 
Table 8-10. Policy Concerns about the Quality of Nursing Home Care 
Group of issues mentioned Countries 
Recruiting and retaining an adequately 
educated and skilled workforce; 
improved qualification of staff 
Twelve countries that replied to this 
question 
Implementation or further development of 
a quality assessment and monitoring 
system 
Austria, Korea, United States 
Co-ordination of care service Canada, Hungary, Germany 
Building quality and amenity Hungary, Japan 
Other supply constraints: downward 
pressure on fees/inadequate fees paid to 
providers; lack of enough time for staff 
New Zealand, United Kingdom, Korea 
(shortage of government subsidies) 
Access to broader range of services, more 
differentiation 
Norway, Austria (number of short-stay 
units) 
Other mentioning of “top concerns” 
(country specific) 
Use of physical restraints (Japan); Number 
of liability claims; lack of liability 
insurance for long-term care (United 
States) 
Note: Data are based on replies from national administrators to the following question: “What are the top 
three concerns in your country in terms of quality of institutional care?” 
Source: OECD (2005: p. 69) 
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Table 8-11. Policy concerns about the quality of at-home services 
Group of issues mentioned Countries 
Recruiting and retaining an adequately 
educated and skilled workforce; 
improved qualification of staff 
Majority of countries that replied to this 
question 
Improvement of skills of care managers Canada, Japan 
Implementation or further development of 
a quality assessment and monitoring 
system; improved standards framework 
Australia, Austria, Korea 
Co-ordination of care services; continuum 
of care 
Australia, New Zealand 
Lack of information about services Japan, UK 
Prevention of inappropriate residential 
care admission 
Australia 
Supply constraints; limited financing Korea, US 
Broader range of services; too little 
differentiation 
Canada, Norway, UK 
Adequate care supply for dementia cases Germany, Japan 
Note: Data are based on replies from national administrations to the following question: “What are the top 
three concerns in your country in terms of quality of home care?” 
Source: OECD (2005: p. 70) 
 
Care workers tend to be considered as low-paid, simple labourers with very 
few career prospects in most countries, despite their increasing importance and 
responsibility in society In the United States, for example, the Direct-Care 
Workers (i.e., care workers in the United States) earn near-poverty wages. As 
Figure 8-10 shows, the wage of direct-care workers is below that of other simple 
labourers. More than 41 percent of Direct-Care Workers’ households rely on 
some kind of public benefit, such as food stamps (PHI, 2009). The ratio of care 
workers who do not have health coverage is nearly double other occupations 
(Figure 8-11). Ironically, those who provide care have much less access to health 
care than others. As it is considered a simple labour, there is no systematic 
career advantage. Nonetheless, the demand for advanced care skills has been 
increasing as care needs become more diverse (e.g., dementia care).  
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Figure 8-10. Direct-Care Workers’ Low Wages 
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Source: Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (2010) 
 
Figure 8-11. Direct-Care Workers Lacking Health Coverage (%) 
15.8
29.2
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
General Public Direct-Care Workers
 
Source: Paraprofessional Healthcare Institute (2008) 
 
The treatment of care workers in Japan also has much room to improve. 
According to a survey of the Japanese Association of Certified Care Workers 
(2005), 47.8 percent of certified care workers claim their low wages as 
occupational dissatisfaction (multiple answers). As a result, the turnover rate of 
Direct-Care Workers 
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care workers is higher than that of all other industries: the turnover rate of care 
workers is 20.2 percent, whereas the combined average of all other industries is 
17.4 percent (MHLW, 2005).    
 
However, the performance measurement with modified theory in Japan helps 
to solve this problem, with the care workers’ career path advantages toward 
being policy makers. Although it may begin with simple labours, the career, in 
Japan, connects to higher positions with higher wages. This certainly attracts a 
capable workforce.   
 
Moreover, a progressive system applies to the Japanese care worker’s wage. 
First, the governments guide the wages of care workers. The system takes 
working experiences and acquired skills into account. The guidance is very 
detailed and complicated. However, as a result, Table 8-12 shows that the 
progressivity of the salary reflects the actual work conditions. Second, the wage 
sharply increases as the care workers acquire a higher level of license. If, for 
example, a Certified Care Worker, among the lowest levels of certified care 
positions, acquires a Certified Care Manager’s license, the salary increases 
sharply. Although, according to the survey of MHLW, 47.8 percent of certified 
care workers claim their low wages as occupational dissatisfaction (multiple 
answers), the ratio drops down to 36.6 percent when it comes to that of certified 
care managers.   
 
The care workers’ job market in Japan attracts a capable labour force as a direct 
result of process-based measurement with modified theory. Certainly, the low 
wage remains as a concern of care workers. However, the attractive career 
paths available, leading to policymaking positions, and the progressive salary 
system reasonably benefits existing care workers and attracts new workers, 
interested in health care related careers. 
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Table 8-12. Actual condition survey of certified care worker’s salary (yearly) in Japan 
column: education;  
row: experience 
Compulsory 
education only 
High-school 
graduate 
2 years junior 
college graduate 
University 
graduate 
Total 
Less than 1 year N.D. N.D. N.D. ¥3,498,120 (AUD 43,727) 3,498,120 (AUD 43,727) 
1 years N.D. N.D. N.D. ¥3,445,886 (AUD 43,074) 3,445,886 (AUD 43,074) 
2-3 years N.D. N.D. N.D. ¥3,422,434 (AUD 42,780) 3,422,434 (AUD 42,780) 
3-4 years N.D. ¥3,524,360 (AUD 44,055) ¥3,598,701 (AUD 44,984) ¥3,759,356 (AUD 46,992) 3,719,525 (AUD 46,494) 
5-6 years N.D. N.D. ¥3,867,120 (AUD 48,339) ¥3,985,331 (AUD 49,817) 3,979,421 (AUD 49,743) 
7-9 years N.D. ¥3,927,800 (AUD 49,098) ¥3,871,712 (AUD 48,396) ¥4,352,265 (AUD 54,403) 4,175,495 (AUD 52,194) 
10-14 years N.D. ¥4,086,404 (AUD 51,080) ¥5,040,950 (AUD 63,012) ¥5,097,907 (AUD 63,724) 4,869,521 (AUD 60,869) 
15-19 years N.D. ¥4,249,240 (AUD 53,116) ¥5,217,939 (AUD 65,224) ¥6,341,404 (AUD 79,268) 6,217,255 (AUD 77,716) 
20-24 years N.D. ¥5,633,941 (AUD 70.424) ¥6,034,183 (ADU 75,427) ¥6,917,815 (AUD 86,473) 6,656,289 (AUD 83,204) 
25-29 years- N.D. ¥5,307,040 (AUD 66,338) ¥6,982,284 (ADU 87,279) ¥7,237,960 (AUD 90,475) 6,906,164 (AUD 86,327) 
30-34 years ¥5,220,120 (AUD 65,252) ¥5,753,727 (AUD 71,922) ¥7,364,764 (AUD 92,060) ¥7,591,954 (AUD 94,899) 7,177,755 (AUD 89,722) 
35 years or above N.D. ¥7,463,673 (AUD 93,296) ¥8,051,006 (AUD 100,638) ¥7,529,076 (AUD 94,113) 7,643,208 (AUD 95,540) 
Total ¥5,220,120 (AUD 65,252) ¥4,904,065 (AUD 61,301) ¥5,455,358 (AUD 68,192) ¥5,579,403 (AUD 69,743) 5,490,568 (AUD 68,632) 
Note: the salary is after tax. Due to the universal care and pension system in Japan, Health insurance and Pension are separately paid by the employer.   N.D. 
indicates non-data. 
Source: Survey by the Japanese Association of Certified Care Workers (2005) with 3,549 answers out of 12,000 questionnaire (by mail) distributions at February, 2005. 
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Summary 
 
Analysing two empirical cases, this chapter proved that the long-term care 
market responds better to the users’ needs when governments implement the 
process-based performance measurement model. Investigating the case of Japan, 
the research showed that process-based performance measurement reflects the 
users’ needs (i.e. garnered from care workers’ behaviour toward and 
understanding of the high needs of users).  In addition, the modified theory 
supports the governments’ acquisition of citizen’s demands via their direct 
inclusion of and interactions with care workers.   
 
The case of the United States endorsed the weakness of outcome-based 
performance measurement. Cutting off the ambiguity of the policy goals, 
outcome-based performance measurement failed to reflect the users’ needs. The 
existing public administration theory did not closely connect the governments 
and providers (i.e., care workers) and, as a result, the gap between users’ 
expectations and provided service expands and ends up with users’ 
dissatisfactions. 
 
The next chapter investigates another aspect of process-based performance 
measurement: care worker training. 
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Chapter 9: Another Aspect of Process-based Performance 
Measurement: Care Workers’ Training 
 
 
As the previous chapter investigates the behaviour of care workers, this chapter 
examines another aspect of process-based performance measurement: care 
workers’ training. There are two purposes. The first is to investigate what kind 
of training is needed for care workers to ensure an appropriate implementation 
of care service and pick up users’ needs.. The second is to examine whether or 
not such care workers’ training can be sustainable in the context that the 
numbers of care workers has been increasing..   
 
 
Overview of Care Workers’ Training 
 
Many nations have already realized that the improvement of care workers’ 
skills and qualifications is significant to ensuring quality of care.  As 
mentioned earlier in Table 8-10 and 8-11 (Chapter 8), public officials commonly 
raise insufficient training for care workers as a policy concern.   
 
In reality, care workers’ training has been seriously overlooked in most 
countries.  In fact, only the United States and Japan have nationally imposed a 
minimum training requirement for care workers.  All other countries have yet 
to define fully who care workers are because care institutions in these countries 
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can hire anyone to provide long-term care22.   
 
In the United States23 and Japan, on the other hand, training is required to be a 
care worker.  Compare the situation to driving a car.  That is, one does not 
need a driver’s license to drive a car on private property, but a license is 
required to drive on public roads and it is illegal otherwise. Likewise, everyone 
in the United States and Japan can provide long-term care to family members, 
friends, and others casually.  Without required training, however, one cannot 
provide long-term care through ‘public channels’, which is Medicaid long-term 
care facilities in the United States24 and the universal long-term care insurance 
scheme in Japan. It is illegal otherwise.   
 
Yet, the United States and Japan have very different approaches toward care 
workers’ training. The training in the United States is concise and focuses on 
exercising proper care and protecting care workers from their potential job risks, 
including injury. In Japan, on the other hand, the training is comprehensive and 
focuses on understanding care recipients in order to pick up their detailed care 
needs. In order to investigate the effectiveness of care workers’ training, 
therefore, this chapter continues to compare the cases of the United States and 
Japan.  
                                                   
22 “Care worker” mentioned here does not include medical staff such as medical 
doctors and nurses. 
23 Some states do not require any training for the category of Personal and Home Care 
Aides. 
24 In the United States, all long-term care facilities, including for-profit and non-profit 
ownership, are required to register with the local governments (state governments in 
most cases). Therefore, “public channels” here does not mean public institutions only. 
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Definition of Care Worker 
 
Table 9-1 reviews the definition of care workers in the United States and Japan. 
Although they have different names, their tasks are similar. They mainly give 
ADL supports to care recipients at care facilities (i.e., nursing homes) and in 
recipients’ homes. 
 
The roles of Nursing Aides and Assistant Nurses are, however, slightly 
different due to the difference of long-term care systems in the two nations. In 
the United States, Nursing Aides, Home Health Aides, and Personal Home 
Care Aides are called Direct-Care Workers.  They all work mainly in long-term 
care industries.  In Japan, on the other hand, Nursing Assistants mainly work 
at hospitals, not in long-term care industries, though Certified Care Workers 
and Trained Home-Helpers mainly work at long-term care industries25.   
 
The difference is rooted in the definition of ‘long-term care’ in these countries. 
As Figure 9-1 shows, the means-tested long-term care scheme is uniquely in 
charge of long-term care in the United States. In Japan, on the other hand, 
long-term care exists across three different schemes.  Whereas the universal 
long-term care insurance scheme covers elderly-related conditions only, 
medical-related long-term care and disabled-related long-term care are covered, 
                                                   
25 Certified Care Workers and Trained Home-Helpers also work at later-mentioned 
disabled care facilities. 
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respectively, by the universal healthcare scheme (i.e., hospitals) and the 
universal disabled care scheme (i.e., disabled care facilities).    
 
Table 9-1. Definition of Care Workers in the United States and Japan 
The United States (Direct-Care Workers) Japan (care workers) 
Nursing Aides generally work in nursing 
homes, although some work in assisted 
living facilities, other community-based 
setting, or hospitals. They support 
residents’ ADL, such as eating, dressing, 
bathing, and toileting. They also perform 
clinical tasks such as range-of-motion 
exercises and blood pressure readings. 
Assistant Nurses generally work in 
hospitals, although some work in 
institutional care (i.e., nursing homes). 
They support patients’ (residents’) ADL, 
such as eating, dressing, bathing, and 
toileting. They also perform clinical tasks 
such as range-of motion exercises and 
blood pressure readings. 
Home Health Aides provide essentially 
the same care and service as nursing 
assistants, but they assist people in their 
homes or in community settings under the 
supervision of a nurse or therapist. They 
may also perform light housekeeping tasks 
such as preparing food or changing linens. 
Certified Care Workers “provide 
appropriate advice and coordination as 
well as personal care to cope with physical 
and/or mental situations of those who need 
help in daily life, based on professional 
knowledge and skills”. (Certified Social 
Workers and Certified Care Workers Law 
of 1987) 
Personal and Home Care Aides26 may 
work in either private or group homes. In 
addition to providing assistance with ADL, 
these aides often help with housekeeping 
chores, meal preparation, and medication 
management. They also help individuals 
go to work and remain engaged in their 
communities. Consumers directly employ 
and supervise a growing number of these 
workers.  
Trained Home-Helpers “are registered 
under the exclusive qualification name of 
THH 27 ” (Enforcement Order Article 
3-1(2), Long-Term Care Insurance Law). 
The tasks include a) “care services” such 
as the assist of eating, bathing, clothing, 
and moving; b) assisted housekeeping 
such as cooking, laundry, cleaning, and 
shopping; c) mental care for care 
recipients and their family; and d) care 
advice for care recipients’ family members 
(National Trained Home-Helper Council, 
2010). 
Note: ADL indicates Activities of Daily Living. 
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics (2010) 
 
                                                   
26 They have many titles, including personal care attendant, home care worker, personal 
assistant, and direct support professional (the latter work with people with intellectual 
and development disabilities). 
27 Although THH is a prefectural license, the required qualifications (training) are 
designated by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare. 
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Figure 9-1. Differences in Long-Term Care Schemes in the United States and Japan 
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Training Hours: Much Longer in Japan 
 
The minimum training hours required to be a care worker is very different in 
Japan and the United States: the required number of hours in Japan is much 
higher than that of the United States. Table 9-2 summarises the required 
training hours in the two nations. The required training hours for a Certified 
Assistant Nurse and Certified Care Worker in Japan are, respectively, 1,890 and 
1,80028 hours, whereas that of the counterparts in the United States is only 75. 
The difference is indeed about 24 times. The training of a Trained Home Helper 
in Japan involves 500 hours (150 for level 2 qualifications), whereas the training 
hours of the US counterpart is 75. This time, the difference is not as significant, 
but Japanese training hours are still nearly six times (or twice in the case of level 
2) greater than are those in the United States. 
 
Certainly, in the United States, many state governments add extra hours of 
training to the federal minimum requirement. In fact, 27 states and Washington 
D.C. require extra hours training. Among them, in 12 states and Washington 
D.C. the training hours go up to 120 hours in total. In Japan, on the other hand, 
the training hours usually do not differ by prefectures, though Assistant Nurse 
and Trained Home-Helper are prefectural licenses (Certified Care Worker is a 
national license). 
 
                                                   
28 In regard Certified-Care Worker, the required training can be replaced by 3 years of 
on-the-job training at certified care facilities. In that case, however, candidates have to 
pass the national examination in order to clarify that the candidate has completed the 
equivalent of the required training.   
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Nonetheless, there is an enormous difference in the number of required training 
hours between the United States and Japan. Moreover, the minimum 
requirement in Japan is under consideration to expand in order to respond to 
diversifying care needs, including dementia care. In fact, the training hours of 
Certified Care Workers have increased recently from 1,500 to 1,800 in 2009. In 
addition, the training hours of Trained Home Helpers have increased from 250 
to 500 and qualifications for level three Trained Home-Helpers, requiring 50 
hours training, were abolished in 200929. Level 2 Trained Home Helpers are 
now encouraged to complete a total of 500 hours of training. Furthermore, the 
licenses of Trained Home-Helpers, together with Certified Assistant Nurses, fall 
under criticism that the training hours are too short. According to the minutes 
of the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare (1996; 2008: p.9), many policy 
makers propose to abolish both licenses, in which case current license holders 
would be required to upgrade to Certified Nurse30 and Certified Care Worker, 
respectively. In the United States, on the other hand, the minimum 
requirements have not changed for a while, though some researchers propose 
to increase the training hours (e.g., Li and Ziemba, 2009). 
 
 
 
                                                   
29 The license expired in April 2009.  
30 Certified Nurse requires 3,000 hours training and national exam. 
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Table 9-2. Required Training Hours in Japan and the United States 
 Japan The United States 
Position Certified Assistant Nurses (CAN) 
Certified Care Workers (CCW), 
Trained Home Helpers (THH) 
Direct Care Workers 
(DCW) 
Required hours  
of training 
CAN: 1,890 hours 
CCW: 1,800 hours 
TTH: 500 hours 
     (Level 2: 130 hours)* 
75 hours 
(including 16 hours clinical 
training) 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010b) and Bureau of Labour Statistics (2010). 
 
 
Two Phases of Training Content 
 
As care worker training is a part of the process-based performance 
measurement, the purpose of the training is to acquire the necessary skills and 
attitudes toward care recipients to provide good quality of care.  There are, 
overall, two phases to achieve success. The first phase focuses on conducting 
requested physical supports safely.  This is the focus of the training in the 
United States.  The second phase focuses on picking up potential care needs 
and responding to them.  This is necessary, especially when providing care for 
the elderly with dementia.  The Japanese training is at this stage. 
 
Phase 1: Case of the United States 
To be able to respond to visible care needs, the first phase of training focuses on 
basic attitudes and physical skills.  The attitudes trained here involve basic 
legal/ethics matters, human rights, and communication.  They are somewhat 
considered as common sense in the profession.  However, the skills trained in 
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Phase 1 are rather specific. They include basic medical-related skills and 
transfer techniques.  Since care recipients tend to be frail, the basic 
medical-related skills are always necessary in case of emergency, though care 
workers are responsible only for first aid and not for medical treatment. As for 
transfer techniques, the training in Phase 1 includes not only giving a smooth 
support, but also protecting care workers’ health.  Throughout the ADL 
supports, care workers often need to lift care recipients.  Although the weight 
of care recipients is widely varied, care recipients are much more delicate and 
often heavier than, say, the materials at a construction site. In fact, Direct-Care 
Workers have the highest injury rate among occupations in the United States 
(Zontek, Isernhagen, and Ogle, 2009). Back injuries, especially, are very 
common31. The training in Phase 1, therefore, covers basic attitudes and skills 
for visible care.  
 
Most contents of the training in the United States can be classified into the basic 
attitudes and skills.  Table 9-3 indicates the content of the training in the 
United States.  Concerning Nursing Aides, resident rights belongs to the 
attitudes, whereas clinical training, basic nursing, personal care, and basic 
restorative are about skills.  Certainly, mental health, social service, and care of 
the cognitively impaired may be exceptions, but overall the content belongs to 
the Phase 1. As for the case of Home Health Aides/Personal and Home Care 
Aides, information regarding personal hygiene is about attitude.  Safe transfer 
techniques, reading, and recording vital signs, infection control, and basic 
                                                   
31 In Japan, about 70% of care workers suffer from back pain (MHLW, 2008b). 
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nutrition indicate the skills.  
 
Table 9-3. Training Content in the United States 
Title Content Hours 
Clinical training  16 
Other skills 
- basic nursing 
- personal care 
- mental health and social service 
- care of cognitively impaired 
- basic restorative 
- resident right 
59 
Nursing Aides 
Total 75 
Covered area: 
-  Information regarding personal hygiene 
-  Safe transfer techniques 
-  Reading and recording vital signs 
-  Infection control 
-  Basic nutrition 
   (+ 16 hours Practical training*) 
75 Home Health Aides/ 
Personal and Home Care 
Aides 
Total 75 
Note: * is required in many states. 
Source: Bureau of Labour Statistics (2010) 
 
Phase 2: Case of Japan 
Aiming at picking up potential care needs, Phase 2 emphasises mental and 
communication aspects in the training.  As a significant number of care 
recipients suffer from dementia and other cognitive impairments, many care 
needs are invisible.  Elderly people may require help to go to the bathroom, an 
assist to change their position in bed, or support to change their clothes.  If 
they cannot properly deliver their will, due to their cognitive conditions, 
however, such needs are easily overlooked.  In order for care workers to pick 
up these potential needs, they must understand elderly peoples’ mentality and 
communicate effectively with them. 
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This does not just help care recipients, but also protects care workers’ health.  
Care work is, indeed, a very mentally draining task, because care recipients’ 
mental statuses tend to be unstable. As most care recipients are living the last 
stage of their lives, they inevitably face a fear of death while in care. According 
to Kübler-Ross (1969), there are usually Five Stages of Grief as a pattern of 
adjustment to human death.  These are denial, anger, bargaining, depression, 
and acceptance.  This means, at each stage, care recipients can be very 
emotional and care workers must face and deal with these dramatic reactions 
while giving care.  The survey of Kawamura (2008) reports32 that about 28 
percent of care workers receive “physical and verbal abuse from care 
recipients”; this is a significant work concern.  In such an environment, it is 
very important for both care recipients and care workers that care workers are 
capable of dealing with such emotions by communicating with care recipients 
effectively. 
 
The focus of the Japanese training has shifted to this Phase 2.  Table 9-4 shows 
the required training content for Assistant Nurses, Certified Care Workers, and 
Trained Home-Helpers.  As in the training of Assistant Nurses, the mental 
aspect of care recipients is covered by several subjects such as Psychology of the 
patient, Psychiatric nursing, and Psychiatric nursing (practice) and a total of 175 
hours are spent on those issues.  Moreover, in order to understand care 
recipients further, the practical subjects have special focuses on recipients’ 
                                                   
32 The survey was conducted in Japan, but it is thought that the concern was shared in 
the United States and other countries because the core workers’ tasks are quite similar. 
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groups such as adult/elderly and mother and child.  A total of 595 hours of 
training are spent specifically on adult and elderly care in order to understand 
their particular needs and issues. In the training of Certified Care Workers, 
these aspects are more clearly emphasised (Table 9-5).  Besides practical 
training, many subjects deal with understanding human mentality. Topics 
include human dignity and independence, human relationships and 
communication, understanding society, leadership and human relations, social 
studies, communication skills, understanding dementia, understanding 
disabilities, and mental and physical structures. Indeed, 460 hours, about 26% 
of the total training, are spent on such matters33. Comparing this to the previous 
version of training content, the difference is clear. 
 
Table 9-6 indicates the required Certified Care Workers’ training, in effect prior 
to 2009. The focus of the training was “practical skills” rather than dealing with 
mental aspects of care.  There were only three mental-related subjects: social 
welfare of the physically and/or mentally disabled, psychology of the elderly 
and disabled, and mental health.  The training duration was only 120 hours, 
about 8% of the current total requirement. As for the training of Trained 
Home-Helpers, the focus on Phase 2 is also clear (Table 9-7).  Most subjects, 
besides the practical part of the training, deal with understanding care 
recipients and their mentalities.  Understanding the mission of life support 
and dignity of care recipients, understanding dementia, communication, and 
skills on care provision are typical examples of such subjects.  In sum, the 
                                                   
33 As for the selective subjects, each training hour is calculated by the total hours 
divided by the number of subjects (i.e., x=120/6).  
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focus of the Japanese training is on understanding and communicating with 
care recipients.  This is how care workers in Japan are trained to identify 
potential care needs.   
 
Table 9-4. Required training of Assistant Nurses in Japan 
Subject Type Hour 
Language arts Lecture 35 
Foreign language Lecture 35 Ba
sic
 
Other general education Lecture  35 
Human body function and structure Lecture 105 
Diet and nutrition Lecture 35 
Medicine and nursing Lecture 35 
Illness Lecture 70 
Infection and prevention Lecture 35 
Care and ethics Lecture 35 
Psychology of patient Lecture 35 B
asi
c s
pe
cia
l 
Structure of healthcare and social welfare/ Nursing and law Lecture 35 
Basic nursing   
General consideration of nursing Lecture 35 
Basic nursing skills Lecture 210 
 
General consideration of nurse practice Lecture 70 
Nursing for adult/ Nursing for elderly Lecture 210 
Nursing for mother and child Lecture 70 
Psychiatric nursing Lecture 70 
Nursing practice   
Basic nursing Practice 210 
Nursing for adult/ Nursing for elderly Practice 385 
Nursing for mother and child Practice 70 
Sp
eci
al 
 
Psychiatric nursing  Practice 70 
Total 1890 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010b) 
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Table 9-5. Required Training of Certified Care Workers (from 2009) 
Subject Hour 
Understanding 
humans 
Human dignity and independence 30 
 Human relationship and communication 30 
Understanding society Understanding society 60 
Hu
ma
n a
nd
 So
cie
ty 
Selective subjects 1. Life science studies 
2. Mathematics and logical thinking on 
human relation and social life 
3. Basic life skills  (e.g., life culture, 
and living skills) 
4. Leadership and human relations 
5. Social studies (sociology, political 
science and economics) 
6. Various social welfare scheme 
120 
Basic care 180 
Communication skills 60 
Life support skills 300 
Care process 150 
Comprehensive care workshop 120 
Ca
re 
Care practice 450 
Understanding dementia 60 
Understanding disabilities 60 
Me
nta
l 
& 
Ph
ys
ica
l  
Mental and physical structure 120 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010b) 
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Table 9-6. Required Training of Certified Care Workers (prior to 2009) 
Subject Type Hours 
Introduction to social welfare Lecture 60 
Social welfare of the elderly Lecture 30 
Social welfare of the physically and/or mentally disabled Lecture 30 
Rehabilitation Lecture  30 
Lecture 30 Practical skill of social work 
Seminar 30 
Practical skill of recreation instruction Seminar  60 
Psychology of the elderly and disabled Lecture  60 
Introduction to domestic science Lecture 60 
Nutrition and cooking Lecture 30 
Practical training of domestic science Practice 30 
Introduction to medicine Lecture 60 
Mental health Lecture 30 
Introduction to care work Seminar 60 
Practical skill of care work in general Seminar 120 
Practical skill of care work (according to each disability type) Seminar 120 
Practical training of care work Practice 450 
Supervision of practical training of care work Seminar 60 
General education Lecture 120 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010b) 
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Table 9-7. Required Training of Trained Home-Helpers 
Subject Type Hours 
Understanding the mission of life, support and dignity of care 
recipients 
Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Understanding the system and services available for frail elderly 
and disabled people 
Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Understanding the disease and disability of frail elderly and 
disabled people 
Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Understanding dementia Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Communication and skills on care provision Lecture/ 
Seminar 
90 
Skills on life supports and housekeeping Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Collaboration with medical and nursing staff Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Social welfare skills on care Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Planning and assessment for life support Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Ethics and tasks as care worker Lecture/ 
Seminar 
30 
Practical training of care work Practice 140 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010b) 
 
 
License Examination 
 
Whereas the completion of the training usually means the qualification for the 
license in the United States, the training completion in Japan may only indicate 
the qualification for a license exam.  First, the Japanese Assistant Nurse 
candidates (i.e., those who complete the required training at designated 
institutions) need to pass the prefectural exam to get the license.  The 
examination for Trained Home-Helpers is to be abolished, but the level 2 exam, 
which allows the successful candidate to skip a part of the required 500 hours of 
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training, will remain.  As for the Certified Care Workers, however, the exam is 
implemented universally34.  As seen in Figure 9-2, there are now six routes to 
be a Certified Care Worker and the exam will soon be implemented in all routes.  
In addition, the exam is not just a formality process.  The subjects range widely 
(Table 9-8) and only half of the candidates pass the exam every year, as shown 
in Table 9-935.   
 
Figure 9-2. Six Routes to be Qualified as a Certified Care Worker 
Qualification of Certified Care Workers
Special training school
(1-year course)
Graduation 
from school 
of social 
work at 
university
Graduation 
from special 
training 
school for 
Certified 
Social 
Workers
Graduation 
from special 
training 
school for 
Children 
Day Care 
Workers
More than 3 
years 
practices 
related to 
care work*
Graduation 
from special 
training 
school for 
Children 
Day Care 
Workers
National examination
Graduation from high school
Special 
training 
school
(2-4-year 
course)
National examination (from 2012) More than 6 months National 
Training (from 2012)
Route 1 Route 2 Route 3 Route 4 Route 5 Route 6
 
Note: The step in the dotted boxes is to be implemented in April 2012. 
* “Practices related to care work” here means on-the-job training through the non-licensed part of nursing 
home tasks, such as cleaning rooms and cooking meals for care recipients.    
Source: MHLW (2010a) 
 
                                                   
34 Until 2012, the exam will have been only for the candidates in route 5 and 6. 
35 The exam is an absolute evaluation, not a comparative assessment.   
 201 
Table 9-8. Subjects of Certified Care Worker Exam 
Paper Exam 
- Compendium of Social Welfare 
- Elderly Care 
- Disabled Care 
- Rehabilitation 
- Social Welfare and Care Support Skills 
- Organising Recreation Activities 
- Psychology of Elderly and Disabled people 
- Domestic Science 
- Medicine 
- Mental Health 
- Compendium of Care Work 
- Care Skills 
- Care Skills on Various Occasion 
Practical Exam (corresponds to the paper exam, especially the subject of “Social 
Welfare and Care Support Skills”) 
Source: MHLW (2010a) 
 
Table 9-9. Exam Pass Rate of Certified Care Workers (2006-2010) 
Year Examinee Successful Examinee Successful Ratio  
2010 153,811 77,251 50.2% 
2009 130,830 67,993 52.0% 
2008 142,765 73,302 51.3% 
2007 145,946 73,606 50.4% 
2006 130,034 60,910 46.8% 
Source: MHLW (2010b) 
 
 
Theoretical Conclusion and Empirical Concern regarding Care 
Workers’ Training as a Process-based Performance Measurement  
 
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate care workers’ training as a part 
of the process-based performance measurement that ensures quality of care. 
Analysing the cases of the United States and Japan has provided theoretical 
evidence that the care workers’ training has two phases and that both are 
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respectively useful to ensure the quality of care. That is, whereas Phase 1 
standardises the care quality of overt needs by ensuring proper care attitudes 
and physical skills (e.g., transfer techniques), Phase 2 enables care workers to 
respond to potential care needs by teaching care recipients’ mentality and 
training communication skills to pick up potential care recipients’ needs.    
 
Nonetheless, an empirical concern is that the care workers’ training may not be 
sustainable. As seen in the case of Japan, while the population of care recipients 
is expected to increase, the content of training has become more comprehensive. 
Can Japan keep this pace for the next decade of an aging society?   
 
Certainly, a part of the question was already answered in the previous chapter. 
The care workers are highly motivated. In Japan, the experience as care worker 
is a necessary step to be a policy maker in the field of care. Starting as a care 
worker, there are certain career steps necessary to be involved in policymaking 
(Figure 9-3). In addition, compared to other countries, the salary of care 
workers is good and expected to increase progressively. In Japan, as a result, 
despite the demanding training requirements, the care workers’ labour shortage 
issue is not as serious as that in the United States. In fact, whereas the United 
States relies on immigrants for 23% of care workers 36  (PHI, 2010), the 
immigrant-dependent ratio in Japan is nearly zero37. This might certainly be 
                                                   
36 PHI defines immigrants as those who are born outside the United States. 
37 Certainly, the Government of Japan gave 3-4-year training scholarships to 208 
Indonesian candidates for the Assistant Nurse/Certified Care Workers program in 2008 
as “the first trial” to accept foreign labour in the field. In the following year, 2009, the 
government also gave similar scholarships to 280 Filipino candidates for the Assistant 
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because of the language barrier of Japanese but, as seen in Table 9-9, the 
number of the license applications (i.e., examinees) has increased. 
 
Figure 9-3. Career Steps of Care Workers in Japan 
 
Note: Coloured box indicates a national license, whereas a white box means a prefectural license. 
Both licenses are, however, interchangeable with meeting the requirements. For example, Trained 
Home-Helpers are eligible to apply for Certified Social Worker qualification; Certified Care Workers 
can apply for Certified Care Manager qualification.   
 
Nonetheless, one must consider the government’s motivation to train care 
workers. Even if care workers are motivated in Japan, it is costly for the 
government to train the candidates for care workers and to maintain the 
long-term care system. Certainly, to ensure quality of care is an important task 
of governments, along with the mission of human service. Particularly, 
                                                                                                                                                     
Nurse/Certified Care Worker program. However, as of November 2010, none of them 
has yet received these licenses. In Japan, there are about 382,000 Assistant Nurses 
(MHLW, 2006), 81,000 Certified Care Workers, and 31,000 Trained Home Helpers 
(MHLW, 2009). Estimates suggest that almost all of them are Japanese natives. 
Certified Care Worker 
Trained Home-Helper 
Certified Social Worker 
(A key player to assess care grade and set 
care quality indicators) 
Psychiatric Social Worker  
etc 
Certified Care Manager 
(the license to make care 
plans for care recipients) 
Step up Step up 
Specific skill 
Care Workers 
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however, it may be that Phase 2 training, shown in the case of Japan, is too 
much of a burden on governments. 
 
 
Government Motivation to Train Care Workers 
 
Phase 2 of care workers’ training can be sustainable. Indeed, the training has 
had great spill over effects on care-related industries in Japan. This section 
analyses the mechanism, investigating the case of Japan. 
 
Long-Term Care in Economic Growth Strategy 
As explained earlier, the purpose of Phase 2 training is to pick up potential care 
needs. In economics or/and business terms, this can be rephrased as ‘market 
research.’ The government of Japan, particularly the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade, and Industry (hereinafter, METI), draws growth strategy utilising the 
care workers’ skills of picking up potential care needs.   
 
With this strategy, the livelihood support robot used in the long-term care 
industry has great potential. The livelihood support robot means the robot that 
helps humans in long-term care, housekeeping, and in the safety and comfort of 
daily living (AIST, 2007). According to Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Machine Industry (2008), the market for the livelihood support robot can be 
expanded to 1,453.4 billion yen (institutional use: 901.2 billion yen [11.2 billion 
AUD]; home use: 552.2 billion yen [6.9 billion AUD]) by 2030.   
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The government of Japan recognises this potential. In 2010, the research of the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, Japan (METI) reveals that the future 
growth of the Japanese robot industry is expected to rely heavily on service 
uses (Figure 9-4). The livelihood support robot will be a core division of service 
use in the near future. In fact, the market for the livelihood support robot is to 
occupy about 20 percent of the 9.7 trillion yen (121 billion AUD) Japanese robot 
industry by 2035 (Table 9-10).   
 
Figure 9-4. Overall Japanese Robot Industry Market Prediction (2015-2035) 
0.0
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4.0
5.0
6.0
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Fishieries
RT product
Manufacturing
 
Note: RT indicates Robot Technology 
Source: METI (2010)
Trillion JPY 
Year 
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Table 9-10. Japanese Robot Industry Market Predictions (2015-2035) (Detailed) 
Division Predicted Market Scale (Billion yen) 
Major 
Division 
Middle Division Small 
Division 
2015 2020 2025 2035 
Calculation 
Conventional 
industrial robot 
- 936.5 1,052.4 1,092.6 1,102.7 Pattern 2 
Assembly 
robot 
(Automobile) 
32.4 99.2 239.3 798.8 Pattern 4 
Manufacturing 
Next-generation 
industrial robot 
Robot cell 
(Electric 
machine) 
32.9 104.8 248.8 827.9 Pattern 4 
RT electric 
appliance/ home 
equipment 
- 92.8 285.9 488.0 557.9 Pattern 5 
RT automobile - 50.9 103.3 208.3 737.0 Pattern 5 
RT ship - 15.9 28.1 44.4 72.9 Pattern 5 
RT railway - 2.5 4.6 7.4 12.8 Pattern 5 
Robot 
Technology 
(RT) product 
RT construction 
machine 
- 14.9 29.8 57.6 175.0 Pattern 5 
Land-use 
agriculture 
1.1 2.3 7.3 27.6 Pattern 5 
Garden 
firming/ 
facility 
firming 
0.9 3.9 15.0 92.7 Pattern 4 
Daily firming/ 
animal 
firming 
10.2 29.4 49.8 58.8 Pattern 3 
Agriculture 
Agriculture 
logistics 
27.3 60.3 81.2 85.8 Pattern 3 
Forestry - 1.7 8.4 30.4 87.2 Pattern 4 
Agriculture, 
Forestry, and 
Fisheries  
Fisheries/ 
aquaculture 
- 5.4 16.8 41.7 114.2 Pattern 4 
Medical care Operation 
support 
4.3 13.6 31.7 53.4 Pattern 3 
 Pharmaceutics 
support 
6.5 21.0 38.3 41.4 Pattern 3 
Self-support 13.4 39.7 82.5 220.6 Pattern 4 Long-Term 
Care Care support 3.3 14.6 41.4 183.7 Pattern 4 
Fitness 137.6 146.1 157.6 181.7 Pattern 3 Healthcare 
Health 
monitoring 
5.4 16.1 44.0 148.0 Pattern 3 
Room cleaning - 2.2 12.7 54.1 428.7 Pattern 3 
Security Machine 
security 
21.0 61.0 124.9 268.9 Pattern 5 
 Institutional 
security 
1.7 21.0 70.3 163.2 Pattern 4 
Receptionist - 0.2 0.9 3.9 46.5 Pattern 3 
Delivery - 0.7 3.0 13.2 81.1 Pattern 3 
Transportation 
(business use) 
- 5 116.2 619.0 675.9 Pattern 3 
Heavy-duty 
support 
- 1.5 4.3 12.0 229.9 Pattern 3 
Food handling 17.9 67.5 143.2 164.0 Pattern 3 Food industry 
Food 
processing 
8.1 30.5 79.3 174.3 Pattern 3 
Logistic Palletizer/ 
depalletizer 
21.2 41.0 86.5 152.3 Pattern 2 
House 4.6 9.8 15.7 21.3 Pattern 1 
Service 
Examination/ 
maintenance Social infrastructure 21.6 103.8 218.8 180.5 Pattern 4 
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Division Predicted Market Scale (Billion yen) 
Major 
Division 
Middle Division Small 
Division 
2015 2020 2025 2035 
Calculation 
Education - 11.9 24.3 36.1 45.0 Pattern 1 
Amusement - 21.1 35.7 57.6 122.2 Pattern 1 
Rescue - 0.8 6.0 29.1 67.0 Pattern 1 
Prospecting - 1.7 7.3 25.7 81.1 Pattern 3 
Transportation 
(home use) 
- 2.1 49.8 265.3 289.7 Pattern 3 
Hobby - 22.3 71.6 1498.5 215.7 Pattern 1 
House-keeping 
support 
- - - 15.7 85.8 Pattern 3 
MIMAMORI/. 
communication 
- 0.3 1.1 3.6 34.1 Pattern 3 
Robot Total 1,599.0 2,853.3 5,258.0 9,708.0  
Livelihood Support Robot  
(occupancy rate in the total) 
31.7 
(2%) 
250.2 
(8.8%) 
1,109.9 
(21%) 
1,980.7 
(20%) 
 
Note: The bold text indicates the livelihood support robot. The original source describes the number 
in increments of 100 million, but this table shows the number in increments of 1 billion. The term 
MIMAMORI is hard to translate, but roughly, it means “to stand watch over frail elderly and/or small 
children and to offer help when necessary” in English.  
Methodology: The prediction is calculated by the logistic curve model formed by the adoption 
number, household adoption rate, replacement cycle, and price transition of the anagogic (in terms of 
price and utilisation) product in the past market of each division.   
- Pattern 1: stochastics of the existing stochastics data 
- Pattern 2: stochastics based on the existing market performance 
- Pattern 3: stochastics based on the model curve of the anagogic robot 
- Pattern 4: stochastics based on the market needs 
- Pattern 5: stochastics based on the model curve of the anagogic RT product 
Source: METI (2010) 
 
The government indeed has heavily committed to the promotion of the 
livelihood robot that collaborates with care workers. The commitment 
originally began with the METI’s policy of the “21st Century Robot Challenge 
Program” in 2001, a year after universal long-term care insurance was 
implemented. Since then, the focus on the livelihood support robot has grown 
stronger. In 2009, the government set up the action plan to back up their 
activities (Table 9-11).   
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Table 9-11. Action Plan to Promote Livelihood Support Robot by Government of Japan 
2009- The livelihood support robot project by METI (1.6 billion yen) 
2010-2011 Introductory Period 
- Safety check (METI)  
- Risk assessment (METI) 
- Test at care facilities (METI, MHLW) 
- LTCI system maintenance for robot introduction (MHLW)  
- Test at special ward (e.g., Tsukuba-city) 
2012-2013 Primary introduction 
- Test of care worker robot (e.g., power suite) (METI, MHLW) 
- Power suite test with normal healthy subjects (METI) 
- Planning of mobility-robots (related Ministries) 
2014- Major introduction through B2B (Business to Business) market 
- Implementation of robot-use promotion policy (MHLW) 
- Setting up robot assessment agency (METI) 
- Implementation of the telecommunication system for robot use 
(MPMHAPT) 
Note: MPMHAPT means Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts, and 
Telecommunications. 
Source: METI (2010) 
 
Research and Development 
The experiences of well-trained care workers in Japan are greatly utilised in the 
research and development of the livelihood supports robot. First, robot makers, 
robot users (i.e., care workers and care recipients), universities, local 
governments, think tanks, insurance companies, venture capitals, and leasing 
companies have formed a collaborative body named the Association of Robot 
Business Promotion. The association offers the members various collaborative 
opportunities such as business matching (Figure 9-5). Furthermore, the New 
Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), a 
government agency, supports the establishment of ethical and safety guidelines 
(NEDO, 2008). Collaborating with robot makers and universities, the National 
Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) conducts 
research in Tsukuba city, a special word of long-term care. Many, universities, 
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especially, take advantage of their care worker training functions on their 
campuses. As mentioned in Route 2 in Figure 9-2, some universities hold care 
workers’ training schools, called Care Worker/Social Worker School. Since the 
needs of long-term care have been increasing, today 179 universities have such 
schools within their campuses (Table 9-12). As many of the teaching staff at the 
schools have care worker experiences38, it is very convenient for the researchers 
in these universities to utilise the detailed needs of long-term care in their 
research.   
 
Figure 9-5. The Association of Robot Business Promotion 
228 members (as of April, 2010): robot makers, robot users (i.e., care workers and care 
recipients), universities, local governments, think-tanks, insurance companies, venture 
capitals, and leasing companies 
President: Takeshi Uchiyamada (Vice President of Toyota Motor) 
 
Organisation: 
 
 
Observers: METI, CAO, MPMHAPT, MHLW, and MLIT 
Note: METI: Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry 
     CAO: Cabinet Office 
     MPMHAPT: Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Post, and Telecommunications 
     MHLW: Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare 
MLIT: Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport 
Source: METI (2010) 
 
                                                   
38and/or they have a very close relationship with care workers. 
Managerial body 
Department of 
Safety and Quality 
Control 
Department of 
Business Matching 
Department of PR 
and Planning 
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Table 9-12. University with Care/Social Work School in Japan 
Area 
Number of Universities 
with Care/Social Work 
Schools 
Hokkaido 8 
Tohoku 13 
Kanto 55 
Koshinetsu 6 
Hokuriku 2 
Tokai 21 
Kinki 34 
Chugoku 16 
Shikoku 6 
Kyushu 16 
Okinawa 2 
Total 179 
Source: Welfare and Medical Service Agency (2010a) 
 
Robot Utilisation Cases 
Because of robot business promotion, many livelihood support robots have 
come into service. After many years of research and development, some have 
begun to grow in popularity and others are starting to be involved in overseas 
export. With these successes, many companies have accelerated their 
investment in the development of the livelihood support robot. 
 
Case 1: Robot Suit HAL (Hybrid Assistive Limb) 
Robot suite HAL, developed by Yoshiyuki Sankai at Tsukuba University, can 
assist the wearer’s movement. Bioelectric sensors attached to the skin, which 
monitor signals transmitted from the brain, control the robot suit (Sankai, 2006). 
With this suit, care workers can easily lift care recipients because care recipients 
enhance their physical capabilities.   
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Collaborating with Tsukuba University and NEDO, Cyberdyne Inc39 released 
the robot suit in the market in 2010. According to Yomiuri Online40, as of the 
20th of August 2010, HAL has already been introduced by 37 hospitals and 
nursing homes in Japan. The article also refers to the half-paralysed elderly who 
can ascend stairs, wearing HAL.     
 
Image. Robot Suit HAL 
 
Photos up: HAL for the use of disabled 
Photo down left: Walking with HAL 
Photo down right: Care giving with HAL 
Source: NEDO (2010) 
 
Case 2: Therapeutic Robot PARO 
The therapeutic robot, PARO, developed by AIST, is designed to have positive 
psychological effects on the people attracted to it because it reacts to the people 
                                                   
39 A venture company founded by Yoshiyuki Sankai, who developed the robot suit. 
40 Online version of Yomiuri newspaper. 
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and/or develops its character as the people take care of it. According to AIST 
(2006) and Wada et al (2008), interacting with PARO improves brain function, as 
measured and analysed in the brain waves of elderly patients with cognitive 
disorders. Robot therapy, with PARO, therefore, may prevent cognition 
disorders.   
 
The use of PARO may also enhance quality of care. That is, the use of PARO 
makes it possible to implement a humanistic method of care giving. Takanori 
Shibata, Senior Research Scientist at AIST says, “Elderly people with dementia, 
especially if their condition is severe, may get agitated and violent, and be 
unable to settle down. Previously, such patients were sedated, and even now, 
that is sometimes the case in Europe and America. In Japan, such patients are 
sometimes physically restrained. If such patients have contact with PARO, 
however, they often settle down almost immediately, smile, and feel good. 
Although the use of PARO may not be 100% effective, it has no particular side 
effects” (Diginfonews, 2010a).     
 
In Japan, as of 2010, 1,300 PARO robots have already been released, and the 
sales have been extended to overseas. Care facilities in Denmark and other 
European countries have started to introduce PARO. PARO is expected to be 
sold in the United States in 2010, as PARO was certified as a medical product by 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Diginfonews, 2010a).   
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Image. Therapeutic Robot PARO 
 
Source: Wada et al (2008) 
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Table 9-13. Other Notable Robots 
Division Developer Name Remarks Release 
Transportation Human-Robot 
Interaction 
Centre, Saitama 
University 
Robot 
Wheelchair 
The wheelchair automatically tracks the 
care worker next to it. Recognising the 
position of the care worker’s shoulder, the 
chair always runs along the left to the care 
worker, so that the care worker and care 
recipient can easily communicate face to 
face while moving. In case the 
corridor/street is crowded, however, the 
chair automatically recognises the traffic 
and then comes behind the care worker to 
avoid possible congestion (Kuno 
Laboratory, 2010).   
 
Image: Diginfonews (2010b) 
Not yet 
MIMAMORI/ 
Communication 
Information and 
Robot 
Technology 
Research 
Initiative (IRT) 
41, University of 
Tokyo 
Mamoru Mamoru, one of a series of reminder 
robots developed by the University of 
Tokyo, is designed to help elderly people 
with dementia by reminding them of 
where they have put items or what they 
have done already. For example, Mamoru 
watches every move the owner makes and 
gives verbal warnings if necessary. When 
the owner brings a box of medicine to the 
table and takes a medicine, Mamoru 
immediately recognises these actions. 
Then, if the owner attempts to take the 
same medicine twice, Mamoru says 
something like “You took the medicine 
already. That was 10 minutes ago.” 
(University of Tokyo, 2010). 
 
Images: University of Tokyo (2008) 
Not yet 
 
 
                                                   
41 IRT has Toyota Motor Corporation, Fujitsu Laboratories, and Olympus as industrial 
partners. 
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Division Developer Name Remarks Release 
Self support Sugano 
Laboratory
, Waseda 
University
42 
Twenty-One Twenty-One, a human-symbiotic robot, is 
capable of assisting people’s daily activities. 
Communicating with the owner, for example, 
Twenty-One can help the owner to move from 
bed to wheelchair. In addition, it can bring the 
owner a tomato source from the refrigerator, 
as ordered. The ‘bio-mechanism design’ also 
makes it possible for the robot to conduct 
sensitive tasks such as picking up a slice of 
bread from a toaster and serving it to the 
owner (Sugano Laboratory, 2007) 
 
 
Image: Sugano Laboratory (2007) 
Not yet 
Care support and 
Transportation 
Japan 
Logic 
Machine, 
Inc. 
Yurina Yurina, a home care robot, is designed to 
transfer care recipients from bed to bathroom, 
toilet, and other rooms. With its touch screen, 
Yurina can be controlled by care workers, but 
it can also be operated by care recipients with 
voice recognition. While transferring, Yurina 
can even make conversation with care 
recipients. 
(Japan Logic Machine, 2010). 
 
 
Image: Japan Logic Machine (2010) 
Already 
introduced 
in 
hospitals 
and care 
facilities. 
 
                                                   
42 Waseda University also runs a Care Worker/Social Workers’ School. 
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Division Developer Name Remarks Release 
Care support Unicharm 
Humancare 
Corporation43 
Humany Humany is a urine aspiration robot, 
designed to ease the caregiver’s 
burden by reducing the number of 
diaper replacements. Connecting 
through a tube to a diaper, Humany 
sucks in urine immediately after the 
urine censer detects it. Humany thus 
always keeps the diaper dry (below 
0.5cc wet). As a result, the number of 
diaper replacements can be 
minimised from 5-7 times to 1 time a 
day. (Unicharm Humancare, 2010). 
 
Released 
May 2009. 
As Humany 
is certified 
as a 
designated 
care product 
by the 
government, 
90% of the 
price is 
covered by 
LTCI, so 
Yurina can 
be  
purchased at 
only 10,000 
yen (about 
80AUD). 
Note: LTCI means Japanese universal Long-Term Care Insurance. 
 
Not just research institutes or venture companies research the livelihood 
support robot. Major Japanese companies such as Toyota Motor, Honda Motor, 
Fuji Heavy Industries, Panasonic, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Toshiba, Fujitsu, 
NEC, Yasukawa Electric, and Hitachi have also developed livelihood support 
robots. Among them, Katsuaki Watanabe, President of Toyota Motor, has 
declared that robots will soon be Toyota’s core business and has decided to hire 
200 robot researchers/developers by 2010 (Diamond, 2008). Panasonic aims at 
100 billion yen (about 1.25 billion AUD) service robot sales in 2015 (Impress 
Watch, 2009). In addition, in 2010, another major technological company, Canon, 
announced its entry into the service robot business (Yomiuri News Paper, 2010).    
 
 
                                                   
43 Unicharm Humancare Corporation is a joint venture between Unicharm, Japan’s 
leading diaper maker and Hitachi, Japan’s leading electric product marker. 
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Generalisation 
The motivation of the Japanese government cannot directly apply to that of 
other governments. Japan produces about 70% of the world’s industrial robots 
(METI, 2009: p.174). It may be unique for Japan to have robots as its basic 
industry.   
 
However, the idea of synergizing care workers’ training to ensure quality of 
care and market research for future industries is applicable to other markets. As 
in the field of long-term care, all OECD member nations are facing rapidly 
increasing aging populations. All markets related to the elderly, not just the 
robot one, are very promising and it is worth conducting ‘market research’ on 
providing the best possible long-term care through care workers’ training.  
Although the impact may not be as significant as that in long-term care, the 
principle is also applicable to the fields of childcare and disabled care.  Most 
physical care support innovations of long-term care can directly apply to 
disabled care.  The care systems such as Mimamori may also be arranged for 
childcare - in order for carers to keep eyes on frail children- through 
well-trained care workers.  
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Chapter 10. 
Conclusion: Managing the Human Service Market  
      
 
This thesis responded to two unique features of human service: ambiguous 
policy goals and a considerable amount of front-line workers’ discretion. The 
research analysed how governments can address these two unique features to 
ensure the best quality of human service for their citizens, in a world where 
increasing need and financial constraints place the provision of care in the 
hands of a competitive market.  
 
Chapter 2 explained that one stream of researchers present evidence that 
market utilisation in the provision of human service is a necessary trend 
because governments today do not have the technical or financial capacity to 
provide human service directly. Yet another research stream argues that market 
utilisation causes long-standing service quality issues because market 
competition means that some providers will sacrifice quality for profit 
maximisation.   
 
By undertaking a survey of the history and the theoretical research into human 
service provision through a competitive market, Chapter 2 defined two research 
questions to guide the remaining sections of the thesis. The chapter first 
outlined the reasons that governments need to be responsible for human service 
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provisions. Tracking back to the origin of human services, the research showed 
transitions in government commitments to human service provision. The 
analysis then concluded that today’s democratic systems urge governments to 
ensure a certain standard of living for their people by being responsible for 
human service provisions. Furthermore, the chapter investigated how human 
service is provided through a competitive market and how governments have 
tried to ensure care quality under competitive market conditions; the vehicle of 
analysis was the expanding and demanding example of long-term care.  
 
To date, the literature primarily consists of two major points: 1) care quality 
models to direct the market competition to enhance the quality of care and 2) 
performance measurement to evaluate and regulate the providers’ quality of 
care.  
 
From that beginning, the present research argued the first point in Part I and 
the second point in Part II. 
1. How should governments design the human service market in order 
to keep the capacity to ensure quality of service? 
2. How should governments set the performance measurement? 
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Part I. Designing the Human Service Market  
to Ensure the Quality of Care Service 
 
Part I of this thesis presented and then tested an alternative care (i.e., service) 
quality model, which is called Ideal CQM (see page 57). Ideal CQM seeks to 
overcome deficiencies in the existing care quality model (i.e., Existing CQM), 
which allow the market to accommodate poor quality care. To this end, Ideal 
CQM presents a theoretical market design in which quality of care is the sole 
basis for market competition. Therefore, by implementing Ideal CQM, 
governments can direct the market competition to enhance the quality of care 
and poor quality service is automatically eliminated from the market. 
 
Ideal CQM requires four preconditions (Table 10-1): a) a universal long-term 
care system; b) standardized content of care according to care recipients’ 
conditions; c) no price competition; and d) publicized care quality information. 
 
Table 10-1. Four Conditions to Implement the Ideal CQM 
a) a universal long-term care system 
b) standardized content of care according to care recipients’ conditions 
c) no price competition 
d) publicized care quality information 
 
The introduction of Ideal CQM would create a process scenario. The image 
would look like this: First, as the service provision is universal, all users are 
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eligible to receive the service by applying for a care needs evaluation. Second, 
since care content is standardised according to care recipients’ conditions, 
users’ care needs are assessed by governments (or official bodies) and decisions 
regarding eligibility and levels of service are made based on individual 
conditions and care needs. Third, with the classification of care needs complete, 
users choose a provider. Since there is no price competition in the market, users 
choose a provider solely based on the service quality. However, due to the 
information asymmetry between users and providers in the human service 
market, governments (or official bodies) must publish the providers’ care 
quality information. 
 
Figure 10-1. Image of Ideal CQM 
Universal 
Insurance Holders
Care Needs 
Assessment,  
Checking the 
applicant 
physical/mental 
condition
Official Body
Apply
Care Needs 
Classification 
Providers 
Choice of a provider
Service use
Official Body
Care Quality 
Evaluation
Access to providers’
Care Quality 
Information
Users
How? (answered in PartⅡ）
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Finding 1: Ideal CQM is Applicable 
 
Findings 
This thesis proved that Ideal CQM is applicable. Surveying the long-term care 
markets in OECD nations, the research found that the Japanese Long-term Care 
Insurance market meets all four preconditions. Together with Japan, Austria, 
Germany, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and S. Korea meet the 
condition of universal care. Furthermore, Germany, Luxemburg, and S. Korea 
also clear the standardized content of care according to care recipients’ 
conditions. However, Japan is the only country that meets the third condition: 
no price competition. 
 
Implication 
The confirmation of Ideal CQM’s applicability may make a positive impact on 
the care quality model research in the field of health economics. For a long time, 
human service’s care quality models in the field have been predominantly 
developed by experiences and research in the United States. Almost all 
researched care quality models are based on the market structure (i.e., 
means-tested system and Medicaid public program). Ideal CQM is the first 
attempt at building a care quality model based on the universal system and the 
experiences of Japan, the nation with the highest long-term care demands.  
 
For Further Research 
The current research identified two future research questions concerning this 
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model. The first is about its applicability to other countries. As mentioned, some 
countries miss only two preconditions of Ideal CQM (i.e., no price competition 
and publicized providers’ care quality information). Beside the publication of 
care quality information, for example, Germany missed the condition of no 
price competition, only because the care recipients can choose to receive 
cash-benefits, not in-kind care service (Naegele, 2009). That is, in the German 
long-term care market, the care recipients can even compare the care providers 
as consumer items. In this environment, certainly Ideal CQM does not properly 
direct the market competition to enhance the quality of care. However, how 
such a deficit in the preconditions influences the workability of the model and 
how Ideal CQM can be modified to overcome environments with deficits in 
only some conditions of the model are topics worthy of investigation. The 
second future question is about the applicability to other fields of human 
service. Since Ideal CQM is designed to accommodate the ample discretion of 
human service providers, the model theoretically fits all areas of human service. 
Nonetheless, each human service is empirically different. Analysing other areas, 
such as childcare and homeless people’s care, research can further develop the 
applicability of Ideal CQM.   
 
 
Finding 2: Ideal CQM is Workable 
 
Finding 
The research endorsed that Ideal CQM is workable. An Ideal CQM’s 
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assumption that users choose a provider based on care quality, conflicts with 
information asymmetry models in the care market. However, the research 
proved that none of these conflicted models are fully supported, analysing the 
case of Group Home providers in the Japanese long-term care insurance market. 
Moreover, the research found that the more competitive the market becomes, 
the better the quality of service that is provided, when governments (or other 
public bodies) publicize the providers’ care quality information.   
 
Implication 
The findings added empirical implications to the literature of care-related 
market’s information asymmetry models: a) Contract Failure model, b) Medical 
Arms Race (MAR) model, and c) Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model. First, 
although the Contract Failure model claimed that users perceive non-profit 
providers as a sign of good service quality, this thesis proved that there is no 
significant difference between non-profits and for-profits in overall service 
quality when users have access to providers’ care quality information. In 
addition, the research further explained that the care service of non-profits 
tends to be better in care implementation, whereas for-profits tend to be better 
at interacting with care recipients’ families. However, overall service quality 
has no significant differences. This suggests that the service quality of 
non-profits and for-profits may look different, depending on a person’s point of 
view. Second, despite the concern of the MAR model, this thesis found that 
Ideal CQM could direct the market competition to enhance the providers’ 
service quality. In fact, the service quality of the providers in competitive 
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areas44 was significantly better than that of the providers in non-competitive 
(usually rural) areas, though the service quality of both areas’ providers 
improves year by year. Third, Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) argued that providers 
newly entering the market lower the market’s service quality, but this research 
found that the effect of Suzuki and Satake’s (2001) model is very limited. 
Certainly, this research partly endorsed the model in that the service quality of 
new entries is significantly worse than that of old entries in the initial entry year. 
However, the research also found that the improvement of the new entries’ 
service quality was much greater than that of old entries’ service quality in the 
following year. This finding, then, suggests that the bad performance of the 
new entries in the initial year is not necessarily because of the market’s 
information asymmetry between users and providers, but because of the lack of 
care providing experience. As the new entries in the initial year are inferior to 
the old entries especially on managerial indicators (see page 104 for details), the 
research suggests that providers’ management rather than care implementation 
requires experience.  
 
For Further Research 
Further studies of the findings should include application of the model to other 
human service markets. The current findings were based on the analysis of the 
Japanese Group Home market, where the providers’ care quality is the most 
comprehensively evaluated and published among the Japanese long-term care 
markets, due to the high ratio of care recipients with dementia in the market. 
                                                   
44 See Chapter 5 for detailed definition. 
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The next step is, therefore, to investigate how the other markets, with a less 
strict evaluation, fulfil the information gap between users and providers in 
terms of providers’ care quality.  
 
 
Finding 3: Ideal CQM is Financially Sustainable 
 
Finding 
The research suggested that Ideal CQM is financially sustainable. Analysing the 
long-term care expenses of OECD nations, the research discovered that 
universal systems are not necessarily more costly than means-tested systems. 
Investigating merit good theory and scale of economics, the research uncovered 
that the cost efficiency of universal systems was rooted in the small income gap 
of the markets. This indicates that a small income gap is a precondition to the 
introduction of a universal system.   
 
Implication 
This finding serves as a basis for discussing whether governments should 
provide human service to all or to the economically vulnerable only. Since 
Esping-Andersen (1980) categorized nations according to the degree of human 
service (and social welfare) coverage (see page 24 for the details), researchers 
have tended to seek the differences in terms of the nations’ philosophy or 
politics. For example, Scandinavian nations are “Social Democratic”, because 
the people generally trust their governments, whereas the welfare policy of the 
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United States is “Liberal”, because of the strong individualism aspect of the 
United States culture45. Although one may not disagree with these arguments, 
the findings of this thesis presented evidence of another cause for the different 
degrees of human service coverage: governments choose the degree of coverage 
based on the provision’s efficiency in a market with a small income gap, the 
service can easily be made uniform and mass-produced (i.e., scale of economics), 
whereas in a market with a large income gap, it is difficult to make the service 
uniform, and thus, the government must focus more on a target group (i.e., 
means-tested system is more suitable46). 
 
For Further Research 
A limitation of the finding is its assumption that the service is socially 
demanded. As illustrated in Chapter 2, long-term care in OECD nations is 
highly demanded and the trend is expected to continue for the next decades. 
Therefore, the finding of the correlation between the income gap and the degree 
of human service coverage (means-tested or universal) is valid in this field of 
human service. However, the finding may not be applicable to some other fields 
of human service. For example, homeless support in OECD nations is far less in 
demand than long-term care. Regardless of the income gap, the governments 
are unlikely to apply universal systems for the provision of homeless support. 
In order to expand the generalisability of the finding, therefore, future research 
                                                   
45 In fact, Esping-Andersen (1980) himself analyses the differences in terms of history 
and/or political attitude. 
46 As an aside, this may even be extended to explain the healthcare issue: why the 
United States government has been struggling to introduce a universal healthcare 
system. 
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needs to investigate further at what levels of demand governments are required 
to decide between universal or means-tested systems for service provision.  
 
 
Supplemental Argument to Ideal CQM  
Finding 4: the Use of Leverage Model 
 
Finding 
As Ideal CQM is not applicable to a means-tested market, the research 
presented a quality improvement tool, which is applicable to that type of 
market. The tool, named ‘Leverage Model,’ finds the care quality indicator that 
has the most positive influence on other indicators. Initiating providers to focus 
their resources on improving that indicator, governments can efficiently 
enhance the quality of service, even in means-tested systems. 
 
Implication 
This model not only helps means-tested markets to enhance the service quality, 
but also contributes to revealing the mechanism of care quality improvement. 
Demonstrating this model using the service quality data of Group Home 
providers in Japan, the model finds how indicators of care workers’ behaviour 
correlate with each other. That is, the investigation allows the examination of 
‘best practices’ to improve the service quality. 
 
For Further Research 
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Leverage Model needs to improve the precision of the best practices. Although 
the model has not yet been investigated in many markets due to the availability 
of care quality information, there are many ways to develop its accuracy. For 
example, the best practice for non-profit providers might be slightly different 
from those of for-profit providers. Therefore, this model may improve the 
accuracy of best practices, including providers’ attributes such as ownership, 
location, and care recipients’ capabilities.  
 
 
Summary of Part I 
 
This thesis proved that Ideal CQM is applicable, workable, and sustainable. 
That is, Ideal CQM sustainably directs the market competition to enhance the 
quality of service along with the care quality indicators approved by 
governments. The remaining question was how to measure the providers’ care 
quality, as seen in Figure. This question was answered in Part II. 
 
 
Part II.  Process-based Performance Measurement Model:  
Reflecting Users’ Needs in Human Service 
 
As Part I proved, governments could direct the market competition to enhance 
the market’s care quality by implementing Ideal CQM. Part II investigated the 
remaining question: How does one measure quality of care? The research began 
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by comparing current outcome-based performance measurement and the 
alternative process-based performance measurement. The comparison found 
weaknesses in both measurements: process-based performance measurement 
does not fit the current market utilising public administration theory and 
outcome-based performance measurement does not fit the ambiguous policy 
goals of human service. However, the weaknesses of process-based 
performance measurement are compensable, whereas the weaknesses of 
outcome-based performance measurement are crucial in terms of ensuring the 
quality of human service. Favouring the alternative process-based performance 
measurement, this thesis modified the market utilising public administration 
theory for the use of process-based performance measurement.  
 
This thesis then presented and tested the process-based performance 
measurement with modified market-utilising public administration theory (i.e., 
process-based performance measurement model). Process-based performance 
measurement model seeks to reflect users’ needs in the care service by 
promoting the interaction between governments and providers who know the 
best about users’ needs. To this end, process-based performance measurement 
model requires the input of providers’ behaviour and the output of providers’ 
training. 
 
The required modification of the current market-utilising public administration 
theory can be described, using ‘logic of governance’ presented by Lynn et al 
(2000). Adding the element of care workers’ behaviour to the current theory 
 231 
achieved the necessary modification (Table 10-2). 
 
Table 10-2. Modifying Public Administration Theory, Using a ‘Logic of Governance’ 
 Performance Measurement Public Administration Theory 
Current Theory Outcome-based O = f(E, C, T, S, M) 
Modified Theory Process-based O = f(E, C, B, T, S, M) 
Note: O = policy outputs/outcomes; E = environmental factors; C = client characteristics; B = care 
workers’ behaviour; T = treatment (i.e., performance measurement); S = structure; M = management. 
See chapter 7 for details. 
 
The image of process-based performance measurement model can be described 
as follows: The policy “Outcomes” depend on the governance in that the 
governments (or public bodies) 1) grasp the public needs by observing “Social 
Environment”, 2) set up the “Treatment (performance measurement)” based on 
“Client Characteristics” and “Care Workers’ Behaviour”, 3) build the 
“Structure” of the market outsourcing of human service provision to 
non-government sectors with trained care workers, and 4) finally, “Manage” 
the human service market (Figure 10-2). 
 
Figure 10-2. Structure of Process-based Performance Measurement Model 
Governments
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Finding 5: Process-based Performance Measurement Model  
Reflects Users’ Needs in Human Service 
 
This thesis found that process-based performance measurement model reflected 
users’ needs in care service. Although this is very important, the existing 
outcome-based performance measurement has missed the chance to recognise 
users’ needs. Focusing on the outcomes, in outcome-based performance 
measurement, governments do not interact with providers (care workers), who 
know the best about users’ needs. Unlike many other public services, service 
recipients of human service often cannot deliver their needs properly (e.g., 
elderly with dementia). Connecting between governments and providers, 
however, the process-based performance measurement model allows 
governments to grasp the users’ needs and to ensure their reflection in service 
by measuring and training the behaviour of care workers.  
 
Implication 
This finding reinforces the concept of Lipsky’s (1980) “street-level bureaucracy” 
in the human service market. In the era of the traditional public bureaucracy 
theory scheme, Lipsky (1980) claimed the importance of human service’s 
front-line workers, named “street-level bureaucrats” because they inevitably 
had a considerable amount of discretion on providing the service. As the 
provision of human service has been outsourced to non-government sectors, 
however, governments have gradually lost the interaction with the front-line 
workers. As Lynn et al’s (2000) ‘logic of governance’ shows, such interaction 
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has become unnecessary in their outsoucer-outsoucee relationship. Nonetheless, 
the human service’s feature of front-line workers’ discretion is unchanged. 
Missing the interaction with front-line workers who know the best about users’ 
needs, governments have faced a long-standing care quality issue in the human 
service market. This thesis revealed the mechanism of reflecting users’ needs in 
the service (and/or performance measurement) and suggested the use of the 
process-based performance measurement model. 
 
For Further Research 
For further research of this model, it was necessary to investigate its 
applicability and financial sustainability. Although the model theoretically 
reflects users’ needs in the measurement, questions remained. a) How can 
governments interact with care workers? b) How should governments train 
care workers? c) How can governments ensure the financial sustainability of 
care workers’ training, which tends to be costly as the number of care workers 
increases? These questions were answered in the following findings. 
 
 
Finding 6: The Interaction with Care Workers Can be Achieved by Giving 
Care Workers Career Path Advantages to Policy-making Positions in the 
Process of Performance Measurement 
 
Finding 
Analysing primarily the case of Japan, this thesis found that the interaction with 
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care workers could be achieved by giving them career paths advantages to be 
involved in the process of performance measurement. In Japan, to participate in 
the process of setting the performance indicators, implementing the 
measurement, and - if the market applies Ideal CQM - classifying the care 
recipients’ care needs, the experience of being a care worker is either necessary 
or very advantageous. With this system, the setting and implementation of 
process-based performance measurement always reflects the voice of front-line 
workers.  
 
This system benefits not only governments, but also care workers. Although the 
salaries of care workers may not be satisfactory, the career paths to be able to 
make decisions in the policymaking process motivate them and attract capable 
human resources. As the survey of OECD indicated (see Table), recruiting a 
competent work force is commonly a major concern of governments. The 
system benefits both governments and providers. 
 
Implication 
This finding has implications for the discussion of how to listen to the voice of 
the socially vulnerable. In most cases, human service users are socially 
vulnerable and often incapable of exercising the consumer’s right of complaint. 
As Lipsky (1980) claimed, their voices are unlikely understood by ‘top-floor 
executives’ of policy makers. The finding presents the model for governments 
to listen to the voice of the socially vulnerable through front-line (street-level) 
workers.   
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For Further Research 
The remaining question of this finding was how governments could trust these 
front-line workers. As they may take on very important roles of human service 
provision, governments need to ensure the quality of care workers. Certainly as 
mentioned above, the career paths advantages for care workers attracts capable 
human resources. However, that does not assure their qualification for 
delivering the users’ voice, and eventually, reflecting it in policy. How to train 
care workers was, then, the next issue. 
 
 
Finding 7: Care Workers Training For Uncovering Hidden Needs 
 
Finding 
Identifying two phases of care workers’ training, this thesis found that care 
workers’ training needs to cover communication skills to uncover hidden users’ 
needs. Phase 1 training is to assure appropriate care implementation. Focusing 
on physical skills, governments train to ensure the safety of care 
implementation, such as care recipients’ physical transfer. This training also 
protects care workers from injuries including back-pain. The purpose of Phase 2 
training extends to strategies and skills to discover care recipients’ hidden care 
needs. Valuing care workers’ communication skills, governments train care 
workers to be able to respond not just to visible care needs, but to invisible 
needs as well. This training helps care workers to be able to deliver care 
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recipients’ hidden needs to governments. In addition, understanding care 
recipients through the communication training protects care workers from 
becoming emotionally drained47. The purpose of process-based performance 
measurement model is not only to ensure the implementation of care service, 
but also to pick up hidden care needs. Therefore, the required training for the 
model is Phase 2 training. 
 
Implication 
This thesis identified the training required for the process-based performance 
measurement model. As the model expects care workers to respond to visible 
and  hidden service needs, Phase 2 training is necessary. This finding is among 
the first to identify required training content for utilising the concept of 
“street-level” representation in human service provision. 
 
For Further Research 
The remaining question was the financial sustainability of Phase 2 training. The 
research showed that Phase 2 training required 2-24 times more training hours 
than Phase 1 training. The needs of human service, particularly long-term care, 
are expected to increase. The cost of the training could be a serious concern in 
the provision of service.  
 
 
Finding 8: By Aiming at the Best Possible Human Service, Governments Can 
                                                   
47 As discussed in Chapter 8, care workers inevitably face some very dramatic stages of 
care recipients’ emotions. 
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Ensure the Sustainability of the Training 
 
Finding 
This thesis found that governments could ensure the suitability of care workers’ 
training by aiming at the best possible human service. Analysing the case of 
Japan, the research discovered that hidden care needs uncovered by trained 
care workers boosted the national economy. That is, the care workers’ efforts to 
provide the best possible service elicited the potential service needs and the 
industries responded to these needs. Supporting such collaborations, for 
example, Japanese governments predict the livelihood that the support robot 
industry will grow up to about 2 trillion yen (25 billion AUD) scale by 2035 
(METI, 2010).  
 
Implication 
The impact of this finding projects on the discussion of increasing human 
service needs. For some time, increasing human service needs have been 
perceived rather negatively, because they create a lot of public expense. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, one of the key factors behind the shift in public 
administration theory to market utilisation was to ease this financial ‘burden.’ 
Certainly, the finding from the Japanese case does not decrease the expense, but 
increases it. Highlighting the positive social effects of increasing human service 
needs, however, the experiences of Japan provide a mechanism to make the 
service provision sustainable. That is, the more training of care workers, the 
more hidden needs uncovered. Then, the elicited needs boost the economy. 
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Importantly, the collaboration among governments, providers, and industries 
benefit them all, bringing financial sustainability for governments48; better care 
for providers49; and new business for industry. Certainly, connecting elicited 
long-term care needs and the robot industry might be rather unique to Japan. 
However, the principle of market economy that elicited needs to stimulate 
industrial activities is applicable to every market.  
 
For Further Research 
For further research of this finding, a multidisciplinary research may be 
required. To strike a balance between market contestability and service quality 
assurance by this finding, research needs to include several views such as 
economics (business), engineering, medicine (nursing), and public policy. This 
challenge is multidisciplinary.  
 
 
Additional Contribution: Significance of Introducing Japanese Case 
 
An additional contribution of this thesis is to introduce the case of Japanese 
human service. The process-based performance measurement model takes a 
‘bottom-up’ approach in that the model values the role of front-line workers. 
This approach has been actively researched in the field of business as a 
                                                   
48 The size of human service expense is usually compared by the expense-to-GDP ratio 
(see Table 2-2, for example). Although the expense is increased, the related GDP growth 
offset the increase. 
49 This of course benefits users as well, because the supply is originally the response to 
their needs. 
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‘Japanese-style management,’ especially after Vogel (1979) conceptualised it. 
Unlike the field of business, however, the Japanese-style management in the 
field of human service has been greatly overlooked. Even when Lipsky (1980) 
claimed the importance of front-line workers (“street-level bureaucrats” in his 
words) in human service, little study mentioned the case of Japan. Such 
bottom-up approaches in human service provision gradually lost attention50, in 
fact, as market-utilisation public administration became popular in the 
provision of human service. Nonetheless, the importance of such a bottom-up 
approach is unchanged, because the provision of human service still needs a 
considerable amount of front-line workers’ discretion. The Japanese case is, 
therefore, important, not only because Japan has faced the most radical increase 
of long-term care needs, but also because the Japanese style management has 
many implications for the provision of human service. An additional 
contribution of this thesis was to address the absence of the Japanese case in the 
research of human service provision. 
 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis proved that governments could reflect users’ needs in the human 
service market by introducing the process-based performance measurement 
model. Connecting the measurement model to Ideal CQM presented in Part I, 
                                                   
50 This does not mean that Lipsky’s (1980) work has lost attention. His idea has still 
been actively quoted in various fields in public administration, but not in the role of 
front-line workers in the field of human service provision. 
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the long-standing quality issue in the human service market is solved. 
 
The models in this thesis respond to two unique features of human service: 
ambiguous policy goals and a considerable amount of front-line workers’ 
discretion. Therefore, the models are applicable to other fields of human service 
(i.e., childcare, homeless support). However, the empirical value of these 
potential models needs further research, because the context of these areas is 
different from that of long-term care. 
 
 
Implications to Market Utilising Public Administration Theory 
 
The nature of human service is different from that of other public services. As 
repeatedly mentioned in this thesis, a considerable amount of service providers’ 
(i.e., care workers’) discretion and the ambiguous policy goals are distinctive 
characteristics of human service. Despite this fact, the existing market-utilising, 
public administration theory treats human service the same as other public 
services in terms of provision through a competitive market. Throughout the 
thesis, this research suggested that such treatment has actually caused the 
long-standing care quality issue. This research studied an alternative theory for 
human service provision through a competitive market and, in turn, the impact 
on the existing public administration theory. The findings of this research can 
be summarised in a simple claim that recurs throughout this thesis: 
     As the nature of human service is different from that of other public services, the 
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existing public administration theory used in the market provision of other public 
services is not directly applicable to that of human service. 
 
This section examines the implications of these research findings for the current 
literature on public administration theory and identifies some avenues for 
future research. In doing so, this section shows that the research undertaken in 
this thesis contributes to current knowledge about public administration theory 
and about public service provision in a competitive market.  
 
 
Reconciling Service Quality Assurance to  
Human Service Provided through the Market 
 
In reviewing existing studies of public administration theory, Chapter 2 
identified that public service provision through the market is not fully 
supported due to concerns about service quality assurance. Certainly, some 
public services, including telecommunication, delivery, and public 
transportation, are successfully provided through the market in that they do not 
usually sacrifice service quality over the competition. These successes are, 
however, only because the quality of these services is heavily standardised and, 
in turn, the purchasing model works as Y = xp (i.e., competing services of the 
same quality for better efficiency). In the fields of human service, on the other 
hand, the quality is not uniform, because each service needs to be customised 
for a user. As a result, the purchasing model becomes Y = x (p, q), which 
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accommodates ‘a poor quality but inexpensive good’ as well as ‘a good quality 
but expensive good’ in the market. In addition, it is difficult to measure the 
quality of service due to ambiguous policy goals. The information asymmetry 
models (i.e., Contract Failure Model, MAR Model, and Suzuki and Satake’s 
Model) also support the difficulty of the measurement. 
 
Nonetheless, this thesis proved that such service quality issues could be solved. 
Implementing Ideal CQM, governments can direct the competition to enhance 
the service quality. Care performance can be measured by the process-based 
performance measurement model. The information gap between users and 
providers can be bridged by making the care quality information (i.e., the 
outcome of the performance measurement) available to the public. Under these 
conditions, these findings support the use of a competitive market in the 
provision of public care services.   
 
In sum, this thesis supports the market use of human service provision, but the 
research suggests that a public administration theory is not indelibly written. 
As each type of public service has distinguishing features, public 
administration theory needs, continuously, to adjust to the changing needs in 
each type of service. 
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